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INTRODUCTION 
Conflict abroad almost always enhances executive power at home. 
This expectation has held true at least since the constitutions of 
antiquity.1 It holds no less true for modern constitutions, including the 
Constitution of the United States. 2 Constitutional arguments for 
executive power likewise escalate with increased perceptions of 
foreign threat. It is therefore hardly surprising that broad assertions of 
presidential power have become commonplace after the events of 
September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on international terrorism. 
One perennial weapon in the executive arsenal is the so-called 
"Vesting Clause" of Article II of the Constitution. This clause, which 
provides that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America,"3 stands in apparent contrast with the 
Article I Vesting Clause, which provides that "All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . . "4 
This textual difference, usually bolstered with historical materials, has 
long undergirded the claim that the Article II Vesting Clause 
implicitly grants the President a broad array of residual powers not 
specified in the remainder of Article II. We will call this claim the 
"Vesting Clause Thesis. "  
The Vesting Clause Thesis was famously advanced by  Alexander 
Hamilton in his first Pacificus essay defending President Washington's 
1793 Neutrality Proclamation.5 The Thesis has had a checkered career 
1. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 346 (T. A. Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 1981) ("The tyrant 
is also very ready to make war; for this keeps his subjects occupied and in continued need of 
a leader."); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, in 2 CAMBRIDGE LIBRARY OF LAW CLASSICS 27, 291 
(Henry Davis trans. 1901) (describing the incentives tyrants have to make war abroad to 
maintain power at home). 
2. A number of constitutional Founders observed that leaders of other countries had 
often initiated war for personal reasons. See, e.g. , THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 46 (John Jay) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[A]bsolute monarchs will often make war when their nations 
are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for 
military glory . . . .  "); JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS No. 4 (Sept. 14, 1793), 
reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 108 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985) 
[hereinafter LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS] ("War is in fact the true nurse of executive 
aggrandizement."). See generally William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the 
Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 ( 1997). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 .  
4.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl .  1 (emphasis added). 
5. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS No. 1 (June 29, 1793), 
reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. 
Cooke eds., 1969) [hereinafter LETTERS OF PACIFICUS]; see also infra Part IV.E. 
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in constitutional law and interpretation ever since. One ostensible high 
point came in Myers v. United States,6 in which a majority of the 
Supreme Court relied on the Vesting Clause Thesis in holding that the 
President had an exclusive power of removing executive officers.7 
Even in Myers, however, the Court's reliance on the Vesting Clause 
Thesis was minimal, and the Court's analysis and holding have since 
been severely qualified.8 An offsetting low point famously occurred in 
the steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,9 in 
which the Court rejected President Truman's broad claim of executive 
power, a claim that was based in part on the Article II Vesting 
Clause.10 Although the majority in Youngstown did not specifically 
address the Vesting Clause Thesis, Justice Jackson addressed it in his 
influential concurrence and repudiated it.1 1 
6. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
7. See id. at 1 18. 
8. The Vesting Clause Thesis takes up only one paragraph of the Court's long opinion. 
Much of the opinion is focused instead on a 1789 debate in the House of Representatives 
over the President's removal power. See id. at 1 1 1-18, 1 19-39, 1 74-75. As we discuss below, 
those who supported a presidential removal power in that debate typically relied on the 
Appointments Clause (which gives the President the power to appoint various officials with 
the advice and consent of the Senate) or the Take Care Clause (which states that the 
President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed") rather than the Vesting 
Clause. See infra Part IV.C. Three Justices - Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis -
dissented in Myers. Justice McReynolds's dissent argues, among other things, that the 
Vesting Clause Thesis is unsupported by Founding history. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 193, 228-
37 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). In a subsequent decision, Humphrey's Executor v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court upheld a statute restricting the power of the President 
to remove a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. The Court in Humphrey's 
Executor noted that the only point actually decided in Myers was that "the President had 
power to remove a postmaster of the first class, without the advice and consent of the Senate 
as required by act of Congress." Id. at 626. The Court also stated that it was disapproving of 
any statements in Myers that were "out of harmony with the views here set forth." Id. The 
decision in Myers was further qualified in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), in which 
the Court held that Congress could impose a "good cause" limitation on the President's 
power to remove an independent counsel. See id. at 686-87. In his lone dissent, Justice Scalia 
invoked the Vesting Clause Thesis. See id. at 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In response, the 
majority stated in a footnote that Justice Scalia's Vesting Clause argument for an absolute 
power of removal "depends upon an extrapolation from general constitutional language 
which we think is more than the text will bear." Id. at 690 n.29. 
9. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
10. See id. at 587-88. For a recent decision rejecting a broad claim of executive power, 
albeit one not expressly premised on the Vesting Clause Thesis, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 
S. Ct. 2633 (2004 ). 
11. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 632 
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("Article II which vests the 'executive Power' in the President 
defines that power with particularity."). The dissenters in Youngstown invoked the Article II 
Vesting Clause in passing, see id. at 681-82 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting), but ultimately rested 
their argument on a "practical construction" of the Take Care Clause. See id. at 702. Perhaps 
surprisingly, presidents have not always embraced the Vesting Clause Thesis. Compare 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1914) (embracing a version of the 
Thesis, which he called the "stewardship" theory of executive power), with WILLIAM 
HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139-40, 144-45 (H. Jefferson 
Powell ed., 2002) (1916) (rejecting the stewardship theory and arguing that "the President 
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In recent years, the Vesting Clause Thesis has gained newfound 
popularity. White House officials were apparently prepared to deploy 
the argument in support of the Bush Administration's authority to use 
military force against Iraq had Congress not expressly granted such 
authority. 12 The Administration's reliance on the Vesting Clause 
Thesis is also evident in controversial memoranda concerning 
treatment of detainees that were prepared by the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Defense after September 11 .13 In terms 
of academic support, professors Saikrishna Prakash and Michael 
Ramsey recently defended the Vesting Clause Thesis at length in an 
important article in the Yale Law Journal.14 Professor John Yoo has 
invoked the Thesis in a number of recent articles as support for a 
variety of alleged presidential foreign affairs powers.15 The Thesis also 
has received recent support from Professor Phillip Trimble, 16 and the 
historical account that ostensibly supports it parallels an interpretation 
can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of 
power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its 
exercise"). 
12. See Mike Allen & Juliet Eilperin, Bush Aides Say White House Needs No Hill Vote; 
Some See Such Support as Politically Helpful, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2002, at AL Congress 
subsequently passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to use force against Iraq. 
See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res. 
114, 107th Cong., 1 16 Stat. 1498. 
13. See Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and 
Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, 
Department of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002) at 14-15 ("Article II makes clear that the President is vested with all 
of the federal executive power. . . .  While Article II, § 1 of the Constitution grants the 
President an undefined executive power, Article I, § 1 of the Constitution limits Congress to 
'[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted' in the rest of Article I."), http://msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
5025040/site/newsweek/; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 
of the Department of Defense (Jan. 22, 2002), at 1 1  (same), http://washingtonpost.com/wp­
srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant 
Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct 
for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), at 37 ("[T]he structure of 
the Constitution demonstrates that any power traditionally understood as pertaining to the 
executive - which includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation - unless 
expressly assigned in the Constitution to Congress, is vested in the President. Article II, 
Section 1 makes this clear by stating that the 'executive Power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America.' That sweeping grant vests in the President an 
unenumerated 'executive power' and contrasts with the specific enumeration of powers -
those 'herein' - granted to Congress in Article I."), http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/ 
bybee80102mem.pdf; Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War 
on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations 
(April 4, 2003), at 23 (same), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/ 
040403dod.pdf. 
14. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111  YALE L.J. 231 (2001). 
15. See infra notes 21-22. 
16. See PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW 10-46 (2002). 
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advanced in a thoughtful recent book by Professor H. Jefferson 
Powell.17 
The principal attraction of the Vesting Clause Thesis is that it 
provides a straightforward solution to what appears to be a paradox of 
American constitutionalism: the specific grants of power in Article II 
are few and limited, especially when compared with Congress's exten­
sive list of powers in Article I, and yet the President has long been a 
significant - some argue, dominant - institutional actor in American 
government. 18 The President has been particularly dominant with 
respect to foreign affairs, and indeed is sometimes referred to as the 
"sole organ" for the United States in its international relations.19 The 
Vesting Clause Thesis reconciles the text of the Constitution with the 
breadth of presidential power by stipulating that the Article II Vesting 
Clause grants the President all powers that are in their nature 
"executive," subject only to the specific exceptions and qualifications 
set forth in the rest of the Constitution. 
In addition to the constitutional text, advocates of the Vesting 
Clause Thesis rely heavily on history. Their historical claim is that 
constitutional theorists in Britain and Europe had worked out a 
common, comprehensive, and detailed conception of the natural 
division of governmental power well before American independence, 
17.  See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002). In arguing that the 
Constitution implicitly vests the President with "authority for the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy," id. at 7, Professor Powell relies primarily on the 
functional goals of the Founders rather than on the Vesting Clause. See id. at 93-94. For 
additional academic reliance on the Vesting Clause Thesis, see, for example, GARY LAWSON 
& GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY ch. 1 (2004); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to 
War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 237-38 (2002). 
18. See, e.g. , EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984 
(5th rev. ed. 1984) (chronicling the shift in power toward the Executive Branch since the 
Founding); FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY (1994) (same); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 
(1973) (same). 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(referring to the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations"). The genesis of the 
"sole organ" language is a speech made by John Marshall in 1800 while he was a member of 
the House of Representatives. President Adams had ordered the extradition to Great 
Britain of Thomas Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, who was accused of murder while aboard a 
British ship. Although Adams acted pursuant to a treaty with Great Britain, he was criticized 
on the ground that the extradition request from Great Britain should have been processed 
by judicial action, not executive action. It was in this context that Marshall, defending 
Adams, proclaimed: "The president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, 
and its sole representative with foreign nations." John Marshall, Address Before the House 
of Representatives (Mar. 7, 1800), in 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 613 (Washington, Gales and 
Seaton 1851). Marshall went on to argue that the President "is charged to execute the laws," 
that a treaty "is declared to be a law," and that the President therefore has the power to 
fulfill U.S. responsibilities under an extradition treaty. 10 id. at 613-14. Marshall therefore 
was not making any claim about unspecified substantive powers. 
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and that the Constitution of the United States - with discrete textual 
exceptions embodied this reigning separation of powers 
understanding. When the Founders referred in the Article II Vesting 
Clause to the "executive Power," the argument runs, they referred to 
an understood bundle of powers and therefore had no need to 
enumerate specific executive powers in the remainder of Article II. 
Rather, such an enumeration became necessary only for those few 
instances in which the Founders were deviating from the prevailing 
understanding - for example, when they divided an executive power 
between the President and the Senate. Proponents of this account line 
up purported support from every relevant development leading to the 
Constitution's ratification: seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
political theory, the revolutionary and "critical" periods under the 
Articles of Confederation, the Federal Convention, and the state 
ratification debates. The most powerful evidence, however, allegedly 
comes from the statements and practices of government officials 
during the Washington Administration, which, it is claimed, confirm 
the consensus underlying Article II. 
Armed thus with text and history, scholars have relied on the 
Vesting Clause Thesis to cash out a number of specific claims 
concerning presidential power. Some argue, for example, that the 
President has the power to terminate treaties because that power is 
executive in nature and is not expressly delegated to Congress or the 
Senate.20 Others assert that the President has broad unenumerated 
war powers in situations not involving congressional declarations of 
war, since the war power, too, is in its nature executive.21 And still 
others have invoked the Vesting Clause Thesis in support of a power 
of the President to conclude certain international agreements on his 
own authority, notwithstanding the requirement in Article II of the 
Constitution that the President obtain the advice and consent of two­
thirds of the Senate in order to make treaties.22 The potential breadth 
20. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 324-27. 
21 .  See, e.g. , ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: 
RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW JN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 53-55 (1991); Eugene V. Rostow, 
"Once More unto the Breach": The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 
14-15 (1986); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1676-78 
(2002). 
22. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 264; Michael D. Ramsey, Executive 
Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 207-16 (1998). Through a 
complex argument that involves characterizing treatymaking as executive in nature and 
treaty implementation as legislative in nature, Professor Yoo has invoked the Vesting Clause 
Thesis to argue that treaties generally should not be viewed as self-executing within the U.S. 
legal system. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, 
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1966-67 (1999); John C. Yoo, 
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2224 (1999). Professor Yoo also has relied on the Vesting Clause 
Thesis as support for a broad presidential power to interpret treaties. See John C. Yoo, 
Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1320-22 
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of the Vesting Clause Thesis is further illustrated by dicta in a recent 
Supreme Court decision, American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi, in which the Court appeared to suggest that the President 
might have the power to preempt state laws simply by articulating the 
"foreign policy of the Executive Branch. "23 
This Article challenges the Vesting Clause Thesis on both textual 
and historical grounds. As for text, the difference in wording between 
the Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses can be explained in other 
plausible ways and need not be read as distinguishing between a 
limited grant of legislative powers and a plenary grant of executive 
power. Familiar canons of construction, such as expressio unius, and 
other interpretive principles further cut against the Vesting Clause 
Thesis. That thesis, moreover, cannot explain some of Article H's 
specific grants of foreign affairs authority, and it sits uneasily with the 
Constitution's enumerated powers structure. 
Given that the textual case for the Vesting Clause Thesis is at best 
uncertain, the persuasiveness of the thesis ultimately depends on 
history. Here there is a particular irony. Proponents of the Vesting 
Clause Thesis are often also advocates of a classically originalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation, pursuant to which the 
understanding of the Constitution's framers and ratifiers controls 
constitutional meaning. Yet, as we will show, the historical sources 
that are most relevant to the Founding, such as the records of the 
Federal Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the state ratification 
debates, contain almost nothing that supports the Vesting Clause 
Thesis, and much that contradicts it. 
Supporters of the Vesting Clause Thesis attempt to compensate for 
the lack of direct Founding support by focusing on political theory and 
practice both before and after the ratification of the Constitution. 
Their historical narrative thus has two central features. First, it is a 
story of continuity, whereby European political theory is carried 
forward, relatively unblemished, into American constitutional design 
and practice. Second, the narrative relies on what could be called 
"executive power essentialism" - the proposition that the Founders 
(2002); John C. Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of 
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 ,  869 (2001) (book review). 
23. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003). In that case, the 
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that a California statute was preempted by executive 
agreements because, in the Court's view, the statute had created an obstacle to the 
achievement of the President's foreign policy as articulated in the agreements. The Court 
referred in passing to the Article II Vesting Clause, stating that "the historical gloss on the 
'executive Power' vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President's 'vast 
share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.' " Id. (quoting Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
Professors Prakash and Ramsey, by contrast, disavow any claim of presidential lawmaking 
power in their defense of the Vesting Clause Thesis. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, 
at 235, 263, 340-46. 
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had in mind, and intended the Constitution to reflect, a conception of 
what is "naturally" or "essentially" within executive power. 24 We 
argue that this historical narrative is wrong on both counts. Among 
other things, the narrative fails to take account of complexity within 
eighteenth-century political theory, the experience of state 
constitutionalism before 1787, and the Founders' self-conscious 
rejection of the British model of government. The narrative also 
understates the degree to which the constitutional Founders were 
functionalists, willing to deviate from pure political theory and 
essentialist categories in order to design an effective government. 
Moreover, as usually presented, the post-constitutional practice of 
the Washington Administration provides only half the story. 
Washington and his cabinet, perhaps unsurprisingly, tended to stake 
out pro-executive positions with respect to the management of U.S. 
diplomacy. To the extent that there was a consensus concerning these 
positions, that consensus was based on functional considerations 
related to specific constitutional grants, not the Vesting Clause. When 
other, more substantive issues arose - such as the power to remove 
executive officials (including the Secretary of State) and the power to 
declare neutrality - the consensus broke down and there was 
substantial disagreement about the sources and scope of executive 
power. Moreover, with the partial exception of Alexander Hamilton, 
neither Washington nor his cabinet actually articulated the Vesting 
Clause Thesis, preferring instead to make more specific and modest 
textual claims. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we show why the 
constitutional text does not by itself establish the case for the Vesting 
Clause Thesis. In Part III, we consider the views of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century political theorists, the practices of the states during 
the Critical Period as they relate to the issue of executive power, and 
lessons from the Continental Congress. In Part IV, we discuss the 
constitutional Founding, with particular emphasis on the discussions 
and debates relating to the presidency. In Part V, we consider some of 
the most relevant practices and debates that occurred during the eight 
years of the Washington Administration. 
24. We are not implying that advocates of the Vesting Clause Thesis are making some 
sort of Platonic claim about the meaning of executive power, but rather simply that they are 
claiming that certain powers would have been understood by the Founders - for 
theoretical, historical, or other reasons - as naturally or essentially belonging to the 
executive. Cf. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 253 n.91 (denying that executive power 
has an inherent meaning in the abstract and instead "mak[ing] a claim about the meaning of 
executive power at a particular time in history"). 
February 2004] Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs 553 
I. TEXTUAL UNCERTAINTY 
It is important to understand at the outset why the textual 
arguments in support of the Vesting Clause Thesis are, at best, 
indeterminate. As noted above, the principal textual argument is the 
difference in wording between the Article I and Article II Vesting 
Clauses. The Article I clause provides that " [a]ll legislative powers 
herein granted shall be vested" in Congress, whereas the Article II 
clause provides that " [t]he executive Power shall be vested" in the 
President. This difference in wording, it is argued, suggests that 
Congress's legislative powers were intended to be limited to the ones 
listed in the Constitution, whereas the President's powers were to 
include all those encompassed by the phrase "executive Power," 
without regard to whether those powers were listed in the 
Constitution. 25 
As an initial matter, even if this textual argument were correct, and 
the Article II Vesting Clause were read as a power-conferring 
provision, the argument would not tell us which powers the Clause 
encompasses. It is possible, for example, that the phrase "executive 
Power" confers simply a power to execute the laws. That would help 
explain, for example, why it is written in the singular rather than the 
plural. Indeed, to the extent that there are any Founding statements 
ascribing substantive content to the Article II Vesting Clause, they are 
all statements equating executive power with the power to execute the 
laws.26 If this is what the Vesting Clause means, it could not serve as 
the source of the foreign relations powers claimed by proponents of 
the Vesting Clause Thesis. Thus, even on its own terms, the textual 
argument for the Vesting Clause Thesis is inconclusive and depends 
on history. 
It is also worth noting that the textual argument assumes a level of 
precision on the part of the Founders that may be unrealistic. As 
Professor Christopher Eisgruber has noted, constitutional law scholars 
25. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 256-57. 
26. See infra Part III. In an article published after his above-referenced article with 
Professor Ramsey, Professor Prakash argues that, "[a]t bottom, the executive power is the 
power to execute the laws." Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 704 (2003). As he notes, one of the definitions of "executive" in the 
Founding-era version of Samuel Johnson's dictionary included "having the power to put in 
act the laws." Id. at 716 (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 683 (Librairie du Liban ed., 1978) (1755)). Although that definition does not 
refer in any way to foreign affairs powers, Professor Prakash continues to adhere to the 
arguments he made with Professor Ramsey about presidential foreign affairs powers. See id. 
at 704 & n.5, 714. As with the Johnson quotation, however, much of the historical evidence 
that Professor Prakash cites in his more recent article suggests that any consensus about 
executive power extended only to a power to execute the laws, and this evidence thereby 
tends to undermine the broader claims he made with Professor Ramsey. For additional 
examples of this point, see infra notes 61, 146, 574, 662. 
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often fall prey to the aesthetic fallacy that "the constitutional text pos­
sesses hidden harmonies that will reveal themselves to assiduous stu­
dents" and, relatedly, that "we should be extremely reluctant ever to 
conclude that it is redundant, clumsy, ambiguous, or incomplete."27 In 
fact, it could be the case, as Professor David Currie has observed, that 
the difference in the wording of the Article I and Article II Vesting 
Clauses "may well have been accidental."28 Whether accidental or not, 
however, there are other plausible explanations for this difference. 
The Article II Vesting Clause states that the executive power shall 
be vested "in a President of the United States of America." As 
discussed later in this Article, a significant issue during the drafting of 
the Constitution was whether to have a unitary or plural executive. 
The Article II Vesting Clause may simply make clear where the 
executive power is being vested - in a unitary President - not the 
scope of that power.29 In other words, the Clause may have been 
worded to address an issue that was specific to Article II. Conversely, 
the "herein granted" language in the Article I Vesting Clause may 
serve to emphasize the limits of federalism on the national legislative 
power, a concern that would have been specific to Article 1.3° Another 
possibility has been suggested by Professor Michael Froomkin. As he 
notes, there was a Congress already in existence at the time of the 
framing of the Constitution, so the "herein granted" language in 
Article I might have been designed to make clear that, from now on, 
Congress would have only the powers being listed. By contrast, the 
27. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 1 13 (2001). 
But see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 236 ("Our framework reveals that there are no 
gaps in the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs powers."). 
28. DA YID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 
1789-1801, at 177 (1997). As Currie notes, the "herein granted" language in Article I was 
added late in the Federal Convention by the Committee of Style, which was not supposed to 
make substantive changes (although it  did so in some instances). See id.; 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 590 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). Of course, even if the 
drafters did not intend for the difference in wording to reflect a difference in meaning, the 
difference might be constitutionally significant if those involved in ratifying the Constitution 
would have perceived a difference in meaning. We address that historical question below in 
Part III.C. 
29. See, e.g. , Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 
53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 53 (1953) ("The records of the Constitutional Convention make it 
clear that the purposes of [the Article II Vesting Clause) were simply to settle the question 
whether the executive branch should be plural or single and to give the executive a title."); 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 47-48 n.195 (1994) ('The [Article JI) Vesting Clause does nothing more than show 
who . . .  is to exercise the executive power, and not what that power is."). As noted below, 
this interpretation appears to be consistent with the way in which the delegates at the 
Federal Convention used the word "vesting." See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 
21 1-213. 
30. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 ,  22 (1993) ("This [language) seemed designed only to reflect the limits of federalism 
on national regulatory power, not to ratify or to recognize substantive executive power."). 
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Founders might not have thought it necessary to use that language for 
the new executive and judicial branches.31 As a matter of text, these 
alternative interpretations are at least as plausible as the Vesting 
Clause Thesis. 
Not only are there other explanations for the difference in wording 
of the Vesting Clauses, there is also a significant textual problem with 
construing the Article II Vesting Clause as conveying unenumerated 
powers. Article II expressly grants the President the commander-in­
chief power; the power to request written opinions from federal 
executive officers; the power to grant pardons; the power to make 
treaties; and the power to appoint a variety of officials.32 Article II also 
directs (and thereby presumably empowers) the President to receive 
ambassadors, and to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.33 
Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis concede that many if not all 
of these specific grants and directives are encompassed within their 
construction of the phrase "executive Power" in the Article II Vesting 
Clause.34 Under their construction, however, the specific grants would 
appear to be superfluous, in contravention of the general presumption 
against redundancy.35 Furthermore, the Founders' decision to list what 
they meant by "executive Power" would tend to suggest, pursuant to 
the expressio unius canon, that their list was complete, rather than 
merely illustrative.36 
Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis attempt to address this 
textual problem by arguing that the delineation of some of the Article 
II powers, such as the treaty power and the appointments power, can 
be explained by the fact that the Constitution divides these powers 
with the Senate. It was necessary to list these powers despite the 
general grant of executive power in the Vesting Clause, the argument 
goes, in order to make clear that the President was not receiving 
31. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1346, 1363 (1994). 
32. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
33. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
34. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 259-60. 
35. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 833 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing 
presumption against redundancy); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th ed. 2000) (same). 
36. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 824-25 (discussing expressio unius canon); 
2A SINGER, supra note 35, §§ 47:23-47:25 (same). Professor Prakash has himself emphasized 
the expressio unius canon in another coauthored article about executive power. See Steven 
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE 
L.J. 541 ,  562-64 (1994). Although that article argues generally for applying the expressio 
unius canon to the Constitution, it does not take a firm position on whether the canon 
should be applied to the list of powers in Article II. See id. at 563-64 (stating that the canon 
"arguably may also apply to the list in Article II"). 
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exclusive control over these functions. 37 Although not a divided 
power, a similar argument is made with respect to the commander-in­
chief power: the Constitution gives Congress a number of powers 
relating to war, so the Founders needed to make clear that the 
President still had the commander-in-chief power.38 
This divided powers response is problematic, for several reasons. 
First, the powers listed in Article II are not written as if they were 
limits on divided powers. Article II does not state, for example, that 
"the executive power to make treaties is subject to the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate," or that "the president's war 
powers shall not extend to issuing declarations of war." Second, 
proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis also maintain that any 
executive powers not specifically delegated to other institutional 
actors should be presumed to rest with the President. As Prakash and 
Ramsey argue, "the Constitution has a simple default rule that we call 
the 'residual principle': Foreign affairs powers not assigned elsewhere 
belong to the President, by virtue of the President's executive power; 
while foreign affairs powers specifically allocated elsewhere are not 
presidential powers, in spite of the President's executive power."39 In 
light of that purported default rule, it is not clear why delineation was 
needed even of divided powers, since whatever was not given to the 
Senate or to Congress would presumptively remain with the President. 
Third, the divided powers response does not explain all of the Article 
II grants. Most notably, the power to require written opinions, the 
pardon power, and the ambassadorial receipt power all rest 
exclusively with the President, and yet they too are specifically 
delineated.40 Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis do not have a 
convincing explanation for these specific grants.41 Finally, as discussed 
37. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 253 n.91. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 254. 
40. The President also was granted the undivided powers of recommending legislation 
to Congress, calling Congress into special session, and commissioning officers of the United 
States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. In addition, the President was granted, in Article I, the 
power to veto legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
41. Prakash and Ramsey do not address either the power to require written opinions or 
the pardon power. As for the ambassadorial receipt power, they simply call it a "small 
redundancy." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 260. It is quite possible, of course, that 
the Constitution contains redundancies. But if one is willing to accept imperfections of 
constitutional drafting in this respect, the textual argument for the Vesting Clause Thesis -
which assumes precise drafting with respect to the differences in the Article I and Article II 
Vesting Clauses - is also undermined. In his more recent article on executive power, 
Professor Prakash contends that the pardon power is listed in Article II in order to define its 
scope, i.e., to make clear that it is limited to federal offenses and that it does not apply to 
impeachments. See Prakash, supra note 26, at 715. But this shift from a divided powers 
explanation to a definitional explanation serves to undermine the claim made by Vesting 
Clause Thesis proponents that the phrase "executive Power" was shorthand for an 
understood bundle of powers. Moreover, if the Pardon Clause had been intended as a 
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below, even though there was only one branch of government under 
the Articles of Confederation - and thus no need to list powers in 
order to divide them - the foreign affairs powers of the government 
(including powers claimed by the Vesting Clause Thesis proponents to 
be "executive" in nature) were specified.42 
The textual argument only becomes more complicated and 
uncertain when one looks at the A rticle III Vesting Clause. This clause 
provides that " [t]he Judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested" in the Supreme Court and whatever lower federal courts 
Congress creates. This clause appears to be similar to the Article II 
clause, in that it refers generally to a category of power instead of 
referring to powers "herein granted." Nevertheless, it has long been 
settled that the specific categories of cases and controversies 
subsequently listed in Article III define the boundaries of the exercise 
of the federal judicial power.43 In other words, the list of cases and 
controversies is treated as exhaustive, not merely illustrative. As 
Alexander Hamilton notes in Federalist No. 80, after he recites Article 
Ill's list of cases and controversies, "This constitutes the entire mass of 
the judicial authority of the Union."44 If Articles II and III are to be 
treated the same, this may suggest that the powers referred to in 
Article II should be construed as exhaustive, not illustrative, of the 
President's authority. 
To be sure, the Article III list is preceded by the phrase, "The 
judicial Power shall extend to," whereas the list of powers in Article II 
is not preceded by the phrase, "The executive Power shall extend to." 
This difference might suggest that, despite the similarity of their 
Vesting Clauses, Articles II and III should be treated differently with 
respect to the issue of unspecified powers. But this response is not 
entirely satisfactory. If the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses 
by their terms convey a package of unspecified powers, it is not clear 
why the language "shall extend to" in Article III is treated as 
exhaustive. That language, unlike the "herein granted" language in 
Article I, could easily be read to be illustrative, especially if it does not 
limitation on an inherent executive power, one would expect it to have been phrased 
differently, e.g., "The President's pardon power shall not extend to offenses against a state, 
or to cases of impeachment." 
42. See infra Part 11.C. In addition, essentially all of the foreign affairs powers listed in 
the Articles of Confederation are specifically assigned somewhere in the Constitution. The 
only slight exception is that there is no precise analogue in the Constitution to the 
congressional power under the Articles of Confederation of "determining on peace." The 
Constitution does assign to Congress, and not the President, the power to "declare War." 
Whether Congress's power to declare war also gives it the exclusive power to determine 
whether the United States will remain neutral in a military conflict was a central issue in the 
1793 debate over President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation. See infra Part IV.E. 
43. See, e.g. , Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
44. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), at 479. 
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fully encompass the package of powers being granted in the Article III 
Vesting Clause. If it is the very enumeration of the cases and 
controversies that makes the Article III list exhaustive, that argument 
would obviously apply as well to the enumeration of executive powers 
in Article II. 
Nevertheless, Professor Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes have 
argued at length that the phrase "shall extend to" in Article III is not a 
grant of power but rather is simply a description of the situations in 
which a particular power can be exercised. The Article III Vesting 
Clause must be a grant of power, they contend, because it is the "only 
explicit constitutional source of the federal judiciary's authority to 
act."45 Professor Froomkin has contested this argument, arguing that 
the judiciary's power to act can be derived either from the structure of 
the Constitution or from Article Ill's list of cases and controversies.46 
It is unnecessary to resolve this debate for present purposes because, 
even if Calabresi and Rhodes were correct, their argument would not 
provide support for the Vesting Clause Thesis. Under their analysis, 
the Article III Vesting Clause simply conveys a power to decide cases 
(with perhaps related powers to protect the process of 
decisionmaking), 47 without defining the circumstances under which 
that power may be exercised. Extending that argument to Article II at 
most suggests that the Article II Vesting Clause conveys something 
like a "power to execute the laws" (with perhaps a related power to 
control executive subordinates), and not that it conveys unspecified 
foreign relations powers, as maintained by the proponents of the 
Vesting Clause Thesis. Indeed, Calabresi and Rhodes themselves 
suggest skepticism about whether the Article II Vesting Clause 
conveys unspecified substantive powers.48 
In addition to these textual difficulties, the Vesting Clause Thesis 
is at least in tension with the enumerated powers structure of the 
45. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1 155, 1 176 (1992); see also Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81-82 (1907) (distinguishing between the Article I and Article III 
Vesting Clauses and stating that "the entire judicial power of the Nation" is granted by the 
Article III clause); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1377 (1994). 
46. See Froomkin, supra note 31, at 1352-53. 
47. The Supreme Court has stated that "[c]ourts invested with the judicial power of the 
United States have certain inherent authority to protect their proceedings and judgments in 
the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities." Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 
820, 823 (1996) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991)); see also Plaut 
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 ,  219 (1995) (reasoning that "a 'judicial Power' is one 
to render dispositive judgments" (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990))). 
48. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1 177 n.119. But cf Prakash & Ramsey, 
supra note 14, at 257 & n.104 (citing the Calabresi & Rhodes article as support for their 
argument). 
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Constitution. The Constitution lists the powers of the three federal 
branches in great detail, and the Founders emphasized that they were 
creating a national government with limited and defined powers. 
James Madison stated in the Federalist Papers, for example, that the 
national government "is limited to certain enumerated objects,"49 and 
that "[t]he powers delegated to the federal government are . . .  few 
and defined." 50 The proponents of the Constitution thought this 
proposition so evident that it precluded the need for a Bill of Rights.51 
Indeed, they argued that a Bill of Rights might be dangerous because 
it could be construed as implying governmental powers that had not in 
fact been granted.52 And, when the Bill of Rights was subsequently 
adopted, it contained the Tenth Amendment, which reaffirms that the 
national government has only the powers that have been delegated to 
it.53 The idea of an unspecified residuum of substantive powers in the 
President does not fit well with this structural feature of the 
Constitution.54 
Our claim here is not that these textual and structural points 
clearly refute the Vesting Clause Thesis. Rather, our claim is simply 
that the legitimacy of the Vesting Clause Thesis cannot be determined 
simply by looking at what the Constitution says. The case for the 
Vesting Clause Thesis, therefore, must lie elsewhere. According to its 
proponents, the Vesting Clause Thesis is confirmed by history. The 
meaning of the Article II Vesting Clause may not be obvious to us, it 
is argued, but to the Founding generation it was simply shorthand for 
an acknowledged array of powers.55 As we will show, not only does the 
relevant historical evidence fail to confirm the thesis, it actually 
provides a powerful case against it. 
49. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 14 (James Madison), at 102. 
50. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 45 (James Madison), at 292. 
51. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 288-338 (1996). 
52. See, e.g. , THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), at 513 
(making this argument); Charles C. Pinckney, Speech in South Carolina House of 
Representatives (Jan. 18, 1778), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, supra note 28, at 256 (same). 
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people."). For a discussion of the tension between the Tenth Amendment and broad 
claims of executive war power, see D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn't True? The 
Tenth Amendment and Executive War Power, 5 1  CATH. U. L. REV. 135 (2001). 
54. For recent Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the enumerated powers structure 
of the Constitution, see, for example, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 155 (1992) . Even Chief Justice Marshall's famous national power decision, McCulloch v. 
Maryland, emphasized this structural feature. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This 
[federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers."). 
55. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 253. 
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II. THEORY AND HISTORY PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
A. Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Political Theory 
As noted, proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis typically place 
significant weight on the views of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
political theorists, especially the writings of John Locke, William 
Blackstone, and Baron de Montesquieu. These writings, the 
proponents contend, show that foreign affairs powers were viewed by 
theorists as inherently executive in nature and thus as at least 
presumptively assigned to the executive branch of any government. 
The Founders would have been familiar with and likely influenced by 
these writings, the argument goes, and thus the writings shed light on 
what the Founders understood with respect to the Article II Vesting 
Clause.56 
As we discuss later in this Article, the purported continuity 
between the views of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
theorists concerning the proper scope of executive power and the 
understandings of the constitutional Founders is highly questionable. 
Among other things, when discussing executive power these theorists 
primarily used the British monarchy as their model, a model 
consciously rejected by the constitutional Founders when thinking 
about executive power. For now, we focus on what the theorists 
actually said. It turns out that, even on their own terms, the theorists 
provide no more than weak support for the idea that foreign relations 
powers are inherently executive in nature. 
Locke, for example, far from claiming that foreign relations powers 
are inherently executive, actually distinguishes executive power from 
foreign relations power. In a chapter of the second book of his Two 
Treatises of Government, Locke describes three classes of power -
"legislative," "executive," and "federative." 57 Here he defines 
"executive" power as simply the power of "the Execution of the Laws 
that are made, and remain in force," a power that he argues should 
be separated from the power to make laws.58 Importantly, Locke 
distinguishes this executive power from the "federative" power, which 
he says encompasses "the Power of War and Peace, Leagues and 
Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all Persons and Communities 
without the Commonwealth."59 He makes clear that these two classes 
56. See, e.g., id. at 265-72. 
57. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 409-12 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. 
ed. 1960) (1690). 
58. Id. at 410. 
59. Id. 
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of power - executive and federative - are "really distinct in 
themselves. "60 
Locke does observe that the executive and federative powers "are 
always almost united," and he argues that if the two powers are 
separated it "would be apt sometime or other to cause disorder and 
ruin[]."61 But he bases his analysis here not on essentialist reasoning 
about the nature of executive power, but rather on functional 
differences between the legislative and executive branches. In 
particular, Locke contends that the federative power, unlike the 
regulation of domestic affairs, "is much less capable to be directed by 
antecedent, standing, positive Laws."62 In his view, the functional 
features of the executive branch - for example, its ability to make 
case-by-case judgments in response to changing circumstances -
argue for assigning it the federative power.63 Assigning it elsewhere, he 
contends, would be "almost impracticable."64 As Professor Rakove has 
noted, Locke is clearly basing his argument about assigning the 
federative power to the executive "on considerations of prudence, 
convenience, and efficiency, not right."65 Furthermore, Locke makes 
clear elsewhere in his treatise that the legislative power is supreme, 
even with respect to the federative power, a proposition at odds with 
the Vesting Clause Thesis.66 
Blackstone provides even less support than Locke for the 
proposition that foreign relations powers are inherently executive in 
nature. Principally an expositor of English law rather than a political 
theorist, Blackstone analyzed the English Constitution primarily in 
terms of Whig "mixed government" theory as opposed to separation 
60. Id.; see also id. at 412 (stating that "the Executive and Federative Power of every 
Community be really distinct in themselves"). 
61. Id. at 411-12; see also Prakash, supra note 26, at 745 (observing that Locke deemed 
powers other than law execution to be "executive" "only because they typically belong to 
the entity charged with law execution"). 
62. LOCKE, supra note 57, at 411. 
63. See id. at 412 ("[W]hat is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much 
upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the 
Prudence of those who have this Power committed to them, to be managed by the best of 
their Skill, for the advantage of the Commonwealth."). 
64. Id. 
65. Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case 
Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 261 (1984). 
66. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 57, at 401 (referring to the legislative power as the 
"supream power of the Common-wealth"); id. at 415 (describing both the executive power 
and the federative power as "Ministerial and subordinate to the Legislative, which as has 
been shew'd in a Constituted Commonwealth, is the Supream"). Prakash and Ramsey are 
thus incorrect in suggesting that under Locke's analysis the federative power is not subject to 
legislative constraint. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 267. 
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of powers. 67 Under the mixed government analysis, the English 
Constitution balanced governmental institutions associated with social 
orders rather than with basic governmental functions. Specifically, the 
King, Lords, and Commons respectively embodied monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy, and through mutual checks prevented the 
respective horribles of tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy.68 This is not to 
say that aspects of the English Constitution could not also be 
understood through a separation of powers framework.69 It is to say, 
however, that the triad of King, Lords, and Commons did not 
obviously translate into the executive, judicial, and legislative 
categories. Accordingly, Blackstone's focus on mixed government as 
an initial matter means that references to the powers of the monarch 
or to specific prerogative powers cannot automatically be translated as 
executive power. 
Although Blackstone on occasion refers generally to the Crown as 
exercising executive power,70 he makes no effort to define the meaning 
of executive power, and still less to delineate the boundaries between 
executive and legislative authority in systematic or categorical terms. 
Moreover, although Blackstone contends that the prerogatives of the 
Crown include particular foreign relations powers, he justifies these 
assignments of power by a combination of functional arguments and 
arguments relating to the nature of the British monarchy. As an 
example of the latter, he contends that the King's prerogative includes 
the power to make treaties because under international law treaties 
are to be made by sovereign powers "and in England the sovereign 
power, quoad hoc, is vested in the person of the king."71 Blackstone 
gives a similar sovereign power justification for the King's 
"prerogative of making war and peace."72 As we discuss later, the 
constitutional Founders expressly rejected this sort of "royal 
prerogative" reasoning when thinking about the U.S. presidency. In 
any event, even Blackstone's royal prerogative arguments are specific 
to the structure of the British government and are not global claims 
about the inherent meaning of executive power.73 
67 . See Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to Book I, in 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND viii-ix (facsimile of First Edition, Stanley Katz, 
ed., 1979) (1765). 
68. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 
at 18-21 (1969). 
69. See Katz, supra note 67, at viii-ix. 
70. See 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 67, at 183. 
71. 1 id. at 249. 
72. 1 id. 
73. Prakash and Ramsey quote some of Blackstone's references to the foreign relations 
prerogatives of the King as if they were definitions by Blackstone of "executive power," see 
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Montesquieu provides more support than Locke or Blackstone for 
the proposition that foreign relations powers are inherently executive, 
but even here the picture is complicated and uncertain. As a French 
theorist rather than an English empiricist, Montesquieu was certainly 
more inclined than Locke or Blackstone towards essentialist 
categories. But his essentialism primarily concerns the abstract 
classification of power rather than the proper institutional assignment 
of power. In addition, Montesquieu's dominant focus is on the 
separation of categories of power in order to preserve liberty, and he 
gives only passing attention to the relationship between executive 
power and foreign relations power. 
In purporting to describe the English constitution, Montesquieu 
notes that in every government there are three classes of power: "the 
legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of 
nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil 
law."74 By the first power, says Montesquieu, "the prince or magistrate 
enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those 
that have been already enacted."75 By the second power, "he makes 
peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public 
security, and provides against invasions."76 This category is thus similar 
to Locke's category of federative power. By the third power, the 
prince or magistrate "punishes criminals, or determines the disputes 
that arise between individuals."77 Although initially labeling the third 
power as a type of executive power, Montesquieu quickly relabels it 
"the judiciary power," and he refers to the second power as "the 
executive power of the state."78 
Montesquieu's taxonomy is confusing, in part because he initially 
refers to two categories of executive power. His subsequent relabeling 
of the third category as the judiciary power does not eliminate 
confusion because it seems to suggest that the second category fully 
covers executive power, in which case executive power would be 
limited to foreign relations powers and would not include the most 
obvious executive power of all - executing domestic laws.79 But it is 
clear from Montesquieu's subsequent discussion (which focuses 
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 269, but Blackstone does not himself use that phrase 
when referring to the prerogatives. 
74. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent trans., 
Hafner Pub. Co. 1949) (1751).  
75.  1 id. 
76. 1 id. 
77. 1 id. 
78. 1 id. 
79. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 95 (2d 
ed. 1998) (explaining Montesquieu's initial taxonomy). 
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primarily on the need for separating legislative, executive, and judicial 
power) that this was not his intent. Thus, for example, he refers to the 
"three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public res­
olutions, and of trying the causes of individuals."80 Here Montesquieu 
equates executive power with executing the laws and makes no 
specific reference to foreign relations powers.B1 
In Montesquieu's subsequent discussion, there are only isolated 
references to foreign relations powers, and they do not shed much 
additional light on the relationship between executive power and 
foreign relations power. In the section of the book containing 
Montesquieu's taxonomy, there is only one subsequent reference to a 
foreign relations power. In asserting that the executive should manage 
the army, Montesquieu argues that this follows "from the very nature 
of the thing, its business consisting more in action than in 
deliberation."82 The word "nature" here might suggest essentialism, 
but the core of the argument appears ultimately to be functional, 
grounded in the executive's (i.e., monarch's) ability to act with speed. 
In a later section of the book, in discussing the executive power in 
ancient Rome, Montesquieu observes that the Roman Senate 
exercised most of the executive power, and he includes within his 
description of the Senate's powers various foreign relations functions 
such as determining on peace and war, regulating the army, and 
receiving and sending ambassadors.B3 Obviously, Montesquieu is here 
assigning foreign relations powers to his executive category, but even 
in this context he is referring to specific powers rather than globally 
equating executive authority with foreign relations authority. 
Given Montesquieu's limited (and confusing) treatment of the 
linkage between executive power and foreign relations powers, it is at 
least an overstatement to suggest, as proponents of the Vesting Clause 
Thesis have suggested, that his treatise provides conclusive support for 
the proposition that foreign relations powers were conceived of in the 
middle to late 1700s as inherently executive.84 In addition, proponents 
of the Vesting Clause Thesis have tended to ignore the functionalist 
80. 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 74, at 152. 
81. As William Gwyn notes, Montesquieu "gets off to a faltering start" with his initial 
taxonomy, since the taxonomy he "actually went on to employ is of a rather different 
nature." W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 101 (1965); see also Rakove, supra note 65, at 262 ("In attempting to define 
legislative, executive, and judicial power . . .  Montesquieu betrayed some confusion."). 
82. 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 74, at 161. 
83. 1 id. at 173. 
84. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 268 ("The influential Charles Louis 
de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, confirmed that Locke's federative power had become a 
branch of the executive power by the mid-eighteenth century."). 
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strands of Montesquieu's reasoning. While more abstract than the 
arguments made by Locke and Blackstone, functionalist arguments 
nevertheless play an important role in Montesquieu's discussion of the 
proper assignment of governmental powers. As noted above, this was 
evident in his brief reference to regulation of the army. In addition, 
when arguing that the executive power should be exercised by a 
monarch, Montesquieu contends that "this branch of government, 
having need of despatch, is better administered by one than by 
many."85 Montesquieu's functionalism is also evident in his arguments 
in favor of dividing powers that otherwise would fall exclusively into a 
particular category. Perhaps most famously, he argues for giving the 
executive a veto power over legislation in order to avoid the accretion 
of too much power in the legislature, even though this means mixing 
the executive and legislative categories.86 As we will document below, 
the constitutional Founders were much more influenced by this sort of 
functionalist reasoning than by Montesquieu's abstract essentialism. 
The writings of other, less-prominent domestic legal theorists are 
no more helpful to the Vesting Clause Thesis. Although the English 
legal theorist Thomas Rutherforth might appear to expressly endorse 
the foreign-affairs/executive-power equation, his support for the 
Thesis is more apparent than real. As an initial matter, Rutherforth 
divides all government power into two rather than three categories 
and then does so in a unique fashion. In his typology, all government 
power is either "legislative" - basically the power, by common 
understanding, to define rights, duties, and membership in the 
community87 - or "executive" - society's "power to act with its joint 
or common force for defense and security. "88 Rutherforth next divides 
the executive power into the "internal," "external," and "mixed." The 
internal, or "civil," executive power operates upon objects within a 
society.89 It follows that the external power, which includes most 
notably "military power," applies to matters outside a society. 90 
Rutherforth's unique dualist scheme, which appeared after the more 
familiar tripartite theses of Locke and Montesquieu, may call into 
question the extent of his influence in America. More generally, the 
85. 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 74, at 156. 
86. 1 id. at 159. 
87. 2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 43-50 (Cambridge, J. 
Bentham 1756). 
88. 2 id. at 50-61. 
89. 2 id. at 50-54. Internal executive power, according to Rutherforth, included the 
"Judicial power," which is "the internal or civil branch of executive power exerting itself 
under such checks and controls, as the legislative power has subjected it to, in order to 
prevent its deviating from the purposes, for which it was formed." 2 id. at 51.  
90. 2 id. at 50-56. Rutherforth gave as an example of "mixed" powers the appointment 
of magistrates. 2 id. at 59-60. 
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emergence of yet another take on governmental structure belies the 
notion that a settled consensus on separation of powers theory 
prevailed in the years leading up to the American Revolution. 
As to foreign affairs, moreover, Rutherforth makes clear that the 
executive wields external authority out of practical considerations, not 
because foreign affairs powers are by their nature executive. As a 
descriptive matter, Rutherforth observes that "where the legislative 
and executive power are lodged in different hands," especially when 
the membership of the legislature is large, "the usual practice is to 
allow some degree of discretionary power in respect of war and peace 
to him or them, who are entrusted with the right of putting the 
military force in motion."91 This is especially so, he continues, "where 
the legislative body cannot act with such readiness and expedition, 
as the occasions or opportunities of war require."92 Nonetheless, 
Rutherforth concludes, though such an arrangement "may be 
convenient, it is not necessary."93 
To the contrary, Rutherforth expressly asserts that most foreign 
affairs powers are in essence legislative and therefore subject to 
substantial legislative limitation. Rutherforth begins his account of 
external executive power with a conventional discussion of military 
defense.94 To this he adds a list of non-military foreign affairs powers, 
including the authority to make peace, grant rights to foreigners, make 
alliances, make treaties, and adjust navigation rights. But are any of 
these powers fundamentally executive? Rutherforth answers no: 
However, though these several powers are usually connected with 
external executive power by being lodged in the same hands, they are not 
naturally essential parts of it. These several powers are rather acts of the 
common understanding, than of the common force; and therefore seem, 
in their own nature, to be parts rather of the legislative than the executive 
power.95 
Despite the practical wisdom of lodging foreign affairs powers in the 
executive, Rutherforth remains careful to assert their legislative 
character, at times in surprising ways. For example, the ostensible 
champion of executive foreign affairs authority argues that the 
legislative authorities can be within their rights to communicate with 
other countries on their own, to make war and peace, and to send 
deputies with a military "to control its operations even in war. "96 
91. 2 id. at 56. 
92. 2 id. 
93. 2 id. at 57. 
94. 2 id. at 54-55. 
95. 2 id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
96. 2 id. at 57. 
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Like Montesquieu, Jean De Lolme was a French theorist who 
examined the English Constitution for lessons about structuring a 
government of ordered liberty, though like Rutherforth, he was both 
subsequent and secondary to his more celebrated countryman. Also as 
with Montesquieu, De Lolme provides more support for the idea that 
foreign affairs are executive in nature than any of the Englishmen who 
lived under the framework he describes. Perhaps more importantly, 
De Lolme further echoes Montesquieu in considering the connection 
between the executive and foreign affairs in a manner that is at best 
cursory and at worst garbled. Appearing in English in 1775, De 
Lolme's uncritical acceptance of broad royal prerogative likely made 
this portion of his analysis less appealing to an American audience, 
however often he may have been quoted generally. 
In the manner of Rutherforth, De Lolme divides government 
power between the legislative and the executive, rather than add 
either the judicial or federative as a coordinate building block.97 His 
main chapter examining executive power, however, quickly shifts to 
speaking in terms of the "prerogative of the King."98 This move means 
that, in contrast to both Rutherforth and Blackstone, De Lolme in 
effect simply equates executive authority, a component of separation 
of powers analysis, with the royal prerogative, in many ways a unique 
set of powers retained by the English monarchy. What then follows is 
a standard, though broadly interpreted, list of English prerogative 
powers, including the King's role as: the "source of all judicial power"; 
the "fountain of honor"; the "superintendent of Commerce"; the 
"Supreme head of the Church"; the "Generalissimo of all sea or land 
forces whatever"; and as a ruler who "CAN DO NO WRONG."99 
Tucked away in this enumeration comes De Lolme's most extensive 
consideration of the monarch's foreign affairs authorities: 
He is, with regard to foreign Nations, the representative, and the 
depository, of all the power and collective majesty of the Nation: he 
sends and receives ambassadors; he contracts alliances; and has the 
prerogative of declaring war, and of making peace, on whatever 
conditions he thinks proper.100 
Precisely because De Lolme follows the royal prerogative, a careful 
reading of this passage indicates that he does not simply equate 
foreign affairs powers with executive authority. Rather, like 
Blackstone, De Lolme references the monarch's functional role in 
discussing specific powers. As noted, however, Blackstone is careful to 
distinguish the pairings, so that the King's role as sovereign, for 
97. See J.L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1784) (1711). 
98. Id. at 72. 
99. Id. at 72-73. 
100. Id. at 73. 
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example, accounts for the prerogative to make war, while his capacity 
as the nation's representative explains the prerogative to receive 
ambassadors. 101 De Lolme, by contrast, lumps them together, clouding 
the functional origins of his conclusions. 
In any case, De Lolme's actual influence on the foreign affairs 
provisions of the Constitution remains unclear. Although he was 
among leading eighteenth-century thinkers whom Americans 
frequently cited,102 we are unaware of any instance in which De Lolme 
was cited for the proposition that foreign affairs authority was 
executive, much less cited with approval. Given De Lolme's fulsome 
description of such prerogatives as head of the established church and 
doing no wrong, together with Americans' rejection of British royal 
authority, the lack of such citations is perhaps not surprising. 
It is not only the theories about the British constitutional system 
that are unsupportive of the Vesting Clause Thesis. Actual British 
practice in the years leading up to the U.S. Constitution further 
undercuts the story of continuity and executive power essentialism 
posited by the Thesis. English historians generally agree that the 
eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of a governmental system 
not readily captured by either mixed government or separation of 
powers conceptions. With the Glorious Revolution of 1688, power 
fundamentally shifted from the Stuart monarchs to Parliament.103 It 
was not, however, until the accession of George I, the German-born 
Elector of Hanover, that Parliament consolidated this shift into a 
stable form of supremacy that lasted most of the eighteenth century. 
Displaying far less concern for British policy than his Stuart 
predecessors, George I mainly concerned himself with the security of 
his principality on the Continent. Government initiative fell to the 
King's ministers, who by the early 1720s themselves deferred to the 
"prime minister," Robert Walpole.104 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
102. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REV­
OLUTION 27 (1967) [hereinafter BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS] ; Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity 
Through History (or to It) , 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1598 (1997). 
103. Older "Whig" interpretations emphasized the extent to which the Revolution itself 
produced this shift. See GEORGE TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1688-1689, at 
175 (1954). More recent views argue that while the Revolution clearly resulted in a transfer 
of real power to Parliament, many issues concerning the boundaries between royal and 
parliamentary power remained unresolved. See J.P. KENYON, STUART ENGLAND 262 (1978); 
J.G.A. Pocock, Introduction in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 13 
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980). 
104. See BETTY KEMP, SIR ROBERT WALPOLE 45 (1976) ("In William Ill's reign, the 
initiative in policy lay with the King; in Anne's reign it lay with those who could command 
her favour; in the 1720s and 1730s, it lay with Walpole."). For a summary of the rise of 
Parliamentary supremacy during this era, see Martin Stephen Flaherty, Note, The Empire 
Strikes Back: Annesley v. Sherlock and the Triumph of Imperial Parliamentary Supremacy, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 612-13, 620-21 (1987). 
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The system Walpole devised in essence vested control of the 
British government in ministers who could command stable majorities 
in Parliament, especially the House of Commons, while retaining the 
monarch's favor. Walpole and his ministry could control Parliament in 
part because both the Revolution and the new dynasty had settled 
many of the divisive issues that had plagued England in the previous 
century, but also in part because of the accepted practice of 
"corruption," whereby the ministry would grant lucrative government 
posts and titles to Members of Parliament in exchange for their 
loyalty. Since the appointment of such posts formally remained with 
the King - as did other prerogatives and forms of influence -
Walpole also needed royal approval to keep these majorities in place. 
Walpole was able to obtain such approval because the monarch was 
generally disengaged and cared mainly that a stable Parliament vote to 
approve adequate funds. This mutually reinforcing circle sustained 
Walpole and his successors through the reigns of both George I and 
his son, George 11.105 Importantly, ministerial initiative extended to 
foreign policy, although here two acting secretaries of state - along 
with somewhat independent ambassadors and other diplomats -
played a greater role than the "prime" minister.106 Not until George III 
ascended to the throne in 1760 did a more assertive monarch put 
pressure on the system.107 By that time, however, the monarchy had 
ceded too much power for too long to have any hope of dismantling 
the framework that remains in recognizable form to this day. 
For present purposes, what matters here is that the ministerial 
approach that Walpole pioneered bears little relation to the royal 
executive touted by Vesting Clause advocates. In separation of powers 
terms, functional executive power, especially the authority to 
determine both domestic and foreign policy, lay less with the monarch 
than with a collection of legislators in Parliament who principally 
comprised the ministry. Real executive and legislative power, in other 
words, was concentrated in Parliament. Certain contemporaries, 
moreover, recognized this state of affairs and decried it, mainly in 
105. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 24-32 (1968) 
[hereinafter BAILYN, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PoLmcs]; BETIY KEMP, KING AND 
COMMONS 1660-1832, at 85-103, 1 13-30 (1957); KEMP, supra note 104, at 3-9, 72-80; J.H. 
PLUMB, ENGLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 60-73 (1992) (1950). See also RAKOVE, 
supra note 51,  at 209-11 (1996) (summarizing British practice). For a classic account of 
Walpole's life as "prime minister," see 2 J.H. PLUMB, SIR ROBERT WALPOLE: THE KING'S 
MINISTER (1960). 
106. See JEREMY A. BLACK, A SYSTEM OF AMBmON? BRmSH FOREIGN POLICY 1660-
1783, at 12-21, 32-79, 175-282 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter BLACK, SYSTEM OF AMBITION?]; 
JEREMY A BLACK, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE 49-89 (1985). 
107. See BLACK, SYSTEM OF AMBITION?, supra note 106, at 41-42, 234-54; KEMP, supra 
note 104, at 124; H.M. SCOTT, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 10-28 (1990). 
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mixed government terms. "Real" or "Old" Whigs, among others, 
blasted the "robinocracy" of Walpole as a perversion under which 
certain ministerial oligarchs employed corruption behind the 
monarch's back to pervert the democracy in Parliament.108 As many 
leading historians have pointed out, this literature was especially 
influential to Americans who came to resist and then rebel again 
Parliament's encroachments on the colonies after 1764. 109 This 
resistance, however, was against the perceived corruption of the 
legislative process, not the shift away from the royal executive. 110 In 
sum, the reality of the ministerial system, as well as the principal 
critique of it, make it even more unlikely that the Founders would 
have settled upon a single, widely held conception of executive power, 
especially one illustrated by a common understanding of the British 
monarchy. 
In addition to the writings of domestic legal theorists, the Founders 
were familiar with the writings of prominent international law 
publicists. These writings can be more briefly described because of 
their relative silence on the relevant issue. To the extent that 
European thinkers influenced the Founders, historians and legal 
scholars commonly reference Grotius, Vattel, Burlamaqui, and 
Puffendorf as comparable to Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu.1 1 1  
On the relationship between the executive and foreign affairs, 
however, these writers had little to say. Instead, they generally 
distinguished between domestic law and the law of nations, declared 
that they would do no more than note the many different ways nations 
arranged their legal orders, including who conducted foreign affairs, 
and that they would devote their attention to international law. 
Foreign affairs powers, under their analysis, were simply linked 
generically to the "sovereigns" or "rulers" - that is, to the particular 
108. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 47-54; BAIL YN, ORIGINS 
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 32-52; WOOD, supra note 68, at 10-17. The still­
standard general account of English opposition literature is CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION, 
DEVELOPMENT AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM THE 
RESTORATION OF CHARLES II UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN COLONIES (1959). 
109. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 52-58; BAILYN, ORIGINS 
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 34-47; WOOD, supra note 68, at 14-18. 
110. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 45-52; BAILYN, ORIGINS 
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 94-143; WOOD, supra note 68, at 18-43. 
1 11. See J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW (Thomas 
Nugent trans., 2d ed. 1763) (1752); HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES 
(Francis Kelsey trans., 1925) (photo reprint 1964) (1646); SAMUEL PUFFENDORF, DE JURE 
NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (photo. reprint 1934) (1688); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 
LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE 
ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) 
(1758); see also BAIL YN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 27 ("In pamphlet after 
pamphlet the American writers cited . . . Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel on the 
laws of nature and of nations, and on the principles of civil government."). 
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governments of the individual nations.1 12 With respect to the power to 
conduct war, for example, Vattel notes that: 
[A]s the various rights constituting that power, which ultimately resides 
in the body of the Nation, can be separated or limited, according to the 
will of the Nation, it is in the individual constitution of each State that we 
must look to find where is located the authority to make war in the name 
of the State. 1 1 3  
By itself, this agnosticism about domestic constitutional 
arrangements simply means that these international law publicists 
offer no support for the executive foreign affairs power thesis. In a 
larger context, however, this silence may work to undermine the 
thesis. These writers centrally concerned themselves with how 
governments should interact with one another in international affairs. 
If there existed a consensus that the domestic executive by definition 
had to conduct foreign affairs, one would expect some mention of this 
assumption, especially given the eighteenth-century tendency to 
attribute decisiveness to the executive and deliberation to the 
legislature. This expectation, however, goes unfulfilled, which in turn 
calls into question the idea that an executive foreign affairs baseline in 
fact existed. 
B. State Constitutional Experience 
In seeking guidance when drafting and debating the Constitution, 
the Founders looked most directly to the experience of the state 
governments during the revolutionary and "critical" periods. 1 14 As 
Professor Rakove has explained, " [t]he states had served, in effect, as 
the great political laboratory upon whose experiments the framers of 
1787 drew to revise the theory of republican government. " 1 15 Thus, 
" [c]onscious as they were of the fate of other republics and 
confederacies, ancient and modern, the lessons of the past that [the 
1 12. See, e.g. , VATIEL, supra note 1 1 1 ,  at 69, 160, 235, 393. But see Prakash & Ramsey, 
supra note 14, at 269-71 (suggesting that the publicists assigned foreign affairs powers to the 
executive branch of governments). 
113. VATIEL, supra note 111 ,  at 235-36 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
1 14. The term "critical period" was used by John Quincy Adams in a commencement 
address at Harvard College in 1787, in which he spoke of "this critical period" in which the 
nation was "groaning under the intolerable burden of accumulated evils." ROBERT A. EAST, 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE CRITICAL YEARS, 1785-1794, at 85 (1962) (quoting Adams); see 
also WOOD, supra note 68, at 393 (discussing use of the term). The term has come to refer to 
the period in the 1780s between the revolutionary war and the ratification of the 
Constitution. See, e.g. , JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783-
89 (1898). 
1 15. RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 31. 
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framers] weighed most heavily were drawn from their own 
experience. " 1 16 
Advocates of the Vesting Clause Thesis suggest that in designing 
the state constitutions Americans simply applied the wisdom of 
European jurists and thinkers without significant modification. 
Prakash and Ramsey, for example, while conceding the need for 
further research, "presume that the ordinary understanding of 
executive power established by Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone 
should be used to construe the analogous phrases in [the first] state 
constitutions" framed after independence. 1 17 As we have shown, 
executive-power essentialists have painted too simplistic a picture of 
the relevant eighteenth-century political, constitutional, and legal 
thought. But even were this portrait accurate, the essentialist account 
errs more dramatically in its presumption that America's 
constitutional practitioners mechanically applied European political 
and legal theory. 
As an initial matter, the essentialist story of continuity and 
consensus is historically counterintuitive. Historians, in contrast to 
lawyers, assume change over time. 118  This is especially true over 
extended periods characterized by upheaval, such as revolution and 
nation-building. A thoroughly-worked-out framework of executive 
power over foreign affairs that endured nearly unaltered for over a 
century, and survived periods of radical political change, may be 
possible, but it is hardly probable. More specifically, the essentialist 
thesis stands at odds with the prevailing professional narrative about 
the period, which stresses discontinuity and ferment. At the very least, 
there should be a presumption in favor of such a prevailing narrative. 
With sufficient historical evidence, such a presumption can of course 
be rebutted. For various reasons, however, legal scholars rarely have 
1 16. Id. at 21;  see also WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: 
REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 290 (expanded ed. 2001) ("The state constitutions' profound 
influence on the drafting of the federal Constitution and the ratification debates was taken 
for granted by contemporaries."); Donald S. Lutz, The First American Constitutions, in THE 
FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 70 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. 
Mahoney eds., 1987) ("By the summer of 1787, the framers of our national constitution, 
many of whom had helped write state constitutions, could draw upon a rich experience in the 
design of institutions and the practical effects of these institutions."). 
117. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 278-79 n.209. Somewhat surprisingly for an 
exhaustive historical account, Prakash and Ramsey devote only one long footnote to the 
early state constitutions, even though these constitutions were the initial focus of 
constitutional thought in the United States, and even though they touched upon matters 
relating to foreign affairs, such as embargoes and control of the military. 
1 18. See BERNARD BAILYN, ON THE TEACHING AND WRITING OF HISTORY 50-51 
(1994). 
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the time or resources to overturn the prevailing historical 
understanding.1 19 
Unlike proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis, the leading 
historians of the period have emphasized the dramatic discontinuity 
and conflict in American constitutional thinking, as the British Empire 
gave way to independent state frameworks joined under the Articles 
of Confederation, which in tum gave way to the Constitution of the 
United States. This story conventionally begins with the English 
"Whig" or "mixed" Constitution that the colonists paradoxically 
internalized and venerated even as they resisted Britain's attempts to 
establish its imperial authority over them. Within a decade, resistance 
led to independence, which forced the King's former subjects to 
experiment with radically different, "republican" constitutions on the 
state level, and the sui generis Articles of Confederation at the 
national level. Perceived democratic excess at home and weakness 
abroad led to a reform movement that reflected a fundamental 
reevaluation of several first principles. This rethinking led to what 
Gordon Wood has famously characterized as a new "American 
science of politics,"120 the chief legacy of which was the Federal 
Constitution. With the shift from the English mixed Constitution, to 
the republican state constitutions, to the United States Constitution, 
there has rarely in constitutional history been such a degree of 
transformation or innovation in such a concentrated period. 121 
The most relevant break with received constitutional wisdom 
followed closely upon independence, as the mixed government 
119. One of us has developed these themes at length. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1745-55 (1996) [hereinafter Flaherty, Most 
Dangerous Branch]; Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 551-54 (1995) [hereinafter Flaherty, History 
"Lite"]. See also Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing credible use of constitutional 
history with regard to recent foreign affairs scholarship). 
120. WOOD, supra note 68, at 593. 
121. This account has emerged in a series of now classic studies written after World War 
II. Any list of essentials would include, in rough order of the periods covered: J .G .A . 
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLmCAL THOUGHT AND THE 
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 
102; JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRmSH EMPIRE AND UNITED STATES, 1607-1788 (1986); 
EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO 
REVOLUTION (1953); 1-4 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986-93); ADAMS, supra note 116; WOOD, supra note 68; 
FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1985). Also useful is a recent and somewhat revisionist account by Marc 
Kruman, who argues, among other things, that the new "American science of politics" had 
emerged as early as the first state constitutions, rather than with the Federal Constitution. 
See MARC w. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION 
MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1997). For a historiographical overview, see 
Flaherty, History "Lite", supra note 119, at 535-49. 
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conception gave way to an emphasis on republicanism. This shift 
reflected a belief that legislatures were the primary guardians of 
liberty, and it involved both an outright rejection of royal prerogative 
powers as a model for republican executives and a suspicion of chief 
magistrates more generally.122 As Edward Corwin has explained, "The 
colonial period ended with the belief prevalent that 'the executive 
magistracy' was the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural 
friend of liberty, a sentiment strengthened by the contemporary 
spectacle of George Ill's domination of Parliament."123 
This distrust of executive authority was evident in the writings of 
leading revolutionary thinkers. The executive, John Adams wrote in 
his influential essay Thoughts on Government, must be "stripped of 
most of those badges of domination called prerogatives." 124 In a 
similar vein, Thomas Jefferson, in his 1783 "Draft of a Fundamental 
Constitution for the Commonwealth of Virginia," emphasized that 
"[b]y Executive powers," 
we mean no reference to those powers exercised under our former 
government by the crown as of it's prerogative; nor that these shall be 
the standard of what may or may not be deemed the rightful powers of 
the Governor. We give him those powers only which are necessary to 
carry into execution the laws, and which are not in their nature [either 
legislative or] Judiciary . 125 
Jefferson, moreover, expressly extended this thinking to foreign 
affairs. His draft constitution delegated the usual array of external 
powers - that is, "of declaring war and concluding peace, of con­
tracting alliances, of issuing letters of marque and reprisal, of raising 
or introducing armed forces" - to the Continental Congress.126 Where 
the Congress did not exercise these powers, they were to be exercised 
by the governor "under the regulation of such laws as the legislature 
may think it expedient to pass."127 The royal prerogative, it was clear, 
would no longer serve as the benchmark for executive power. 
The state constitutions drafted in the wake of independence 
reflected this shift in thinking. By 1777, ten of the thirteen states, as 
well as Vermont, had adopted new constitutions. As Allan Nevins 
notes, this "was the first time in the world's history that a large group 
122. See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1796, at 
27 (1922). 
123. CORWIN, supra note 18, at 5-6. 
124. JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in 4 PAPERS OF 
JOHN ADAMS 65, 89 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979). 
125. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 294, 298-99 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952). 
126. 6 id. at 299. 
127. 6 id. 
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of communities had begun the formation of their own governments 
under written constitutions." 128 Thereafter the states' constitutional 
creativity slowed, but did not cease. In a second, more prolonged spate 
of constitution-making, Massachusetts drafted its first state 
constitution, while South Carolina, New Hampshire, and Vermont 
each adopted a second or revised constitution. By the opening of the 
Federal Convention, fifteen state constitutions had been drafted. 
In drafting the state constitutions, Americans rejected the English 
mixed government model, and instead embraced republican 
government as the leading alternative that classical theory had to 
offer. In purest form this would mean concentrating governmental 
authority in a single deliberative assembly that would remain 
accountable to the people, and so protect their liberty, by insuring that 
it would be as representative and responsive as practicable. At least 
two early constitutions, Pennsylvania and Vermont, came close to this 
ideal, and nearly all of the early republican frameworks would 
approach it in some degree.129 Yet even at this early stage, other 
considerations directed Americans away from republicanism in its 
most simple form. In particular, one additional consequence of mixed 
government passing from the scene was that separation of powers 
analysis could come out of its shadow and provide what would become 
a complementary framework for allocating governmental authority. 
Four of the initial state constitutions contained express separation of 
powers clauses, with three following suit several years later. Typical 
was the language of Maryland's 1776 constitution, which declared, 
"the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to 
be forever and distinct from each other."130 
The initial state commitment to separation of powers, however, 
was largely rhetorical. The reality of the first state constitutions was a 
128. ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 
1775-1789, at 117 (1924). 
129. See WOOD, supra note 68, at 83-90, 163. The Pennsylvania and Vermont 
Constitutions were nearly identical. See PA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 3081 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS]; VT. CONST. OF 1777, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3737. 
130. See Mo. CONST. OF 1776, art. VI, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 1686, 1687. In all, eight of the fifteen state constitutions during this period contained 
such clauses. The other states were North Carolina, N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. IV, reprinted 
in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2787; Virginia, VA. CONST. OF 1776, § 
5, reprinted in 7 ST ATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3813; Georgia, GA. CONST. 
OF 1777, art. I, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 778; and later 
Massachusetts, MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XXX, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 1888, 1893; New Hampshire, N.H. CONST. OF 1784, art. XXXVII, reprinted in 4 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2457; and the second Vermont constitution, 
VT. CONST. OF 1786, ch. II, art. VI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
3749, 3755. 
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concentration of extensive authority in the legislatures, in keeping 
with the republican ideal. Echoing a chorus of authorities, Willi Paul 
Adams has observed that after 1776 the state assemblies "became the 
most powerful political institutions in the states. . . . In the 
metaphorical language of the day, the legislature was 'the soul, the 
source of life and movement' in the body of the state."131 Thus, for 
example, many of the first state assemblies could appoint judges,132 
and had either express or implicit power to alter their constitutions. 133 
The corollary of supreme legislatures was subordinate executives. 
As an initial matter, the state constitutions were united in rejecting the 
royal model. Two states, Virginia and Maryland, expressly rejected 
prerogative powers as the template for their executives, declaring that 
the governor in exercising executive powers "shall not, under any 
pretence, exercise any power or prerogative by virtue of any law, 
statute, or custom of England or Great Britain."134 Even when left 
unstated, a similar repudiation was plain nearly everywhere else. Thus, 
for example, the Pennsylvania constitution created a plural rather than 
unitary executive, and New Hampshire's 1776 constitution omitted an 
131. ADAMS, supra note 1 16, at 229 (quoting The American Whig, No. III, PROVIDENCE 
GAZETTE, April 3, 1779, at 1); see also, e.g. , Lutz, supra note 1 16, at 75 ("The executive was 
invariably quite weak [under the early state constitutions) and a creature of the 
legislature."). 
132. Four of the relevant state constitutions vested the appointment of the judges in the 
legislature. See N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XIII, XXXIII, reprinted in 5 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791, 2793; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XIX, XX, 
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3246; VA. CONST. OF 1776, 
para. 35, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3817. New York 
vested judicial appointments in a special council chosen by the assembly in which the 
governor had one vote. See N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXIII, reprinted in 5 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2633. In Georgia, intermediate appointments were 
vested in the governor, with appointments generally being left to whatever process the 
legislature would establish by law. See GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXI, reprinted in 2 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 781. 
133. Two constitutions expressly allowed the legislature to enact amendments. See DEL. 
CONST. OF 1776, art. 30, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 568 
(providing for constitutional amendment by legislative supermajorities); MD. CONST. OF 
1776, art. LIX, reprinted in 3 STA TE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1701 
(requiring intervening election prior to legislative amendments going into effect). In other 
states, the constitution technically amounted to no more than a statute. See N.J. CONST. OF 
1776, pmbl., reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2595; S.C. 
CONST. OF 1778, pmbl., reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3248; 
S.C. CONST. OF 1776, pmbl., reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 
3243; VA. CONST. OF 1776, pmbl., reprinted in 7 STA TE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
3812, 3814. Among the defects of the Virginia Constitution, Jefferson famously included the 
fact "that the ordinary legislature may alter the constitution itself." Thomas Jefferson, Notes 
on the State of Virginia, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 85, 225 (Paul Leicester 
Ford ed., 1894). 
134. See MO. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXIll, reprinted in 3 STA TE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 1686, 1696; VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 3812, 3816-17. 
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executive altogether.135 Furthermore, aside from New York, each of 
the twelve constitutions that did provide for a single governor or chief 
executive further made provision for some sort of executive or privy 
council. In contrast to the English Privy Council, however, these 
bodies were selected by the legislature as an independent check, and 
were thus accorded the express power to advise, or (in several states) 
make decisions with, the chief executive.136 Perhaps most striking, the 
new republican governors could not exercise a veto, and could not 
adjourn or prorogue the legislature as could their royal 
predecessors.137 
135. See PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 3, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, 
at 3081, 3084; N.H. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
2451;  see also NEVINS, supra note 128, at 166 (describing the "subordination of the executive 
branch to the legislature" in the state constitutions). 
136. In Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, the councils in certain matters had the 
power of consent; in the other states the power of the councils was advisory. See DEL. 
CONST. OF 1776, arts. 8-9, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 563-
64; GA. CONST. OF 1777, arts. II, XIX-XXV, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 777, 778-81; MD. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XXVI, XXXIIl-XXXIX, reprinted in 3 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1695-97; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. 
II, § I, arts. III, IV, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1900-01; 
id. at pt. II, ch. II, § 3, arts. I-IV, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
1888, 1904-05; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, 
at 2453, 2463-66; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art VIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV, reprinted in 5 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, arts. V, VIII-IX, 
XXXl-XXXII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3249, 3255; 
S.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. V, XII-XIV, XXV,. reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 3241, 3244, 3246-47; VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 31, reprinted in 7 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3817. 
137. Under nine of the state constitutions adopted during this period, the governor had 
no power to prorogue, dissolve, or adjourn, and seven of the constitutions lacked any 
provision for a veto. The first South Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided for a veto but 
did not provide for a power to prorogue, dissolve, or adjourn; the New York constitution 
allowed the other powers, but lacked a genuine gubernatorial veto, instead creating a council 
of revision, of which the governor was a part, which could veto legislation subject to an 
override by two-thirds of each house of the legislature. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 10, 
reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 564; GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. 
XIX-XX, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 781; MD. CONST. OF 
1776, art. XXXIll, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1697; N.Y. 
CONST. OF 1777, arts III, XVIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
2623, 2628-29, 2632-33; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XVIII-XX, reprinted in 5 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791-92; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, arts. XVI-XVII, 
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3252-53; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, 
arts. VII-VIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3244; VA. 
CONST. OF 1776, para. 30, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 
3817; VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, § XIV, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 3737, 3744. The second Vermont Constitution provided for a provisional veto that 
put a bill over to the next session. See Vt. CONST. OF 1786, ch. 2, § XVI, reprinted in 6 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3757. Pennsylvania, which had a plural executive 
council with a nominal president instead of a true governor, likewise made no provision for 
the executive council to prorogue, dissolve, adjourn, or veto. See PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20, 
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3081, 3087-88. See also BAILYN, 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 102, at 66-70 (contrasting the power of royal and 
republican governors); KRUMAN, supra note 121, at 123-26 (arguing that both the legacy of 
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The republican state executive also lost out with regard to 
government appointments, a process that the legislatures dominated. 
Indeed, no governor had the exclusive power to appoint either judges 
or certain officials that today would be termed executive, such as the 
secretary of state, the comptroller, and military officers. In a number 
of states the power to make such appointments was vested exclusively 
in the legislatureY8 Moreover, in most of the constitutions adopted in 
the first wave of state constitution-making, the election of the 
governor himself was assigned to the legislature rather than to the 
electorate.139 
prerogative power as well as "the framers' sense of a functional separation of powers" 
contributed to a denial of the veto power to the new republican governors); WOOD, supra 
note 68, at 141 ("Even among those who desired a stronger magistrate than most, it seemed 
abominable that a single person should have a negative over the voice of the whole 
society."). 
138. Delaware illustrated several approaches at once in providing that the chief 
executive could appoint judges jointly with the Assembly, see DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 12, 
reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 564-65; and could appoint civil 
officers unless otherwise directed by the Assembly, see art. 16, 1 id. at 565; yet mandating 
that the Assembly itself appoint all military officers, see 1 id. Several states emphasized the 
council as a check, with Maryland subjecting the governor's appointments to council 
approval, see MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XL VIII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 1686, 1699; and Vermont vesting the power in the chief executive and council 
jointly, see VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. II, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 3737, 3745. Somewhat surprisingly, New York placed most appointments 
in a council of appointment, a body in which the governor had only one vote, and vested 
selection of the state treasurer in the Assembly. See N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXIII, 
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2633-34. A number of states 
went still further and vested either all, or at least significant, judicial, civil, and military 
appointments in the legislature. See, e.g. , VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 13, reprinted in 7 STA TE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3817 (vesting appointment of Supreme Court, 
Chancery, and Admiralty judges, as well as the Attorney General, in the Assembly). 
139. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 STA TE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 562, 563; GA . CONST. OF 1 777, arts. II, XIII, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 777, 778-781; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXV, reprinted in 3 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1695; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. VII, reprinted in 5 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XV, 
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, 
art. III, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3249; S.C. CONST. OF 
1776, art. III, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3243; VA. 
CONST. OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 
3817. The two exceptions were Vermont, which provided for public election of the governor 
to a one-year term, see VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. II, § XVII, reprinted in 6 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3744; and New York, which provided for public 
election of the governor to a three-year term, see N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XVII, reprinted 
in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2632. As has widely been noted, the 
New York constitution was ahead of its time in terms of separation of powers and executive 
authority. In contrast to other constitutions adopted immediately after independence, New 
York provided for a substantially more powerful governor through such mechanisms as a 
qualified veto, the authority to convene and prorogue the assembly, and the authority to 
appoint judges. In its different realization of executive authority, New York anticipated the 
"second wave" of reform constitutions such as the Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
constitutions, as well as the Federal Constitution. For a discussion of the New York 
Constitution in the constitutional development of the period, see Flaherty, Most Dangerous 
Branch, supra note 1 19, at 1768-70. 
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Contrary to what essentialist theory might predict, none of the 
constitutions adopted during this period simply granted the "executive 
power," or, having done so, proceeded to specify what inherently 
executive powers would be shared with the other branches - the 
strategy that essentialist scholars attribute to Article II of the federal 
Constitution. About half of the early state constitutions did preface 
their treatment of the executive branch with some general provision 
concerning executive power. 140 Such texts, however, were always 
followed by specific grants of powers, such as the power to pardon, the 
commander-in-chief power, and the power to appoint civil and 
military officials, that would have been superfluous if the general 
clause were expected to encompass the universe of executive authority 
that modern essentialists assume.141 This pattern indicates that, to the 
extent these general executive power provisions conveyed anything, 
140 . Four state constitutions expressly employed the term "vest," though in 
Pennsylvania and Vermont, the latter of which produced two constitutions during the period 
under consideration, the term was applied to a plural executive. See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, 
art. XVII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2632 ("(T]he 
supreme executive power and authority of this State shall be vested in a governor."); PA. 
CONST. OF 1776, § 3, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3081, 3084 
("The supreme executive power shall be vested in a president and council."); VT. CONST. OF 
1786, ch. 2, § 3, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3754 ("The 
supreme executive power shall be vested in a Governor (or, in his absence, a Lieutenant­
Governor) and Council."); VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, § 3, reprinted in 6 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3743 ("The supreme executive power shall be 
vested in a Governor and Council."). Five other state constitutions arguably employed the 
equivalent of vesting language with such formulations as the governor, chief magistrate, or 
president "shall exercise" or "have" executive power, or "shall execute" the laws. See GA. 
CONST. OF 1777, art. XIX, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 781 
("The governor shall, with the advice of the executive council, exercise the executive powers 
of government, according to the laws of this State and the constitution thereof . . . .  "); N.J. 
CONST. OF 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 
2596 ("(T]he Governor, or in his absence, the Vice-President of the Council, shall have the 
supreme executive power . . . .  "); S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3250 ("(T]he executive authority be vested in the 
governor and commander-in-chief, in the manner herein mentioned."); S.C. CONST. OF 1776, 
art. XXX, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247 ("(T]he 
executive authority be vested in the president and commander-in-chief, limited and 
restrained as aforesaid."); VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3816 ("A Governor, or chief magistrate . . .  shall, 
with the advice of a Council of State, exercise the executive powers of government according 
to the laws of this Commonwealth."). 
141 . See GA. CONST. OF 1777, arts. XIX, XX-XXII, reprinted in 2 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 777, 781 ;  N.J. CONST. OF 1776, arts. VIII, XIX, reprinted 
in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, arts. VII­
XIX, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2623, 2632-33; PA. CONST. OF 
1776, § 20, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3081, 3087-88; S.C. 
CONST. of 1778, arts. XVIII, XXIX-XXXIII, XXXV, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 3248, 3254-55; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XXII-XXVI, reprinted in 6 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3246-67; VT. CONST. OF 1786 art. XI, 
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3756; VT. CONST. OF 1777, 
art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3745; VA. CONST. 
OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3816-17. 
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they conveyed no more than a general power of implementing and 
enforcing the laws. 
The other state constitutions dealt with executive authority in even 
more guarded fashion. Two constitutions, in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire, simply set up a governor or equivalent, listed discrete 
powers, and refrained from any general language suggesting further 
grants of authority.142 Several others set forth a detailed list of discrete 
executive powers, followed by a catch-all phrase declaring that the 
chief magistrate could also exercise "other" executive powers. These 
phrases, however, were always qualified with language that made clear 
that the exercise of executive authority had to be consistent with the 
constitution, the laws, or both.143 
Notably, language mandating that executive power accord with the 
constitution or laws appeared even in some constitutions that prefaced 
their treatment of executive power with the more general provisions. 
Virginia, for example, required that executive powers had to be 
exercised "according to the laws of this Commonwealth." 144 The 
second South Carolina constitution was particularly explicit in this 
regard, stating that "the executive authority be vested in the governor 
and commander-in-chief, in manner herein mentioned."145 
The prevailing state approach, therefore, may be summarized as 
follows. In no instance did a state constitution list executive powers 
simply for the purpose of specifying exceptions to some general grant 
of authority. Instead, the early state constitutions adopted an array of 
strategies with respect to executive power, which in and of itself 
should give pause to anyone who would make ready generalizations 
about what the Founding generation thought as a whole on the nature 
of executive power. Common to all approaches, however, was an 
emphasis on specific delegations of authority. General language was 
used to delegate only the power to implement the laws, and in any 
case was invariably followed with additional grants of ostensibly 
executive powers, and often was further limited with language 
142 See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § I, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 1888, 1899-1903; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. 2, reprinted in 4 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2462-65. 
143. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 562, 563 (subjecting the exercise of executive power to the constitution and laws); 
MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 STA TE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
1686, 1696 (subjecting the exercise of executive power to the laws); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, 
art. XIX, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791-92 (subjecting 
executive power to constitution and laws). 
144. VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 29, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 3812, 3816. 
145. S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, 
at 3248, 3250 (emphasis added). See also S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXX, reprinted in 6 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247 (granting executive authority "limited 
and restrained as aforesaid"). 
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requiring the exercise of executive authority to accord with the state 
constitution, laws, or both. In short, nothing in the state constitutions 
indicates that American constitutionmakers sought to vest executive 
officials with broad powers that were not otherwise specified.146 
This pattern - strong legislatures and limited and defined execu­
tive powers - extended to foreign affairs. Contrary to popular per­
ception,147 the first state constitutions necessarily addressed external 
powers, in part because they were drafted amidst the uncertainties of 
war and in part because the national government lacked an operative 
written framework until the Articles of Confederation were rati­
fied in 1781. 148 Accordingly, all fifteen of the constitutions under 
consideration addressed the militia, 149 and ten specified additional 
146. In contrast to his article written with Professor Ramsey, Professor Prakash's 
subsequent study on executive power does examine the early state constitutions in some 
detail and comes to conclusions similar to our own concerning the dominance of the 
legislatures. As he puts it: 
[M]ost states adopted constitutions that, although they paid lip service to the separation 
adage, nonetheless made their executive powers appendages of the legislature. With notable 
exceptions, executives were appointed by the legislature, faced term limits, could not 
appoint executive officers, and lacked the veto authority. To top it off, the few constitutional 
powers they did enjoy were often subject to legislative alteration. 
Prakash, supra note 26, at 756-57. Professor Prakash goes on to argue, however, that the 
weak executives that characterized the state constitutions became a sort of anti-template 
that ignored the wisdom of Montesquieu, wisdom that was rediscovered by the time of the 
Federal Convention. See id. at 768-79. As noted above, see supra note 27, we do not 
necessarily disagree with Professor Prakash that the term "executive power" might have 
been understood by the Founders to refer generically to the authority to implement the laws. 
We disagree with Professor Prakash's suggestion, however, of a settled and specific 
understanding of executive power, and we particularly disagree with the claim by Professors 
Prakash and Ramsey that such a settled and specific understanding extended to foreign 
affairs. 
147. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 278-79 n.209 ("For the most part, 
state constitutions said little specific about foreign affairs."). 
148. See RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 80-91 
(1987). 
149. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 562, 563; GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 777, 782; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1686, 1696; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. 
VIII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1901; N.H. CONST. OF 
1784, pt. 2, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2463-64; N.H. 
CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2451 ,  2453; N.J. 
CONST. OF 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 
2596; N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 2623, 2632-33; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791; PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20, reprinted in 5 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3081, 3088-89; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXIII, 
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3255; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, 
art. XXVI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247; VT. CONST. 
OF 1786, ch. 2, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3756; 
VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, 
at 3737, 3745; VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 33, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 3812, 3817. 
582 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:545 
powers concerning external relations such as the power to lay 
embargoes.150 To the extent that the executives were granted foreign 
affairs powers, those powers were often shared with the advisory 
council or the legislature. Both the 1776 and 1778 South Carolina 
constitutions, for example, prohibited the governor from commencing 
war, concluding peace, or entering into treaties without the consent 
of the legislature. 151 Furthermore, although the state constitutions 
typically made the executive the commander in chief of the state's 
armed forces, a number of the constitutions required approval of the 
executive council, or even the legislature, to exercise the commander­
in-chief power, even to the point of restricting the governor's ability to 
assume command in person.152 In addition, the states typically either 
made the appointment of military officers subject to legislative 
approval, or mandated that the legislature alone make military 
appointments, or otherwise placed appointment outside the 
governor's control, as in election of officers by militia companies 
themselves.153 
150. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 9, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 562, 564; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXllI, reprinted in 3 ST A TE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 1686, 1696; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. X, reprinted in 3 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1902; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. 2, reprinted 
in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2463-64; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. 
XIX, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791; PA. CONST. OF 
1776, § 20, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 3081, 3088-89; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, arts. 
XXXIII, XXXV, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3255; S.C. 
CONST. OF 1776, art. XXVI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 
3247; VT. CONST. OF 1786, ch. 2, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 3749, 3756; VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3745. 
151. See S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXllI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 3248, 3255; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXVI, reprinted in 6 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247. 
152. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 9, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 562, 563; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXllI, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 1686, 1696; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. VIII, reprinted in 
3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1901; PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20, reprinted 
in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 121, at 3081, 3088-89; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. 
XXVI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247; VT. CONST. OF 
1786, ch. 2, art. XI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3756; VT. 
CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
3737, 3745. Although the North Carolina and Virginia constitutions did not expressly subject 
aspects of the commander-in-chief power to the consent of the legislature or council, the 
North Carolina constitution provided that the governor could "embody," or call up, the 
militia only during the recess of the legislature, see N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVIII, 
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2787, 2791, while the Virginia 
constitution stated that the governor would have the power to direct the militia "according 
to the laws of the country," VA. CONST. OF 1776, para. 34, reprinted in 7 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3812, 3817. 
153. Five state constitutions expressly lodged the appointment of either high-ranking or 
all military officers in the legislature. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 16, reprinted in 1 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 562, 565; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, art. X, 
reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1902; N.H. CONST. OF 1776 
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Significantly, these examples of ongoing supervision of the 
executive appeared in later constitutions that were adopted during the 
1780s. Not long after independence, leading observers came to 
conclude that the nation's first experiments in framing government 
were flawed. Rethinking separation of powers would prove to be a 
prominent feature of constitutional reform. Fundamental among the 
insights that experience under the state constitutions suggested was 
the sobering possibility that the people could tyrannize themselves. 
Where classical theory indicated that republican government typically 
descended into anarchy, in effect too much liberty, state laws 
infringing rights of property, contract, and trial by jury appeared to 
demonstrate that concentrating power in the legislatures had instead 
resulted in the oxymoron that John Adams famously dubbed 
"democratic despotism."154 Madison also referred to this phenomenon 
during the debates in the Federal Convention, when he noted that, 
"Experience has proved a tendency in our governments to throw all 
power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in 
reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2451 ,  2453; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, 
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2596; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, 
art. XIV, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129,' at 2787, 2791. In addition, 
both South Carolina constitutions, as well as the Virginia constitution, while initially vesting 
military appointments elsewhere, indicated that the legislature could alter the procedures 
regarding the military and presumably accord the appointment power to itself. See S.C. 
CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 
3255; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXV, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, 
at 3241,  3247; VA. CONST. OF 1776, paras. 33-34, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 3812, 3817. Seven constitutions placed the authority to appoint either all or high­
ranking military officers in the governor, subject to the approval of the executive council. See 
MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XL VII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
1686, 1699; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. II, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 2453, 2464-65; PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20, reprinted in 5 STA TE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 3081, 3087; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 6 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3248, 3255; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXV, reprinted in 
6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3241, 3247; VT. CONST. OF 1786, ch. II, art. XI, 
reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3749, 3756; VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 
II, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 3737, 3745. Four 
constitutions specified that the appointment of inferior officers would rest with their 
individual companies. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II, art. X, reprinted in 3 STA TE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1902; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. II, reprinted in 4 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2453, 2464-65; N.H. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 
4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2451,  2453; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. X, 
reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 2594, 2596. The New York 
constitution vested appointments generally in the governor and a council constituted for that 
purpose. See N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 2623, 2633. The Georgia constitution provided that the governor, with the advice 
of the council, would fill all intermediate appointments until the next general election, at 
least implying that the ultimate authority to determine appointment procedures rested with 
the legislature. See GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXI, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 129, at 777, 781. No state constitution expressly vested the appointment of 
military officers in the governor alone. 
154. See WOOD, supra note 68, at 404. 
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general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent."155 This 
discovery that the people could tyrannize themselves, and the ensuing 
return to the constitutional drawing board, remain perhaps the central 
episodes in the narrative that constitutional historians have 
reconstructed over the past several generations. 156 
In response to these perceived abuses by the legislatures, some 
states moved to make the executive more independent of the 
legislature. The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for example, made 
the governor subject to popular election and gave him, along with an 
advice council, powers of appointment and a veto power over 
legislation subject to an override by two-thirds of each house of the 
legislature. 157 His specific, substantive powers, however, were still 
limited and defined. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution 
goes into great detail about what exactly the governor's commander­
in-chief power entails, stating, for example, that the governor would 
have the power "to take and surprise, by all ways and means 
whatsoever, all and every such person or persons, with their ships, 
arms, ammunition, and other goods, as shall, in a hostile manner, 
invade, or attempt the invading, conquering, or annoying this 
commonwealth." 158 It also states that the governor's specifically 
enumerated commander-in-chief powers had to be "exercised 
agreeably to the rules and regulations of the constitution, and the laws 
of the land, and not otherwise."159 So, even here, the legislature was 
given significant, and ultimately controlling, authority. The 
Massachusetts Constitution also gave the legislature power to make 
significant appointments, including appointment of various military 
officials.160 
In sum, the state constitutions reflected a sharp break from the 
royal prerogative model of executive power, even with respect to 
foreign affairs. As the Critical Period progressed, some states moved 
to enhance the independence and authority of the executive branch, 
155. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 35. 
156. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 237-62 (1988); MCDONALD, supra note 121, at 
143-83; WOOD, supra note 68, at 391-467; Rakove, supra note 65, at 35-56. 
157. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 11, ch. II, § I, arts. II-III, reprinted in 3 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1900 (making governor subject to popular 
election); id. at pt. II, ch. I, § I, art. II, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, 
at 1888, 1893 (giving governor veto power); id. at pt. II, ch. II, § I, arts. IX-X, reprinted in 3 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 1888, 1902 (giving governor appointment power). 
158. See id. at pt. II, ch. II, § I, art. VII, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 1888, 1901. 
159. Id. 
160. See id. at pt. II, ch. II, § I ,  art. X, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
129, at 1888, 1902; id. at pt. II, ch. II, § IV, art. I, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 129, at 1888, 1905. 
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but they did so in order to provide a check on the legislature, not 
because of some essentialist conception of executive power. 
Moreover, the actual allocation of executive power remained specific 
and functional rather than categorical and essentialist. 
C. Lessons from the Continental Congress 
The experience at the national level during this period further 
contradicts the story of continuity posited by executive power 
essentialists. The Continental Congress, made up of delegates from 
the colonies, first met in September 1774 to discuss and seek redress of 
American grievances against the British. Fighting subsequently broke 
out between American and British forces at Lexington and Concord in 
April 1775, and a second Continental Congress met the next month. 
At that point, Congress began to manage American foreign affairs, 
including, most notably, the conduct of the revolutionary war.161 
For its first seven years, Congress operated without a ratified 
constitutive document. To justify the separation of the thirteen states 
from England, Congress did of course issue the Declaration of 
Independence. The Declaration observed that, with their separation, 
the states had "full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract 
Alliances, establish Commerce, and do all other Acts and Things 
which Independent States may of right do."162 The Declaration did not 
tie these foreign relations powers to any particular governmental 
structure, and it certainly did not suggest that these powers inherently 
had to be exercised by an executive branch. Nor, as explained above, 
did the state constitutions being developed at this point reflect an 
understanding that foreign affairs powers had to be assigned to the 
executive. 
Congress agreed on the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual 
Union in 1777, but the Articles did not take effect until 1781, after 
they had been ratified by all the states. There is nothing in Congress's 
experience, either before or after the adoption of the Articles, that 
suggests an understanding that foreign affairs powers had to be vested 
in an executive branch. As an initial matter, it is worth noting the 
obvious: the national government did not have an executive branch 
prior to the Constitution, and thus exercised its foreign affairs powers 
through Congress. Furthermore, under the Articles, the exercise of 
161. See generally EDMUND CODY BURNETI, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1941); 
JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF POLITICAL 
LEGITIMACY, 1774-1776, at 206-23 (1987); PETER S. 0NUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1787 (1983); 
JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 38-49 (1935). 
162. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 429, 432 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
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many important foreign affairs powers, including going to war, 
entering into treaties, and appointing military commanders, required 
the concurrence of at least nine of the thirteen states, and the 
appointment of state representatives in Congress was determined by 
the state legislatures.163 Furthermore, during this period, a number of 
states engaged in their own foreign affairs activities, frequently 
through their legislatures.164 These facts, by themselves, would seem to 
substantially undermine the claim that foreign affairs powers were 
viewed as inherently associated with an executive. 
The Continental Congress did handle many foreign affairs issues 
through committees, and subsequently through departments. For 
example, in November 1775, Congress established a Committee of 
Correspondence to communicate with and seek support from 
sympathizers in Europe. This committee was eventually succeeded by 
a more general Committee for Foreign Affairs. These committees, 
however, reported back to the full Congress and were subject to 
Congress's direction and control. 165 In the early 1780s, Congress 
moved to establish departments, including a Department of Foreign 
Affairs, that would be headed by a single secretary. The heads of these 
departments, however, were appointed by and controlled by Congress. 
As John Jay noted when he was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, "I am 
to be governed by the Instructions, and it is my Duty faithfully to 
execute the Orders of Congress. " 166 Moreover, the duties of the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs were largely ministerial, and "all matters 
of great importance were referred to Congress."167 Furthermore, the 
justifications Congress gave for creating the foreign affairs department 
were purely functional rather than essentialist. In particular, a 
congressional committee determined that "a fixed and permanent 
Office for the department of foreign affairs ought forthwith to be 
established as a remedy against the fluctuation, the delay and 
163. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. l; id. at art. IX, para. 6. 
164. See, e.g. , NEVINS, supra note 128, at 658-60; Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the 
American Revolution: An Historical Study, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1907). We take no 
position here on whether the national government's foreign relations powers were originally 
derived from the states, a matter of significant historical debate. See GREENE, supra note 
121, at 178-80 (discussing this debate). 
165. See, e.g. , SANDERS, supra note 161, at 40-41, 45-46. 
166. Letter from John Jay to the President of Congress (Aug. 3, 1786), in 3 THE 
EMERGING NATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1780-1789, at 247, 255 (Mary 
A. Giunta et al. eds., 1996). 
167 . SANDERS, supra note 161, at 1 14; see also 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE CREATION OF A 
REPUBLICAN EMPIRE, 1776-1865, at 55 (1993) (noting that Congress kept the Department 
"on a very short leash"); ELMER PLISCHKE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 11 (1999) 
(explaining that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was "regarded as little more than a 
congressional clerk"). 
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indecision to which the present mode of managing our foreign affairs 
must be exposed."168 There is no hint of executive power essentialism 
in this reasoning. 
The list of powers in the Articles of Confederation is also 
revealing. Like the later Constitution, the Articles assigned specific 
foreign affairs powers to the national government, and expressly 
prohibited the states from engaging in specified foreign affairs 
activities. Thus, for example, the national government was assigned 
the powers of "determining on peace and war," sending and re­
ceiving ambassadors, and entering into treaties.169 The states were, 
correspondingly, prohibited from entering into treaties, sending and 
receiving ambassadors, and engaging in war, unless they obtained 
Congress's consent.170 The Articles never used the word "executive" to 
refer to foreign affairs powers, and they certainly did not use that 
word as a shorthand for an unspecified package of foreign affairs 
powers. Instead, they listed and defined the foreign affairs powers of 
the Continental Congress with great specificity. Prakash and Ramsey 
seek to explain away this feature of the Articles by suggesting that 
"the drafters of the Articles did not employ the most economical 
phrasing." 171 The phrasing of the Articles, however, is perfectly 
economical with respect to the assignment of foreign affairs powers, 
once one rejects the Vesting Clause Thesis. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that essentially all of the foreign affairs powers 
referred to in the Articles are also referred to in the Constitution.172 
That the Constitution specifically carries forward the foreign affairs 
powers listed in the Articles of Confederation (and, in fact, adds to 
them), further undercuts the assertion that the Founders would have 
perceived some undefined package of foreign affairs powers that had 
to be encompassed by the Article II Vesting Clause.173 In fact, James 
168. Congressional Committee Report and Resolution (Jan. 10, 1781), in 1 THE 
EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 139, 140. 
169. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 1 .  
170. Id. at art. VI. 
171. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 275 n.191. 
172 . Unlike the Articles of Confederation, however, the Constitution does not 
specifically refer to a power of "determining on peace." The lack of such a specific reference 
became an issue in the Neutrality Controversy of 1793, discussed below in Part IV.E. 
173. Prakash and Ramsey could be read to suggest that the Continental Congress was 
granted unspecified executive powers by virtue of Article IX, paragraph 5, of the Articles of 
Confederation, which provided that Congress would have the power to "appoint such other 
committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the 
united states under their direction." See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 275 & n.191. 
This appointment power, however, did not by its terms suggest any additional substantive 
powers, and we know of no support during the Critical Period for construing it as granting 
such powers. Furthermore, the Articles of Confederation specifically reserved to the states 
"every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated 
to the United States," thereby making clear that the Articles were not delegating unspecified 
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Madison made clear in the Federalist Papers that, other than adding 
the commerce power, the Constitution "does not enlarge" the foreign 
affairs powers listed in the Articles of Confederation, but rather 
simply "substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them."174 
Prakash and Ramsey note correctly, although vaguely, that the 
national government had difficulty managing foreign affairs under 
the Articles. 175 The Federalist Papers begin, in fact, by noting the 
"inefficacy of the subsisting federal government,"176 and it is clear from 
subsequent essays that Publius had foreign affairs concerns 
prominently in mind. Similarly, early in the Federal Convention, 
Edmund Randolph began by listing the defects of the Confederation, 
many of which concerned the conduct of foreign affairs. 177 These 
defects, suggest Prakash and Ramsey, persuaded the Founders to 
incorporate the purported Locke/Blackstone/Montesquieu conception 
of executive power essentialism into the Constitution, through the 
Article II Vesting Clause. 
The difficulties under the Articles, however, and the efforts by the 
constitutional Founders to respond to them, are at best unconnected 
to the Vesting Clause Thesis, and at worst substantially in tension with 
it. By the time of the Federal Convention, it was perceived that the 
Articles were deficient in at least three respects concerning the 
management of foreign affairs.178 First, there was no clear indication in 
the Articles that treaties operated as supreme law of the land. This 
omission, combined with the lack of a national court system, meant 
that the national government had difficulty preventing states from 
violating treaty provisions, especially the peace treaty with Great 
powers. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II (emphasis added); see also 
MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 
SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781, at 130 
(1940) ("[T]he final draft of the Articles of Confederation was a pact between thirteen 
sovereign states which agreed to delegate certain powers for specific purposes, while they 
retained all powers not expressly delegated by them to the central government."). 
174. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 45 (James Madison), at 293. 
175. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 278. 
176. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), at 33. 
177. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 19. 
178. See Jack N. Rakove, Making Foreign Policy - The View from 1 787, in FOREIGN 
POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1,  2-4 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990) ; 
see also FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1973) (discussing inadequacies in the Articles of 
Confederation); PERKINS, supra note 167, at 17-53 (same); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE 
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS 342-52 (1979) (same). There were other deficiencies in the Articles that did not 
directly concern foreign affairs but that nevertheless implicated foreign affairs, such as the 
lack of a power to regulate directly on the people, see THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 
15 (Alexander Hamilton), at 108, and the lack of a taxing power, see id. No. 30 (Alexander 
Hamilton), at 188-91. 
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Britain. In turn, Great Britain used the state violations as an excuse 
for continuing to occupy its northwestern forts in the United States. It 
was in this context that John Jay expressed the view that the states 
had, "by express delegation of Power, formed and vested in Congress a 
perfect though limited Sovereignty for the general and National pur­
poses specified in the [Articles of] Confederation."179 This experience 
of state violation of treaty commitments obviously was on the minds of 
the constitutional Founders, and they addressed it directly by 
including a Supremacy Clause in the Constitution that refers to 
treaties, and also by providing for the creation of a national court 
system.180 This federalism problem, however, has nothing to do with 
the Vesting Clause Thesis. 
A second foreign affairs problem under the Articles was that the 
Continental Congress had not been given the power to regulate 
commerce, including foreign commerce. As a result, it lacked leverage 
in negotiating trade concessions from other countries, especially from 
Britain and France. Threats by the Continental Congress to restrict 
access to U.S. markets were ineffectual, since each state could set its 
own foreign trade policy, and at least some states would tend to 
deviate from the purported national policy. The constitutional 
Founders addressed this problem as well in the Constitution, by 
assigning to Congress the power to regulate commerce. 181 This 
experience - which showed the need to increase Congress's foreign 
affairs powers - hardly shows that foreign affairs authority inherently 
was associated with an executive branch. 
The third foreign affairs problem has at least some connection to 
the U.S. presidency, but it too is unsupportive of the Vesting Clause 
Thesis. The problem was that the United States had trouble 
negotiating with foreign nations through a legislative body rather than 
through an independent executive branch. John Jay's efforts to 
negotiate with Spain over navigation rights on the lower Mississippi 
were the most prominent example of this problem. Jay's efforts were 
repeatedly hampered by the fact that Congress, as a plural body 
representing different regional interests, had difficulty agreeing on the 
U.S. negotiating position, and by the fact that, when it could agree, 
it often micromanaged Jay's efforts. 182 Thus, for example, Jay 
179. John Jay's Report on State Laws Contrary to the Treaty of Peace (Oct. 13, 1786), in 
3 THE EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 334 (emphasis added). Echoing Jay's views, 
the President of Congress subsequently sent a letter to the state governors stating that "the 
Thirteen Independent Sovereign States have by express delegation of power formed and 
Vested in us a general, though limited Sovereignty, for the general and National purposes 
specified in the Confederation." Letter from the President of Congress to the State 
Governors (April 13, 1787) , in 3 THE EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 472, 473. 
180. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 3 (John Jay), at 43-45. 
181. See id. No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). 
182. See SANDERS, supra note 161, at 124. 
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complained to Congress that he found "exceedingly embarrassing" its 
directive that, in negotiating with Spain, he was required to 
communicate in advance to Congress every proposition he would 
make to the Spanish representative, and also to report back to 
Congress on every proposition that the representative made to him 
during the negotiations.183 Jay also wrote to Jefferson, complaining 
that he would "often experience unreasonable Delays and successive 
Obstacles in obtaining the Decision and Sentiments of Congress, even 
on points which require Dispatch." 184 The situation was so problematic 
that Jay eventually suggested that Congress consider appointing a 
committee "with power to instruct and direct me on every point and 
Subject relative to the proposed treaty with Spain. " 185 
Once again, the constitutional Founders addressed this problem 
with specific text: they assigned the treaty power to an independent 
President who could negotiate more effectively than a legislative body. 
It was through such specific assignments of power, and through the 
structure of the presidency, that the Founders sought to achieve what 
Hamilton referred to in the Federalist Papers as "energy in the 
183. Letter from John Jay to the President of Congress (August 15, 1785), in 1 THE 
EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 744; see also Letter from John Jay to the President of 
Congress (Aug. 10, 1785), in 3 THE EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 257, 257-58 
(stating that it was impossible for him instantly to execute Congress's order that he convey 
to Congress "without Delay" any information he received concerning France's views of U.S. 
rights of navigation on the Mississippi and Spain's territorial claims on the east side of the 
Mississippi). In response to Jay's complaint about having to report back to Congress on 
every proposition made or received during the negotiations, Congress changed his 
instructions to eliminate that requirement. See Congressional Resolution Changing John 
Jay's Instructions for Negotiating a Treaty with Spain (Aug. 25, 1785), in 2 THE EMERGING 
NATION, supra note 166, at 768-69. 
184. Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 18, 1786), in 3 THE EMERGING 
NATION, supra note 166, at 266, 266-67; see also Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson 
(Jan. 19, 1786), in 3 THE EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 69, 69-70 (complaining 
about Congress's failure to pay sufficient attention to foreign affairs). Jay also noted in some 
of his correspondence that, in order for the government to operate effectively, the 
legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the government should be separated, albeit 
with checks on each other. As he explained in a letter to Washington, "Let Congress 
legislate - let others execute - let others judge." Letter from John Jay to George 
Washington (Jan. 7, 1787), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 
226, 227 (Henry P. Johnston ed., New York, Putnam 1891); see also Letter from John Jay to 
Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 18, 1786), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF 
JOHN JAY, supra, at 210, 210 (stating that the "three great departments of sovereignty should 
be forever separated, and so distributed as to serve as checks on each other"); Letter from 
John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 14, 1786), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra, at 222, 223 (stating that "government should be divided into 
executive, legislative, and judicial departments"). This separation, Jay further explained, 
would not itself answer the question of which powers should be assigned to the government, 
"a question which deserves much thought." 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF JOHN JAY, supra, at 227-28. Jay thus appeared to conceive of "executive power" as the 
power to execute the laws. 
185. Letter from John Jay to the President of Congress (May 29, 1786), in 3 THE 
EMERGING NATION, supra note 166, at 190, 190. 
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executive."186 Even on the treaty-power issue, however, the Founders 
limited executive power by requiring the President to obtain the 
advice and consent of the Senate, the smaller of the two houses of the 
new national legislature.187 The Founders' decision that, for functional 
reasons, it would be better to have an independent executive rather 
than the legislature negotiate U.S. treaties hardly shows that they 
intended to delegate to the President a package of unspecified 
additional powers out of some notion of executive power essentialism. 
There are statements during this period, as Prakash and Ramsey 
emphasize, referring to the foreign affairs department and other 
congressional departments as "executive." 188 This label, however, 
appears to have been used simply to refer to the role of the 
departments in executing congressional policy. Robert Morris had 
complained, for example, that so long as Congress attempted "to 
execute as well as deliberate on their business it never will be done as 
it ought."189 And the Continental Congress made clear its intention 
that when it referred a matter to a department, the matter would be 
"carried into execution." 190 There is no evidence that the label 
"executive" referred to an understood bundle of foreign affairs or 
other substantive powers. Indeed, as noted above, the key foreign 
relations powers granted by the Articles of Confederation were 
retained and exercised by Congress as a whole even after the 
establishment of the "executive" departments.191 
186. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), at 423. 
187. As discussed below, the delegates at the Federal Convention initially contemplated 
that the Senate alone would have the treaty power, and only late in the Convention decided 
to divide the treaty power between the Senate and President. See infra Parts III.A., IV.A. 
188. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 274-76; see also, e.g., Letter from Robert 
R. Livingston to Benjamin Franklin (Oct. 20, 1781), in 1 THE EMERGING NATION, supra 
note 166, at 257, 257 (referring to the "great Executive Departments"). 
189. MARSTON, supra note 161, at 307. 
190. 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 722 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1914). 
191. Prakash and Ramsey also rely on the 1778 pamphlet, Essex Result. Apparently 
written by Theophilus Parsons (a leading Massachusetts lawyer and subsequently chief 
justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court), this pamphlet called for rejection of a draft 
Massachusetts constitution because, among other things, the executive was given insufficient 
power. See ESSEX RESULT (1778), reprinted in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF 
THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359 (1859); see also THACH, supra note 122, at 44-49 (discussing this 
pamphlet). The pamphlet thus proposed, for example, that the executive be given a veto 
power over legislation and full command over the state's military forces, proposals that were 
subsequently included in the constitution adopted by Massachusetts in 1780. As discussed 
above, however, the 1780 constitution also defined the governor's commander-in-chief 
powers in great detail, and stated that these powers had to be "exercised agreeably to the 
rules and regulations of the constitution, and the laws of the land, and not otherwise." See 
supra text accompanying notes 157-160. In discussing executive power, Essex Result noted 
that this power "is sometimes divided into the external executive, and internal executive," 
and that "[t]he former comprehends war, peace, the sending and receiving ambassadors, and 
whatever concerns the transactions of the state with any other independent state." ESSEX 
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Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDING 
A. The Federal Convention 
Far from supporting the Vesting Clause Thesis, the records of the 
Federal Convention all but devastate it. The records show that as the 
delegates drafted and negotiated the constitutional text, they 
attempted to specify the powers being granted to the executive 
branch. Although there were occasional references to the concept of 
executive power in the abstract, the records make clear that there was 
no consensus on what was encompassed by that concept, with 
delegates disagreeing, for example, over whether powers relating to 
war, peace, and treatymaking were executive in nature. Furthermore, 
although one should always be cautious about making inferences from 
silence, it is telling that there is not a single reference to the Vesting 
Clause Thesis in all of the records of the Federal Convention. The oft­
expressed opposition of many delegates to creating an executive that 
resembled the British monarch further weighs against the Thesis. 
The story begins on May 29, 1787. On that date, Edmund 
Randolph presented the Virginia Plan, which consisted of fifteen 
resolutions. The seventh resolution called for the establishment of a 
national executive, to be chosen by the national legislature.192 The 
resolution also stated that "besides a general authority to execute the 
National laws, [the national executive] ought to enjoy the Executive 
rights vested in Congress by the Confederation." 193 If this resolution 
had been adopted by the Convention, it might support the Vesting 
Clause Thesis, because it suggests a conception of "executive power" 
as a defined category that can be distinguished from legislative 
powers, albeit one limited by reference to the Articles of 
Confederation. Even this is not entirely clear, though, since the 
Virginia Plan was proposing general ideas, not constitutional 
language. As a result, it would have been consistent with this plan to 
specify the foreign affairs powers of the Executive, just as the Articles 
of Confederation had specified the foreign affairs powers of the 
Continental Congress. In any event, this resolution was not adopted 
RESULT, supra, at 373. The U.S. confederation, explained the pamphlet, had "lopped off this 
branch of the executive, and placed it in Congress." Id. Although these statements do appear 
to borrow from the taxonomy developed by some of the European theorists, it is notable 
that the pamphlet also recognizes that the "external executive power" can be divided from 
the "internal executive power" and can be exercised by a legislature, such as the Continental 
Congress. In this way the Essex Result echoes Locke properly understood, insofar as Locke 
distinguished between domestic executive power and foreign federative power, and 
acknowledged that these powers do not necessarily have to be vested in the same hands. See 
supra Part II.A. 
192. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 21. 
193. 1 id. 
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by the Convention. In fact, the conception of executive power 
reflected in this resolution was quickly rejected by the delegates, and 
all subsequent discussions of executive power by the delegates were in 
terms of specific grants of executive power rather than in terms of a 
collection of powers. 
On June 1, the delegates began considering Randolph's seventh 
resolution. There was general agreement with the idea of establishing 
a national executive. There was significant concern, however, about 
vesting too much power in the executive, and about using the British 
model as a benchmark for executive power. Charles Pinckney stated 
that he "was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive 
powers of (the existing) Congress might extend to peace & war &c 
which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, 
towit an elective one."194 John Rutledge similarly stated that "he was 
for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for 
giving him the power of war and peace. "195 Roger Sherman stated even 
more strongly that "he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing 
more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into 
effect."196 And James Wilson emphasized the impropriety of using the 
British monarchy as a model for executive power: 
He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper 
guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were 
of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only 
powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, 
and appointing officers, not (appertaining to and) appointed by the 
Legislature.197 
Among other things, it is clear from these statements that the speakers 
did not equate the concept of executive power with an accepted 
bundle of foreign relations powers. 
This concern about creating an executive that resembled the 
British monarch was part of the reason for some delegates' opposition 
to a singular, as opposed to a plural, executive. Randolph, for 
example, expressed the view that a singular executive would be the 
"fetus of Monarchy."198 Supporters of a singular executive denied that 
it would be similar to the British monarchy. Thus, Wilson "repeated 
that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable 
to the situation of this Country."199 
194. 1 id. at 64-65. 
195. 1 id. 
196. 1 id. 
197. 1 id. at 65-66. 
198. 1 id. at 66; see also 1 id. at 88 (statement by Randolph on June 2 that "the 
permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy"). 
199. 1 id. at 66. 
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At this point in the debate, Madison suggested that the delegates 
"fix the extent of the Executive authority" because "as certain powers 
were in their nature Executive, . . .  a definition of their extent would 
assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely 
entrusted to a single officer."200 Madison agreed with Wilson that 
executive powers "do not include the Rights of war & peace &c." and 
that "the powers should be confined and defined" because "if large we 
shall have the Evils of elective Monarchies. "201 He therefore moved 
that the national executive be vested with three powers - "to carry 
into execution the national laws," "to appoint to offices in cases not 
otherwise provided for," and "to execute such powers, not legislative 
or judiciary in their nature, as may from time to time be delegated by 
the national legislature. "202 The Committee of the Whole agreed to the 
motion but deleted the third listed power as "unnecessary, the object 
of them being included in the 'power to carry into effect the nation­
al laws.' "203 
Thus, in their first consideration of the issue, the delegates sharply 
rejected the purported Locke/Montesquieu/Blackstone assignment of 
powers. They disagreed, for example, that the powers over war and 
peace should be vested with the executive. As Professor Rakove has 
noted, "the remarks of June 1 demonstrate that the framers believed 
that questions of war and peace - that is, the most critical subjects of 
foreign policy were appropriate subjects for legislative 
determination rather than an inherent prerogative of executive 
power."204 Moreover, instead of relying on the British model or even 
the Continental Congress as a categorical reference, the delegates 
moved to, in Madison's words, "confine[] and define[]" the executive's 
powers. All subsequent discussions in the Federal Convention are 
consistent with this theme: the delegates continued to define the 
executive's powers, including his foreign affairs powers, and they 
never suggested that they were vesting him with unspecified residual 
powers. Moreover, to the extent that this discussion reveals any 
consensus about what is inherently part of executive power, it was 
simply that executive power entails the power to execute the laws. 
After the June 1 deliberations, there were a number of discussions 
concerning the manner of electing the executive, whether the 
executive should be plural or singular, whether the executive should 
have a veto power over legislation, and the executive's term of 
200. 1 id. at 66-67. John Dickinson similarly stated that "the powers of the Executive 
ought to be defined before we say in whom the power shall vest." 1 id. at 74. 
201. 1 id. at 70 (emphasis added). 
202. 1 id. at 63. 
203. 1 id. at 67. 
204. Rakove, supra note 65, at 239. 
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office. 205 These discussions were complicated and contentious. As 
George Mason noted at one point, "In every Stage of the Question 
relative to the Executive, the difficulty of the subject and the diversity 
of the opinions concerning it have appeared. "206 In these discussions, 
however, there was repeated agreement that the only powers being 
granted to the executive were those of executing the laws, making 
certain appointments, and (after additional discussion) vetoing 
legislation.207 This agreement is also reflected in the Report of the 
Committee of the Whole on June 13, which delineates these, and only 
these, executive powers. 208 There were also repeated, uncontested 
statements in these discussions that the U.S. executive should not 
resemble a monarchy. 
The alternative constitutional plans presented to the delegates 
were fully consistent with this approach. On June 15, William Paterson 
presented the New Jersey Plan. Under this plan, the executive would 
be elected by Congress, would be plural rather than singular, and 
would have "general authority to execute the federal acts" as well as 
the power "to appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, 
& to direct all military operations."209 Like Madison's amendment of 
the Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan spelled out the powers that 
would be vested in the executive. As for other foreign affairs powers, 
the Plan stated that Congress would have the powers specified in the 
Articles of Confederation, as well as a number of additional powers, 
such as the power to regulate international trade.210 Under this plan, 
205. In discussing the Federal Convention, Prakash and Ramsey move immediately 
from Madison's motion on June 1 to the considerations of the Committee of Detail, in late 
July, noting that "[a]fter this modification of the Virginia Plan, there was no sustained 
consideration of foreign affairs until the Committee of Detail." Prakash & Ramsey, supra 
note 14, at 283. In doing so, Prakash and Ramsey fail to give sufficient attention to a number 
of relevant discussions and proposals that occurred during this period. 
206. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 1 18. In 
a letter to Thomas Jefferson in October 1787, James Madison recounted that "[o]n the 
question whether [the executive] should consist of a single person, or a plurality of co­
ordinate members, on the mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree of 
power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated discussions took place." Letter from 
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 131, 132. 
207. See, e.g. , 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, 
at 101; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 32-33, 
1 16. But cf 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 113 
(comment by George Mason on June 4 that "[w]e have not yet been able to define the 
powers of the Executive"). 
208. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, 
at 236. 
209. 1 id. at 244. Given the Plan's reference to directing military operations, Prakash 
and Ramsey are incorrect in describing the executive under this Plan as "bereft of foreign 
affairs authority." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 281 n.214. 
210. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, 
at 243. 
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therefore, the executive's foreign affairs powers were to be very 
limited and defined, and most foreign affairs powers were to be 
granted to Congress. 
The obviously limited nature of executive power under the 
modified Virginia plan and the New Jersey plan helps shed light on 
what the delegates understood when they referred to the "vesting" of 
executive power. On June 4, there were repeated references to 
"vesting the executive powers in a single person,"211 even though the 
proposal before the convention at this point was for an executive that 
would have only the powers of executing the laws and making 
appointments.212 On June 16, in contrasting the Committee of the 
Whale's modified Virginia Plan with the New Jersey Plan, James 
Wilson noted that the Committee's plan "vested the Executive powers 
in a single Magistrate" whereas " [t]he plan of N. Jersey, vested them 
in a plurality."213 In other words, constitutional plans that clearly did 
not incorporate the Vesting Clause Thesis were nevertheless viewed as 
"vesting the executive powers."  Vesting, under this conception, simply 
meant assigning the specified powers, not granting unspecified resid­
ual powers. To put it differently, a general vesting clause described 
where powers were being vested, not what those powers were. 
On June 18, Alexander Hamilton presented his own constitutional 
plan. Already displaying a pro-executive inclination for which he 
would later become famous, Hamilton proposed: 
The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be vested in a 
Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour - the election 
to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election Districts 
aforesaid - The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as 
follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the 
execution of all laws passed, to have the direction of war when 
authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the 
Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of 
the heads or chief officers or the departments of Finance, War and 
Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all officers (Ambassadors to 
foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the 
Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences except Treason; 
which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.214 
Hamilton's plan obviously proposed a broader package of 
executive power than what was reflected in either the modified 
Virginia Plan or the New Jersey Plan. But even under Hamilton's 
more expansive proposal, the powers of the executive, including 
211. See, e.g. , 1 id. at 101, 106-07, 1 10. 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 202-203. 
213. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, 
at 254. 
214. 1 id. at 292. 
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powers relating to foreign affairs, were spelled out in detail. Hamilton 
does not appear to have been relying on some undefined residuum of 
executive power. Prakash and Ramsey assert the contrary, claiming 
(without explanation) that the beginning of the first sentence quoted 
above - "The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be 
vested in a Governour to be elected during good behaviour" - was 
implicitly a grant of "residual foreign affairs authorities not vested 
elsewhere."215 But this is pure assertion, and it is contradicted by the 
language that immediately precedes Hamilton's list of executive 
powers - "The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as 
follows." It is also undermined by the fact that Hamilton used similar 
language with respect to the vesting of legislative power,216 yet Prakash 
and Ramsey do not contend that he was proposing to grant 
unspecified residual powers to Congress. Finally, their claim is 
undermined by Hamilton's assignment to the Senate, rather than to 
the Governor, of "the sole power of declaring war" and "the power of 
advising and approving all Treaties,"217 significant foreign relations 
powers that Prakash and Ramsey claim are executive in nature. 
Still another constitutional proposal was the Pinckney Plan, 
proposed by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and evidently 
considered by the Committee of Detail. This plan provides that "the 
executive Authority of the U.S. shall be vested" in the President, and 
it then lists a variety of presidential duties and powers, including 
duties and powers relating to foreign affairs.218 Prakash and Ramsey 
assert that the vesting clause in the Pinckney Plan implied that the 
executive would have residual foreign affairs powers.219 Again, this 
begs the question, since the meaning of such a vesting clause is 
precisely what is at issue. Moreover, as Prakash and Ramsey 
acknowledge, Pinckney's comments in response to the Virginia Plan 
(described above), in which he opposed assigning the foreign affairs 
powers exercised by the Continental Congress to the executive, 
suggest that he did not believe that the executive should have residual 
foreign affairs powers. Prakash and Ramsey simply note that 
Pinckney's comments "contradicted his own plan."220 There is no 
215. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 280. 
216. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 291 
("The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to be vested . . . .  "). 
217. 1 id. at 292. 
218. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, 
at 606. 
219. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 281 n.215. Pinckney's plan stated that, "In 
the Presid[ent) 'the executive Authority of the U.S. shall be vested.' " 3 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 606. 
220. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 281 n.215. 
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contradiction, however, if the vesting clause is not read as granting 
residual powers.221 
The Committee of Detail was appointed on July 23. 222 The 
Committee's drafts show that it attempted to enumerate the 
executive's powers, including ultimately some foreign affairs powers, 
just as the various plans had attempted to do.223 As Prakash and 
Ramsey concede, "At this stage, the executive lacked the residual 
executive power."224 Prakash and Ramsey assert, however, that the 
Committee's final report, presented on August 6, included such a 
residual power. In other words, they claim that the Committee of 
Detail substantially modified the nature of the executive's power in a 
way inconsistent with all of the Convention's discussions up to that 
point. The only evidence they provide for this assertion is that the 
portion of the report addressing executive power begins with the 
clause, "The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a 
single person."225 The language of this clause, however, can easily be 
read just as addressing the issue of whether the executive power that is 
specified will be vested in a "single person" or a plural body, an issue 
discussed at length in earlier stages of the Convention. And this is 
exactly how Madison's record of the Convention describes the clause 
when it was voted on by the Committee of the Whole on August 24.226 
Furthermore, the Committee of Detail's report spells out in great 
detail the executive's powers and duties, including those relating to 
foreign affairs, and it expressly gives other foreign affairs powers to 
the Senate or to Congress. 227 Indeed, all of the foreign affairs powers 
221 .  As discussed below, Pinckney also stated at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention 
that the Senate and President "form together a body in whom can be best and most safely 
vested the diplomatic power of the United States." See infra text accompanying note 411 .  In 
an 1818 letter to John Quincy Adams, Pinckney recalled that his constitutional plan was 
"substantially adopted . . .  except as to the Senate & giving more power to the Executive 
than I intended." Letter from Charles Pickney to John Quincy Adams (Dec. 30, 1818), in 3 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 427, 427. With 
respect to the enhancement of executive power, Pinckney gives the example of the decision 
late in the Convention to divide the treaty power between the Senate and President rather 
than assign it exclusively to the Senate. 3 id. 
222. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 95. 
223. See, e.g. , 2 id. at 132, 145, 171; SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 189 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987). 
224. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 283. 
225. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 185. 
226. See 2 id. at 401 ("On the question for vesting the power in a single person - It was 
agreed to nem: con: So also on the Stile and title."). The "stile" and "title" were addressed in 
the next sentence of this portion of the Committee's report: "His stile shall be 'The President 
of the United States of America;' and his title shall be, 'His Excellency'." 2 id. at 185. 
227. For additional discussion of this point, see Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of the 
Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties - The Original Intent of the 
Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 87 (1979): 
The [Vesting Clause] could not possibly have had [residual power] meaning in the report of 
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that had been discussed in the Convention are mentioned expressly 
somewhere in the Committee's report, making it even less likely that 
the Committee intended the executive Vesting Clause to convey 
additional foreign affairs powers. 228 Finally, the Committee used 
similar vesting language for the legislative and judicial branches, 
suggesting, as Abraham Sofaer has noted, "that the committee . . .  had 
no specific pro-executive plan in mind."229 
It is also worth noting that Committee of Detail's report 
envisioned that the Senate would have the dominant power over U.S. 
foreign relations. Accordingly, it assigned to the Senate the sole power 
of making treaties, as well as the power of appointing ambassadors.230 
In commenting on the report, Pinckney noted that "the Senate is to 
have the power of making treaties & managing our foreign 
affairs . . . .  "231 In the closing weeks of the Convention, some of the 
Senate's foreign affairs power was shifted to the President. But, again, 
the story is one of assignment of particular powers to particular 
institutional actors, not one of an essentialist conception of executive 
power or of granting unspecified powers. More specifically, the 
debates strongly suggest that power was being shifted to the President 
not because of some sort of executive power essentialism, but rather 
because of mistrust of the Senate.232 
Consider, for example, the power to make treaties. When the 
Committee of the Whole addressed the proposal to assign the treaty 
power to the Senate, Madison "observed that the Senate represented 
the Committee of Detail, for the essential powers in the realm of diplomacy were specifically 
bestowed elsewhere - that is to say, on the Senate exclusively. In their use of general terms 
like 'Executive Power,' the framers obviously intended that the meaning should be arrived at 
by observing the particular powers actually enumerated in the relevant article of the 
Constitution. 
Id. See also Rakove, supra note 65, at 264 ("Given the evidence that a doctrine of inherent 
executive power over war and peace was not influential at the outset of the Convention - as 
the proceedings of June 1 conclusively prove - it hardly seems likely that it would have 
become more attractive as the debates wore on."). 
228. Prakash and Ramsey's discussion of this point - the linchpin of their argument 
about the Federal Convention - is entirely conclusory. They assert that the Committee of 
Detail's use of the Vesting Clause was a reintroduction of the idea of residual executive 
power, and they remark that "no one sought to strike the language or complained." Prakash 
& Ramsey, supra note 14, at 286. It would be important - and, indeed, surprising - that no 
one would comment on the reintroduction of an idea that had generated substantial 
opposition at the beginning of the Convention. Of course, the most likely reason why no one 
commented on it is that Prakash and Ramsey's assertion about the Vesting Clause is 
incorrect. 
229. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: 
THE ORIGINS 30 (1976). 
230. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, 
at 183. 
231. 2 id. at 235 (emphasis added). 
232. For a detailed explanation of this point, see RAKOVE, supra note 5 1 ,  at 263-67. 
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the States alone, and for this as well as other obvious reasons it 
was proper that the President should be an agent in Treaties."233 
Gouverneur Morris also expressed concern about giving the Senate 
the treaty power, and he proposed an amendment whereby treaties 
would not be binding on the United States until ratified by federal 
legislation. 234 Madison and others disagreed with that amendment, 
however, on the grounds that it would be too inconvenient and would 
put the United States at a disadvantage in international negotiations, 
and the amendment was defeated.235 This debate was resumed on 
September 7, with James Wilson moving to amend the treaty clause to 
require the consent of the House of Representatives. 236 Sherman 
responded that "the power could be safely trusted to the Senate" and 
that "the necessity of secrecy in the case of treaties forbade a 
reference of them to the whole Legislature."237 Wilson's motion was 
defeated. Madison subsequently moved, unsuccessfully, to allow two­
thirds of the Senate to make peace treaties without the President's 
consent.238 What is noteworthy about these discussions is that at no 
point was there a claim that the treaty power inherently belonged to 
the executive. The only issues were whether, for functional reasons, 
the power should be divided between the Senate and some other 
institutional body, and, if so, which institutional body would be best. 
The Convention finally turned to the executive branch part of the 
Committee of Detail's report on August 24. The discussion here is, 
once again, revealing for what it does not show. Delegates quibbled 
with the specific grants of authority and responsibility and thus, for 
example, modified the language of the appointments provision and the 
provision giving the President command of the state militia.239 They 
also added in certain presidential powers and responsibilities, such as 
the responsibility for receiving ambassadors. 240 But there was no 
discussion of whether the list of powers and responsibilities matched 
some preconception of what should be executive, and there was no 
suggestion that the Vesting Clause was granting unspecified powers. 
Indeed, if the delegates had been assuming the Vesting Clause Thesis, 
much of their quibbling about specific executive powers would have 
been beside the point. 
233. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 392. 
234. 2 id. 
235. 2 id. at 392-94. 
236. See 2 id. at 538. 
237. 2 id. 
238. See 2 id. at 540-41. 
239. See 2 id. at 405-06, 422. 
240. 2 id. at 419. 
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The Convention's brief discussion of Congress's power relating to 
war is not to the contrary. The Committee of Detail had proposed to 
give Congress the power " [t]o make war."241 Pinckney objected to that 
proposal, arguing that the House of Representatives would be "too 
numerous for such deliberations," and that the power should rest with 
the Senate alone because it would be "more acquainted with foreign 
affairs."242 Pierce Butler, by contrast, thought that the Senate would 
have the same institutional problems as the full Congress, and he 
proposed that the power to make war be given to the President.243 A 
number of delegates expressed concern, however, about giving the 
President the power to commence war. Madison moved to amend the 
Committee of Detail's proposal to give Congress the power to 
"declare" rather than "make" war, which he said would "leav[e] to the 
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."244 Roger Sherman did 
not think this amendment necessary, since he believed that the 
President would already have the power to repel attacks. 245 The 
delegates apparently agreed, initially voting against the motion. Rufus 
King, however, noted that the word "make" could be understood to 
include conducting the war, "which was an Executive function, '' and at 
that point the delegates voted in favor of the motion. 
There are obviously statements in this discussion suggesting that 
certain war-related powers belong to the executive - namely the 
power to repel attacks and the power to conduct the operations of 
war. The basis for this assumption is not entirely clear, but it easily 
could have been based on the President's assigned power as 
Commander in Chief.246 What is clear is that, when considering where 
241. See 2 id. at 182. 
242. 2 id. at 318. 
243. 2 id. 
244. 2 id. 
245. 2 id. 
246. The New Jersey Plan, for example, specifically referred to a presidential power to 
"direct all military operations." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
supra note 28, at 244; see also THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 69 (Alexander 
Hamilton), at 418 (stating that the President, as Commander in Chief, has "the supreme 
command and direction of the military and naval forces"). And the Hamilton Plan gave the 
President the power of "direction of the war when authorized or begun." 1 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 292 (emphasis added). The 
phrase "or begun" in Hamilton's Plan presumably included situations in which a war was 
initiated against the United States and it acted to repel the attack. See JOHN HART ELY, 
WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 
142 n.22 (1993); see also Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1543 (2002) (explaining that the Founders understood that war could be "declared" by 
an attack on the United States and that this would trigger the President's commander-in­
chief powers). But see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 285 (arguing that the reference 
in the Convention debate to a power to repel attacks proves that the delegates assumed that 
the President would have residual foreign affairs powers). 
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to assign the foreign relations power of declaring war, the delegates 
agreed not to vest it with the President, and no one claimed that this 
violated some sort of essentialist conception of executive power. 
B. The Federalist Papers 
The Federalist Papers likewise repudiate the Vesting Clause 
Thesis. As in the Federal Convention debates, the discussions of 
executive power in the Federalist Papers are premised on the 
assumption that the President is being granted only the powers 
specified in Article II. This assumption is evident, for example, in the 
comparisons between the proposed U.S. executive and the British 
monarch. In Federalist No. 48, Madison acknowledges that, " [i]n a 
government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in 
the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very 
justly regarded as the source of danger."247 But he contrasts that 
situation from "a representative republic where the executive 
magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and the duration of 
its power. "248 
Similarly, in Federalist No. 67, Hamilton acknowledges the 
"aversion of the people to monarchy," and he proceeds to go through 
the President's enumerated Article II powers to show that they are 
much less extensive than those of the British monarch.249 Nowhere in 
this essay does he suggest that the Vesting Clause is an independent 
source of power. Moreover, the structure of his discussion - going 
through the enumerated powers in Article II to show that they are 
sufficiently limited - would make little sense if there were also an 
unspecified residuum of "executive Power." Hamilton repeats this 
approach in Federalist No. 69, again going through the President's 
enumerated powers, and arguing that the limitation of the President to 
these powers means that "there is no pretense for the parallel which 
has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. "250 
The Federalist Papers also repeatedly suggest that Congress's 
powers will be much greater than those of the President. In doing so, 
the Papers point to the limited list of powers in Article II, Section 2. 
These statements, like those contrasting the President with the British 
monarch, would make little sense if there were an unspecified 
residuum of presidential power. For example, in Federalist No. 48, 
247. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 48 (James Madison), at 309. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. No. 67 (Alexander Hamilton), at 407. 
250. Id. No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), at 422; see also id. No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), 
at 442 (considering the powers "which are proposed to be vested in the President of the 
United States"). 
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Madison states that Congress's powers are "more extensive, and less 
susceptible of precise limits" than those of the President, and he 
describes the executive power as "being restrained within a narrower 
compass and being more simple in its nature. "251 
Another inconsistency between the Federalist Papers and the 
Vesting Clause Thesis is that the Papers generally employ functional 
arguments for the assignment of powers, not essentialist labels like 
"legislative" or "executive." In Federalist No. 64, for example, Jay 
argues that, even though the treaty power could be viewed as 
legislative in nature, it nevertheless made sense to vest it in the 
President and Senate. He suggests that one should not place too much 
emphasis on formal labels: " [W]hatever name be given to the power of 
making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when made, 
certain it is that the people may, with much propriety, commit the 
power to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive, or the 
judicial."252 When the Federalist Papers invoke essentialist labels, they 
tend to eschew the traditional categories used by Locke, Blackstone, 
and Montesquieu. In Federalist No. 75, for example, Hamilton 
acknowledges that treatise writers had classified the treaty power as 
properly belonging to the executive, but he calls this "an arbitrary 
disposition" and rejects it.253 
The Federalist Papers also emphasize a more general background 
point that, as noted in Part I, is in tension with the Vesting Clause 
Thesis. Specially, they emphasize that the Constitution is establishing 
a government of limited and defined powers. Most famously, Madison 
states in Federalist No. 45 that " [t]he powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and 
defined. "254 An unspecified residuum of executive power does not sit 
comfortably with this general structural feature of the Constitution. 
Another background point made in the Federalist Papers is that 
there is nothing inherently problematic, from a separation of powers 
standpoint, with mixing powers among branches of government. 
Madison makes this point most clearly in Federalist No. 47, where he 
responds to the Anti-Federalist charge that "the Constitution is [in] 
supposed violation of the political maxim that the legislative, 
executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and 
distinct."255 Turning to Montesquieu (upon whom the Anti-Federalists 
frequently relied), Madison explains that the relevant political maxim 
251. Id. No. 48 (James Madison), at 310; see also id. No. 51 (James Madison), at 322 
("In a republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates."). 
252. Id. No. 64 (John Jay), at 394. 
253. Id. No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), at 450. 
254. Id. No. 45 (James Madison), at 292. 
255. Id. No. 47 (James Madison), at 301. 
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is instead that "the accumulation of all powers . . . in the same 
hands . . .  may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny,"256 
and that the Constitution's mixing of powers does not violate this 
maxim. Even under the British Constitution - "to Montesquieu what 
Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry" - Madison 
notes that there was a mixing of powers.257 Madison also looks in detail 
at the state constitutions in the Critical Period and finds that "there is 
not a single instance in which the several departments of power have 
been kept absolutely separate and distinct."258 
The only Federalist Paper that offers even superficial support to 
the Vesting Clause Thesis is Federalist No. 72. There, Hamilton notes 
that the "administration of government . . .  falls peculiarly within the 
province of the executive department." 259 Hamilton makes this 
observation in order to justify giving the President the power to 
nominate appointments. He does not appear to be arguing that 
"administration" is a separate, unspecified executive power; rather, he 
seems to think that it is part of the President's role in executing the 
laws and carrying out his specified powers. In any event, the foreign 
affairs administrative functions he mentions - negotiating with 
foreign governments, the arrangement of the armed forces, and the 
direction of war - can all be justified from the specific grants of 
power, such as the treaty power and the commander-in-chief power.260 
C. State Ratification Debates 
With the state ratification debates - the final component of the 
usual originalist trinity - the Vesting Clause Thesis continues down 
the path from historical claim to present-day wishful thinking. At least 
for originalists, the constitutional understanding reflected in the state 
conventions merits particular weight. As Chief Justice Marshall 
famously asserted in one of his own, if infrequent, originalist forays, 
the Constitution "was a mere proposal," which "the people were at 
perfect liberty to accept or reject."261 It followed that " [f]rom these 
[ratifying] Conventions the constitution derives its whole authority."262 
Similarly, James Madison noted, many years after the Constitution's 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 301-02. 
258. Id. at 304. The state constitutions are discussed above in Part Il.B. 
259. Id. No. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), at 435. 
260. See also id. No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), at 519 (noting that the "management of 
foreign negotiations will naturally devolve" on the President, subject to the consent of the 
Senate). 
261. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. ( 4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819). 
262. Id. at 403. 
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ratification, that it was in the "respective State Conventions, where 
[the Constitution] received all the authority which it possesses."263 
It is puzzling, therefore, that proponents of the Vesting Clause 
Thesis have devoted relatively little attention to the state ratification 
debates. Prakash and Ramsey's ostensibly originalist account, for 
example, devotes only a few short pages to the subject.264 A possible 
reason for this omission is that the state ratification debates offer little 
evidence for executive power essentialism with regard to foreign 
affairs and no instances that articulate the Vesting Clause Thesis. Such 
silence is particularly striking in light of the sheer volume of the state 
debates.265 Instead of assuming the Vesting Clause Thesis, the state 
ratification debates, like the Federal Convention debates and the 
Federalist Papers, proceed on the assumption that the President is 
being granted only the powers specified in Article II. To support this 
claim, we consider in detail the six most significant convention debates 
- Virginia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, 
and South Carolina. 
Virginia. Virginia produced arguably the most significant 
ratification debates for several reasons. First, Virginia was the most 
important state in terms of size and leadership. Even though the 
requisite eight states had ratified the Constitution when the Virginia 
ratifying convention met, few thought the ratification process could 
succeed without the Old Dominion.266 Second, Virginia unquestionably 
produced the most comprehensive debates in terms of quality and 
quantity. The Virginia ratification materials account for over 1700 
pages in the authoritative Documentary History of the Ratification of 
the Constitution,  and more than 600 of those pages reflect the con-
263. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 3 LETrERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 228, 228 (1865); see also 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 374 (recording Madison's statement in 
the House of Representatives on April 6, 1796: "If we were to look, therefore, for the 
meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the 
General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and 
ratified the Constitution."). 
264. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 287-95. 
265. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution is approaching 
twenty volumes. That said, it should be noted that the quality of the documentary record 
varies wildly, and that the accounts of many of the convention debates are plagued by 
partisanship and poor recording. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The 
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1986). The unevenness of the 
record should caution those who seek to discern constitutional meaning from the debates 
without more. Poor parliamentary reporting, however, does not explain the relative absence 
of a position central to issues concerning which a wide array of other positions were 
documented. 
266. Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION 261, 262 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). 
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vention debates.267 The caliber of debate, moreover, was exceptionally 
high, featuring James Madison, Edmund Randolph, George Mason, 
John Marshall, Patrick Henry, James Monroe, among other notables. 
Perhaps most important of all, for present purposes, the Virginia 
convention addressed foreign affairs issues in greater detail than any 
other state, in part out of its paternalistic concern for the fate of 
Kentucky and what was then the Southwest, especially with regard to 
the treaty power and U.S. navigation rights on the Mississippi.268 For 
these reasons, foreign affairs scholars have typically, and rightly, 
focused upon the discussions that Virginia produced. The telling 
exception proving this rule is the work of Vesting Clause Thesis 
proponents, where the Virginia debates are conspicuous by their 
absence.269 
The Virginia convention from the outset dispelled any notion that 
conceptions of government that may have been celebrated in Europe 
carried over without alteration to America. The convention opened 
with the Anti-Federalists, led by Patrick Henry, seeking to portray the 
Constitution as the reincarnation of the British imperial government 
that Virginians had rejected in 1776. Prominent in this strategy were 
attempts to equate the President with the British monarch. " (T]here is 
to be," Henry declaimed, "a great and mighty President, with very 
extensive powers; the powers of a King. "270 Henry pressed the analogy 
by invoking the old Whig fear concerning the misuse of troops 
ostensibly mustered to protect the nation from foreign enemies: 
"Away with your President, we shall have a King: The army will salute 
him Monarch; your militia will leave you and assist in making him 
King, and fight against you: And what have you to oppose this 
force?"271 Federalists, such as Edmund Randolph and John Marshall, 
dismissed both the Anti-Federalists' horribles as well as the royal 
comparison.272Even before the convention, "An Impartial Citizen" 
contrasted the U.S. and British Constitutions, citing the President's 
merely contingent veto and commenting that " (t]he President in many 
267. The Virginia debates take up volumes eight through ten of The Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution. See 8-10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1988-90). 
268. For an overview of the ratification struggle in Virginia, see Banning, supra note 
266, at 261-99. 
269. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 291-92 & n.261; id. at 293 & 
nn.271-72. 
270. 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 267, at 961. Note that even here, Henry does not speak in terms of executive or 
royal power as a unitary abstraction, but instead refers to "powers" in the plural. 
271. 9 id. at 964. 
272. See, e.g. , 9 id. at 1019, 1 125. 
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important cases, must have the concurrence of the Senate, wherein his 
sole decision might be dangerous."273 
In debating the war power, the comparison between King and 
President merged into a discussion of the Constitution's assignment of 
foreign affairs authority. Here the debate reflected a general pattern 
whereby the participants concentrated on the allocation of specific 
powers and the likely consequences of the allocation, rather than on 
essentialist claims about what was truly "executive" or "legislative." 
Specifically, Anti-Federalists objected to the combination in Congress 
of the power to declare war with the authority to finance it, while 
Federalists responded that the republic could only be safe with the 
power to declare war vested in the legislative branch. As Henry put it, 
"I find fault with the paper before you, because the same power that 
declares war, has the power to carry it on."274 To him, this combination 
was even worse than in Britain, since there " [t]he King declares war: 
The House of Commons gives the means of carrying it on. This is a 
strong check on the King."275 Yet, " [h]ow is it here? The Congress can 
both declare war and carry it on; and levy your money, as long as you 
have a shilling to pay."276 Note that Henry, not one to leave any 
argument unspoken, does not object that affording Congress the 
power to declare war violates a general understanding that such a 
power is "executive." Rather, he attacks the combination of powers in 
light of the results it will produce. 
Federalists defended the war power in the same functionalist 
terms. Randolph countered Henry, arguing that America compared 
favorably to England because it imposed more of a popular check on 
the exercise of the war power: "In England the King declares war. In 
America, Congress must be consulted. - In England, Parliament 
gives money. In America, Congress does it. There are consequently 
more powers in the hands of the people, and greater checks upon the 
Executive here, than in England."277 Marshall echoed Randolph in the 
same functionalist terms, asking, "Are the people of England more 
secure, if the Commons have no voice in declaring war, or are we less 
secure, by having the Senate joined with the President?" 278 By 
contrast, no Federalist asserted that the declare war power was 
legislative in nature, or that the Constitution's allocation of the declare 
war power to Congress was an exception to a general rule. 
273. 8 id. at 295. 
274. 9 id. at 1069. 
275. 9 id. 
276. 9 id. 
277. 9 id. at 1098. 
278. 9 id. at 1 125. Unless he was referring to the treaty power, Marshall should have 
referred to the full Congress rather than the Senate, since the full Congress was given the 
power under the proposed Constitution to declare war. 
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The single most sustained foreign affairs debate in Virginia 
concerned the treatymaking power, and that discussion produced 
almost no essentialist rhetoric. This relative silence is striking given 
the important role accorded the Senate in this purported executive 
function. Instead of essentialism, the overwhelming majority of the 
debate centered on whether the requirement that two-thirds of the 
senators present give their advice and consent to a treaty would be a 
sufficient check against regions bent on using the treaty authority to 
undermine the interests of other regions, in particular, the South's 
interest in maintaining free navigation of the Mississippi. When the 
President does make an appearance, the issue is not whether the 
executive should or should not be the exclusive repository of this 
important foreign affairs power, but whether the characteristics of the 
office would make it an additional check against a regional sell-out. 
Especially noteworthy is the Anti-Federalist failure to make the 
obvious objection that Senate approval, let alone by a supermajority, 
is an infringement of executive foreign affairs authority. Instead, Anti­
Federalists objected to the allocation of treatymaking authority on the 
ground that it would not protect regional interests. In this context, 
William Grayson argued that " [t)he consent of the President (is) 
considered as a trivial check. "279 James Monroe concurred on the 
ground that the President likely would not prevent a betrayal of 
Southern interests since he probably would be elected by, and 
beholden to, the Northeast.280 The Anti-Federalists further argued that 
the Senate would not provide a sufficient safeguard. This critique 
dominated the convention's two main discussions of treaties,281 and it 
was rigorously explored in a table that George Mason provided 
predicting likely Senate voting patterns.282 
Federalists defended the treatymaking power primarily on the 
ground that it would protect the interests of Virginia and the region to 
which Virginians were likely to emigrate. At least one delegate, 
Francis Corbin, addressed the possibility of vesting the power in the 
President alone, and rejected it on solely functional grounds. Even 
then, he did not make the point to justify a departure from an abstract 
baseline, although he did note that it made U.S. practice diverge from 
most governments elsewhere: 
It would be dangerous to give this power to the President alone - as the 
concession of such a power to one individual, is repugnant to Republican 
principles. - It is therefore given to the President and the Senate (who 
279. 10 id. at 1383. 
280. 10 id. at 1371-73. 
281. The Convention took up treatymaking from June 12-14, and again on June 18 and 
19. See 10 id. at 1184-1297, 1371-1410. 
282. 10 id. at 1375. 
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represent the states in their individual capacities) conjointly. - In this it 
differs from every Government we know. - It steers with admirable 
dexterity between the two extremes - neither leaving it to the 
Executive, as in most other Governments, nor to the Legislature, which 
would too much retard such negotiations.283 
Virginia's emphasis on specific powers and likely results also 
prevailed in considering Article II itself. If any topic should have 
prompted discussion of what "executive" authority entailed as a 
general, residual, or baseline matter, Article II would have been it. 
But even though the debate was extensive, there was neither a 
considered analysis of the Vesting Clause nor any assertion that the 
text reflected a grant of unspecified powers. Instead, the delegates 
repeatedly moved to consider the implications of the particular powers 
specified in Article II. Even before the convention formally took up 
Article II, James Monroe set the tone when he sought to demonstrate 
that the President would be too powerful, but he did so with reference 
only to specific textual grants rather than residual powers.284 Other 
speakers followed Monroe by also decrying the President's power, 
again only with reference to particular grants. Mason, for example, 
"animadverting on the magnitude of the powers of the President, was 
alarmed at the additional power of commanding the army in 
person."285 While he admitted that the President should have the 
power to "give orders, and have a general superintendency" over the 
army, he feared that the commander-in-chief grant - not some 
general ideal of executive power - further entailed command in the 
field and that this could be abused. Likewise, Mason objected to the 
pardon power on the ground that it might easily be abused and clear 
the way for a monarchy.286 
In theory, the Federalists could have defended against such 
objections on the ground that personal command or the pardon power 
were essentially executive in nature. They did not. Madison, for 
instance, contended that it would be improper to vest the pardon 
power in the House or Senate, "because numerous bodies were 
actuated more or less by passion, and might in a moment of vengeance 
forget humanity."287 Looking back, he also turned not to Montesquieu 
but to the experience of Massachusetts, where the legislature's 
exercise of the pardon power had resulted in inconsistent decisions.288 
More generally, Edmund Randolph answered the Anti-Federalist 
283. 10 id. at 1391-92. 
284. See 9 id. at 1 1 15 (referring to the specific powers listed in Article 11). 
285. 10 id. at 1378. 
286. 10 id. at 1378-79. 
287. 10 id. at 1379-80. 
288. 10 id. at 1380. 
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attacks on the presidency by emphasizing the limited and divided 
nature of the powers conferred on the President in Article II: 
What are his powers? To see the laws executed. Every Executive in 
America has that power. He is also to command the army - This power 
also is enjoyed by the Executives of the different States. He can handle 
no part of the public money except what is given him by law . . . . I cannot 
conceive how his powers can be called formidable. Both Houses are a 
check upon him. He can do no important act without the concurrence of 
the Senate. 289 
By contrast, the essentialist arguments that the Virginia convention 
did produce were few and fleeting, especially with respect to foreign 
affairs. As noted, no one asserted that foreign affairs authority was as 
a class "executive,'' and no one claimed that the Article II Vesting 
Clause accorded the President general foreign affairs authority. In a 
handful of instances some Virginians did employ essentialist rhetoric 
when analyzing specific foreign affairs powers. Outside the 
Convention, "Cassius" defended the Constitution by arguing that, 
"though the power of making treaties [has] been, always, considered a 
part of the executive,'' the Senate provides an important check.290 "A 
Native of Virginia" likewise commented that the powers vested in 
Article II, sections 2 and 3, including the Commander in Chief Clause, 
"belong from the nature of them, to the Executive branch of 
government; and could be placed in no other hands with propriety."291 
Mason in passing referred to the President as " [t]his very executive 
officer,'' en route to suggesting that he might receive pensions from 
European potentates.292 If there are other examples, they are difficult 
to find and all but eclipsed by the focus on powers and functions 
already recounted. 
Only a few essentialist comments crop up even when the frame is 
expanded to encompass executive power in general. Arthur Lee, 
for example, complained to John Adams that the Constitution 
vested "legislative, executive & judicial Powers in the Senate."293 
"Republicus" from Kentucky appeared to make a Vesting Clause 
argument when stating that "supreme continental executive power" is 
granted to the President, but then went on to discuss only those 
powers that are specified.294 Mason at the convention asserted that the 
President and Senate were united as "man and wife,'' and that " [t]he 
289. 9 id. at 1098. 
290. 9 id. at 645. 
291. 9 id. at 681 .  
292. 10 id. at 1365. 
293. 8 id. at 34. Joseph Jones made the same general point in a letter to Madison. See 8 
id. at 129. 
294. 8 id. at 448. 
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Executive and Legislative powers thus connected, will destroy all 
balances. "295 Given the voluminous records, the paucity of essentialist 
language, let alone sustained argument, is striking. 
A number of express denials of executive power essentialism, 
moreover, offset the rhetoric to the contrary. Two of these came from 
the prominent Federalist Edmund Pendleton. Writing to Madison, 
Pendleton declared that " [t]he President is indeed to be a great man, 
but it is only in shew to represent the Federal dignity & Power, having 
no latent Prerogatives, nor any Powers but such as are defined and 
given him by law."296 To Richard Henry Lee he also wrote that the 
President's "powers are defined, & not left to latent Prerogatives -
they none of them appear too large," with the possible exceptions of 
pardoning treason before conviction and giving force to treaties.297 A 
more complex and intriguing denial of essentialism came from 
Randolph in a rejoinder to Madison's claim that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause would simply permit Congress to enact necessarily 
implied powers. Stating that Madison's narrow construction would 
make the clause "superfluous,'' he continued: 
Let us take an example of a single department: For instance that of the 
President, who has certain things annexed to his office. Does it not 
reasonably follow, that he must have some incidental powers? The 
principle of incidental powers extends to all parts of the system. If you 
then say, that the President has incidental powers, you reduce [the 
Necessary and Proper Clause] to tautology.298 
Randolph's discussion itself would have been superfluous if there 
had been a general understanding that the Article II Vesting Clause 
accorded all executive authority unless otherwise specified. Of course, 
it might be argued that Randolph was referring to incidental powers 
that the President might have that were not executive in nature, 
whatever these might be. The more natural reading, however, is 
simply that Randolph looked to Article II's specific grants of power as 
the starting point, and then assumed that the President, like all parts 
of the government, would possess additional implied powers for the 
system to be workable even absent the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Randolph at one point went further, suggesting that Congress 
should be the primary repository of foreign affairs authority. He began 
by noting that, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress "had 
nominally powers, powers on paper, which it could not use."299 He 
recounted, for example, that " [t]he power of making peace and war is 
295. 10 id. at 1376. 
296. 8 id. at 47. 
297. 10 id. at 1627. 
298. 10 id. at 1348. 
299. 9 id. at 985. 
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expressly delegated to Congress; yet the power of granting passports, 
though within that of making peace and war, was considered by 
Virginia as belonging to herself." 300 To strengthen the national 
government's foreign affairs powers, Randolph explained, Congress's 
powers had to be enhanced: "Without adequate powers vested in 
Congress," he argued, "America cannot be respectable in the eyes of 
other nations. Congress, Sir, ought to be fully vested with the power to 
support the Union - protect the interest of the United States," 
including the authority to "defend them from external invasions and 
insults."301 If such an approach would have amounted to a revolution 
in settled understandings equating foreign affairs power with the 
executive, Randolph, no more than other Virginians, seems to have 
discerned it. 
Pennsylvania. Virginia's unparalleled foreign affairs discussion 
earns it pride of place, but the Constitution's first significant test and 
resulting debates occurred in Pennsylvania. Unlike Delaware, the first 
convention to ratify, Pennsylvania boasted a substantial and vigorous 
Anti-Federalist opposition that ensured thorough consideration. With 
the exception of James Wilson, Pennsylvania's delegates did not rival 
Virginia's in terms of sophistication or depth of knowledge, but the 
leaders included able spokesmen, including Thomas McKean among 
the Constitution's defenders, and William Findley and John Smilie 
among the adversaries.302 The fact that the Constitution had been 
framed in Pennsylvania gave the state's role in the ratification process 
particular symbolic importance. 
Unfortunately, poor and even politicized recording undermines the 
usefulness of the resulting exchanges. With the significant exception of 
speeches by McKean and Wilson, the account of proceedings within 
the Convention are terse and only partially enhanced by outside 
articles and commentaries. Moreover, the scope of the President's 
proposed powers under the Constitution was not a significant 
component of the debate in Pennsylvania. The debate focused instead 
on the lack of a bill of rights and on the scope of Congress's and the 
Senate's proposed powers. 
Despite these limitations, the Pennsylvania debates serve to 
further undermine the Vesting Clause Thesis. In particular, when the 
President's powers were discussed in Pennsylvania, both the 
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists appeared to assume that the 
President was being granted only the powers specified in Article II. 
300. 9 id. 
301. 9 id. at 985-86. 
302. See RAKOYE, supra note 51,  at 1 16-18; George J. Graham, Jr., Pennsylvania: 
Representation and the Meaning of Republicanism, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 268, at 52, 52-69. 
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Moreover, in defending against the charge that the Constitution 
impermissibly mixed categories of power, the supporters of the 
Constitution commonly resorted to functionalist rather than 
essentialist explanations, further confirming that they were not 
thinking of the Constitution's assignment of powers in the manner that 
is assumed by the Vesting Clause Thesis. 
In a widely circulated defense of the proposed Constitution, 
published soon after the end of the Federal Convention, Tench Coxe 
anticipated that there would be objections to the scope of the 
President's powers. In his first "American Citizen" essay, he carefully 
contrasted the proposed President with the British monarch, arguing 
that the President would be much less powerful.3°3 For example, he 
noted that the President "will have no authority to make a treaty 
without two-thirds of the Senate, nor can he appoint ambassadors or 
other great officers without their approbation. "304 Coxe concluded by 
stating that, "[f)rom such a servant with powers so limited and 
transitory, there can be no danger. "305 This description, with its focus 
on limited and defined powers, at least implicitly suggests that the 
President was not being granted some general residuum of execu­
tive power. 
The sort of objection anticipated by Coxe was not in fact pressed 
vigorously by opponents of the Constitution in Pennsylvania. Outside 
of the convention, Anti-Federalists such as "Philadelphiensis" and 
"An Officer of the Late Continental Army" did charge that the 
President would have too much power and would be an "elective 
king." In explaining this charge, the Anti-Federalists referred only to 
powers specified in the Constitution, such as the commander-in-chief 
power, pardon power, and veto power.306 In response, a Federalist 
essay denied this charge, noting, among other things, that "the new 
Constitution provides that [the President) shall act 'by and with the 
advice and consent of the senate' (Article 2, Section 2), and can in no 
instance act alone, except in the cause of humanity by granting 
reprieves or pardons."307 This response, too, seems to envision the 
President receiving only the powers specified in Article II, a number 
of which are shared with the Senate. 
303. See Tench Coxe, An American Citizen I, lNDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept. 26, 1787, 
reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
138, 140-41 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
304. 2 id. at 141. 
305. 2 id. at 142. 
306. See, e.g. , 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 303, at 210, 212; 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 136, 137 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
307 . Plain Truth: Reply to An Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEP. 
GAZETTEER, Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 303, at 216, 221. 
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From then on in the Pennsylvania debates, the Anti-Federalist 
objections concerning the President's powers, although sometimes 
framed in essentialist terms, were primarily that the President would 
be too weak, not that he would resemble a monarch. During the 
Pennsylvania convention, John Smilie contended that the Senate had 
"an alarming share of the executive" power.308 Similarly, he stated: 
"The balance of power is in the Senate. Their share in the executive 
department will corrupt the legislature, and detracts from the proper 
power of the President, and will make the President merely a tool to 
the Senate. "309 And William Findley objected that " [ o ]nly a part of the 
executive power is vested in the President. The most influential part is 
in the Senate, and he only acts as primus inter pares of the Senate; only 
he has the sole right of nomination. "310 As James Wilson subsequently 
observed in describing the Anti-Federalist position in Pennsylvania, 
"[t]he objection against the powers of the President is not that they 
are too many or too great, but to state it in the gentleman's own 
language [referring to John Smilie's comments], they are so trifling 
that the President is no more than the tool of the Senate. "31 1 
In responding to this criticism, defenders of the Constitution did 
not suggest that the President would have powers not specified in 
Article II, and they - unlike the critics - did not typically resort to 
essentialist labels. Rather, they defended the Constitution's 
assignment of powers in functional terms. In defending the Senate's 
role in the treaty process, for example, Thomas McKean stated: "Is it 
an objection that the President is bound to consult the Senate? This is 
contending for his monarchy. But he clearly is responsible to the 
people."312 Similarly, James Wilson argued that, even though treaties 
"are to have the force of laws," it was proper to assign the treaty 
power to the Senate and President rather than to Congress because 
"sometimes secrecy may be necessary [during negotiations]" and 
because Congress would not be able to be in session during a "long se­
ries of negotiation."313 Wilson also famously defended the assignment 
of the declare war power to Congress on the ground that more 
numerous bodies would be slower to go to war than individuals.314 
The Federalists, in other words, acknowledged the President's 
limited powers and defended the limitations on functional grounds. 
308. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 303, at 466. 
309. 2 id. at 508. 
310. 2 id. at 512. 
311. 2 id. at 566. 
312. 2 id. at 544. 
313. 2 id. at 562. 
314. See 2 id. at 583. 
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There are a couple of statements by Wilson that are slight, but only 
slight, exceptions to this pattern. In denying that the President would 
be the tool of the Senate, Wilson observed that he could "see that [the 
President] may do a great many things independent of the Senate; and 
with respect to the executive powers of government in which the 
Senate participate, they can do nothing without him."315 The "great 
many things" referred to by Wilson presumably would have included 
the President's powers as Commander in Chief, his role in receiving 
ambassadors, and his Take Care Clause responsibilities in executing 
federal law; Wilson need not be read here as referring to unspecified 
powers. Wilson further stated that the President "holds the helm, and 
the vessel can proceed in neither one direction nor another, without 
his concurrence."316 The reference to the President's "concurrence" 
presumably was a reference to the President's veto power and the 
requirement of his agreement to treaties, not a reference to some 
residuum of unilateral presidential powers. 
Although Prakash and Ramsey do not consider the Pennsylvania 
debates in detail, they do quote comments by John Smilie and others 
complaining about the Senate's role in the treaty process, an activity 
that the complainants described as "executive" in nature.317 Statements 
like these, argue Prakash and Ramsey, show that the participants in 
the Pennsylvania debates had a conception of executive power, 
something that Prakash and Ramsey assert " [i]n a roundabout way . . .  
confirms the conventional view that the President enjoyed a residual 
executive power over foreign affairs. "318 
That some of the participants in these debates referred to 
executive power in the abstract does not in fact show - in either a 
straightforward or roundabout way - that they believed that the 
Constitution was granting the President a residuum of unspecified 
foreign affairs powers. There is no evidence, for example, that the 
participants who made these statements believed that there were 
executive powers, let alone foreign affairs powers, that had not 
already been specified in the Constitution. Nor do these abstract 
references, by critics of the Constitution, demonstrate that there was a 
consensus about what was properly encompassed within the category 
of executive power. Moreover, as noted above, these references were 
in the context of complaints that the Constitution's grants of power to 
the President were too limited, and that the President would be the 
tool of the Senate. Neither the complainants nor the defenders of the 
proposed Constitution suggested that the President would have 
315. 2 id. at 566. 
316. 2 id. 
317. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 291. 
318. Id. at 290. 
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powers unspecified in Article II, even though such residual power 
might have alleviated the concerns about the weakness of the 
President. 
Massachusetts. Although comprising an extensive set of materials, 
the Massachusetts ratification debates, like the Pennsylvania debates, 
were of relatively low quality, especially when compared with those of 
Virginia.319 Many of the state's most able leaders were effectively 
missing in action: John Adams was in Europe; Samuel Adams had to 
cope with the death of his son shortly after the start of the convention; 
and John Hancock was in poor health and straddled the fence until the 
eleventh hour.320 In addition, prominent in the debates were Anti­
Federalists from the West who did not compare to the Southern 
gentry with respect to learned political analysis. 321 Relatedly, 
the specter of Shays's Rebellion still hung over the state, and led 
to a preoccupation with internal affairs.322 Finally, the debates in 
Massachusetts, both within and outside the state convention, focused 
primarily on the scope of Congress's, rather than the President's, 
powers.323 
The debates over presidential power that did take place in 
Massachusetts all concerned the powers listed in Article II. Thus, for 
example, "Vox Populi," in arguing that the proposed Constitution 
would deprive Massachusetts of its sovereignty (and thereby conflict 
with the oath that Massachusetts's state officials were required to 
take), referred to the President's treaty, appointment, pardon, and 
commander-in-chief powers - all powers listed in Article II. 324 
Similarly, the objections that were raised with respect to presidential 
power in the brief discussion of Article II during the convention 
concerned the treaty and pardon powers.325 Here and elsewhere, the 
participants in the Massachusetts debates appeared to assume that the 
319. The Massachusetts debates take up volumes four through seven of The Doc­
umentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. See 4-7 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1997-2001). 
320. See RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 119-20; Michael A. Gillespie, Massachusetts: 
Creating Consensus, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 138, 138-67. 
321. See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON­
STITUTION, supra note 319, at 1 108-09; RAKOVE, supra note 51,  at 119. 
322. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON­
STITUTION, supra note 319, at xxxviii-xl. 
323. The Massachusetts convention spent over two weeks debating Article I, but only 
three days discussing Articles II and III. See 6 id. at 1 1 10-1 1 ,  1 1 16. 
324. See Vox Populi, To the PEOPLE of MASSA CHUSETTS, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov. 
23, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 309, 311 .  
325 . See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 1362. 
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President was being granted only the powers listed in Article II. 
"Cornelius," for example, after reviewing the specific grants of power 
in Articles I, II, and III, stated that the President is "vested with the 
powers prescribed in the Constitution."326 
Moreover, the defenders of the Constitution in Massachusetts 
emphasized the limited nature of the grants of power in Article II, 
again suggesting that the President was receiving only the powers 
listed. "Cassius," for example, contended that "no more than 
necessary powers are vested in the executive of the United States by 
the new constitution," and that, in Article II, Section 3, "[v]ery little 
more power is granted to the [P]resident of the United States . . .  than 
what is vested in the governours of the different states."327 Similarly, 
Governor James Bowdoin stated during the convention debates that 
" [t]he executive powers of the President[] are very similar to those of 
the several States, except in those points, which relate more 
particularly to the union; and respect ambassadours, publick ministers, 
and consuls."328 In what may be the only reference to the Article II 
Vesting Clause in the Massachusetts debates, Cassius observed as 
follows: "Section one, of article second, provides, that the executive 
power shall be vested in a President of the United States. The 
necessity of such a provision must appear reasonable to any one; any 
further remarks, therefore, on this head, will be needless."329 Here, 
Cassius almost certainly was treating the Vesting Clause as identifying 
the recipient of the Article II powers, not as conveying a package of 
unspecified powers.330 
Although Massachusetts did feature some essentialist rhetoric, 
such statements were few, in passing, and served more as labels than 
as justifications for the allocation of given powers. For example, 
Elbridge Gerry, who had served as a delegate to the Federal 
Convention and had declined to sign the Constitution, objected that in 
the Constitution "the executive is blended with & will have an undue 
326. 4 id. at 416; see also 6 id. at 1436 (documenting a statement by William Cushing, in 
an undelivered speech, that "the powers of ye president & Senate are Specified"). 
327. Cassius, To the Inhabitants of this State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 1787, reprinted 
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 319, at 500, 500-01 .  
328. 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY O F  THE RATIFICATION O F  THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 319, at 1392. 
329. Cassius, To the Inhabitants of this State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted 
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 319, at 479, 482. 
330. See also 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 1363 (recording the statement by Nathaniel Gorham that 
Article II, Section 1 "fixes the mode of appointment"). 
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influence on the legislature."331 Similarly, John DeWitt observed that, 
"The Legislative is divided between the People, who are the 
Democratic[,] and the Senate, who are the Aristocratical part, and the 
Executive between the same Senate and the President who represents 
the Monarchical branch."332 A further essentialist comment came from 
Bowdoin, who defended the Senate by noting that it resembled the 
upper house in most states in "having not only legislative, but 
executive powers."333 Given that the upper houses of the states did not 
have treatymaking authority, Bowdoin appears to have meant simply 
that the Senate, as he immediately went on to explain, would act as 
"an advising body" to the President.334 
One of the few, if only, statements equating the executive with any 
aspect of foreign affairs came from Daniel Taylor, who remarked that, 
"When the [S]enate act as legislators they are countroulable at all 
times by the [House of R ]epresentatives; and in their executive 
capacity, in making treaties and conducting negociations, the consent 
of two thirds is necessary."335 Importantly, the reference here is to a 
foreign affairs power specifically listed in the Constitution 
(treatymaking), and there is no suggestion of unspecified foreign 
affairs powers. Moreover, there is no suggestion here or anywhere else 
in the Massachusetts debates that foreign affairs powers inherently 
had to be assigned to the executive branch. In fact, a few 
commentators pointed to the other extreme to argue that foreign 
affairs authority most naturally belonged to the legislative branch. 
According to "Agrippa," for example, "the intercourse between us 
and foreign nations, properly forms the department of Congress," 
including not just the authority to regulate trade, but also "the right of 
war and peace."336 These stray statements no more establish legislative 
foreign affairs essentialism than their counterparts prove the executive 
variety. That, however, is exactly our point. 
331. 4 id. at 98. In response to this objection, the other two Massachusetts delegates to 
the Federal Convention, Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham, argued that "[t)he same 
objection might be made [against) the constituti0n of this State . . .  but as experience has not 
proved that our Executive has an undue influence over the Legislature - we cannot think 
the objection well founded." 4 id. at 188. 
332. John De Witt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, AM. 
HERALD, Nov. 5, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENT ARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 194, 196. 
333. 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 319, at 1391. 
334. 6 id. 
335. 6 id. at 1326. 
336. Agrippa, To the Massachusetts Convention, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1788, 
reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 319, at 720, 724. 
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New York. Although New York held its convention debates 
relatively late and was the eleventh state to ratify the Constitution, its 
debates were important for several reasons. New York City had been 
serving as the national capital, and the state was geographically central 
to the new nation. The state also had growing commercial importance, 
and was the source of the Federalist Papers. Its debates also featured 
prominent figures such as Alexander Hamilton and John Jay. 
Outside of the convention, Anti-Federalists such as "Cato" pressed 
the usual charge that the President would be an "elective king," and 
they cited to the express grants of authority in the Constitution, not to 
any unspecified residuum, in support of this charge.337 There was, 
however, little discussion of the presidency in the convention debates. 
By the time the convention had turned to Article II, the delegates 
became aware that the Constitution had received its ninth ratification 
(by New Hampshire) and therefore was approved. The scope and na­
ture of the subsequent discussions were likely affected by this news.338 
Much of the initial debates focused on the process provisions of 
Article I, such as the provisions relating to the apportionment of 
representatives and the frequency of congressional elections. There 
was also debate over whether the Senate would be too powerful. 
Gilbert Livingston complained, for example, that "too much is put in 
their hands" and that there was "little or no check" on the Senate.339 In 
addition, there was some debate over Congress's Necessary and 
Proper power,340 and there was substantial discussion of Congress's 
power to tax.341 But, as the records themselves state, there was "little 
or no debate" about Article II of the Constitution.342 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the statements in the New York 
debates relating to foreign affairs primarily concerned the Senate. 
These statements suggest an understanding that the Senate would 
have substantial foreign relations power, perhaps equal to or greater 
than the President's foreign relations power. For example, Robert 
Livingston, in defending the Constitution's assignment of a long term 
of office for senators, observed that the Senate is "to form treaties 
337. See Cato, To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y. J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted 
in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 195, 
197-98 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003). 
338. See Cecil L. Eubanks, New York: Federalism and the Political Economy of Union, 
in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 300, 300-40. 
339. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 279 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS); see also 2 id. at 278 (statement by Gilbert Livingston 
that the Senate was "a dangerous body"). 
340. 2 id. at 314-17. 
341. See, e.g. , 2 id. at 320-22. 
342. 2 id. at 379. 
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with foreign nations," and that this "requires a comprehensive 
knowledge of foreign politics, and an extensive acquaintance with 
characters, whom, in this capacity, they have to negotiate with."343 
Similarly, Alexander Hamilton, in arguing against a proposal that 
would give state legislatures the power to recall senators and limit the 
ability of senators to be reelected, stated that the Senate, "together 
with the [P]resident, are to manage all our concerns with foreign 
nations."344 Robert Livingston went on to state, even more broadly, 
that the Senate is " to transact all foreign business."345 
These statements about the Senate are difficult to reconcile with 
the Vesting Clause Thesis, which hypothesizes that the President will 
manage foreign affairs by virtue of having the "executive Power."  
Prakash and Ramsey's only answer to  these statements i s  to  assert that 
the speakers were mistaken.346 It is noteworthy, however, that these 
statements went uncontested in the recorded debates. By contrast, 
when John Lansing suggested that the Senate also had the power to 
declare war,347 Robert Livingston quickly corrected him, noting that 
"the power could not be exercised except by the whole legislature. "348 
When the New York convention proceeded to have its limited 
discussion of Article II, Melancton Smith and Gilbert Livingston made 
several unsuccessful motions to amend the Constitution to limit the 
power of the presidency. Smith moved to change the President's term 
to a single term of seven years.349 Livingston moved that the President 
"should never command the army, militia, or navy of the United 
States, in person, without the consent of the Congress; and that he 
should not have the power to grant pardons for treason, without the 
consent of the [C)ongress." 350 And Smith moved to have the 
convention express the view that Congress could appoint a council of 
advice to assist the President. 351 Given their concerns about the 
343. 2 id. at 281. 
344. 2 id. at 294. 
345. 2 id. at 308. 
346. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 289 & nn.253-54. 
347. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 285. 
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sufficient number of representatives in Congress, John Jay noted that the critics of the 
apportionment provisions did not think a larger number of representatives was necessary for 
"the important powers of war and peace," even though these powers "reach[] objects the 
most dear to the people; and every man is concerned in them." 2 id. at 274. And both 
Hamilton and Jay argued that the new Congress would be less susceptible to corruption than 
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presidency, it seems likely that Smith and Livingston would have 
complained about unspecified presidential powers, if they had 
believed that such powers were encompassed by the Article II Vesting 
Clause. But neither they nor anyone else in the New York ratifying 
convention mentioned that possibility. 
North Carolina. The views expressed in the initial North Carolina 
convention might be entitled to less weight due to the fact that the 
convention voted against the Constitution. Nevertheless, the 
statements made during the debates shed further light on how the 
supporters and opponents of the Constitution understood Article II. 
Almost all of the relevant comments in the North Carolina debates 
suggest that the President's powers were specified in Article II. In 
addition, the proponents of the Constitution typically relied on 
functional rather than essentialist arguments to explain the 
Constitution's assignment of powers. Although there are a few 
statements in the debates that suggest essentialist thinking with 
respect to the assignment of the treaty power, these statements are 
specific to that power and, in any event, were contested and 
contradictory. 352 
As elsewhere, the convention discussed the Constitution section by 
section. Early in the debate, in discussing the first section of Article I, 
William Lenoir objected to giving the President the treaty power 
because, in his view, that power is legislative in nature and the 
Constitution says in Article I that the legislative power is being vested 
in Congress. 353 Richard Spaight, Archibald Maclaine, and James 
Iredell denied that the power was legislative. In this regard, Maclaine 
argued that, unlike legislation, treaties act upon states rather than 
individuals, such that the President acts "in his executive capacity" 
when making treaties.354 Iredell explained, somewhat differently, that 
there is nothing inherently objectionable about the President making 
law, since every exercise of power operates as the law of the land, and 
he gave the example of a pardon.355 Lenoir remained unpersuaded by 
these responses. 
Prakash and Ramsey rely heavily on this exchange,356 but it is not 
clear that it helps them. First, Lenoir was relying on the statement in 
the Constitution that the legislative power was being assigned to 
352. For a general discussion of the unusual course of ratification in North Carolina, see 
Michael Lienesch, North Carolina: Preserving Rights, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 268, at 343, 343-67. 
353. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STA TE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 56. 
354. See 4 id. 
355. 4 id. at 57. 
356. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 292 n.262, 294-95. 
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Congress, not on some pre-constitutional baseline.357 Second, to the 
extent that the exchange shows essentialist thinking about what is 
legislative and what is executive, it does so only with respect to a 
power specifically listed in Article II, not some unspecified power or 
foreign affairs powers more generally. No one in this exchange said, 
for example, that foreign affairs powers must be vested with the 
executive. Third, even for the specified power that was discussed, the 
exchange demonstrates that there was substantial debate and 
uncertainty concerning the proper categorization. 
When the North Carolina convention reached Article II, and the 
first section of that Article was read, there apparently was silence. 
William Davie, a supporter of the Constitution, expressed 
"astonishment at the precipitancy with which we go through this 
business."358 He thought it "highly improper to pass over in silence any 
part of the [C]onstitution which has been loudly objected to."359 
Although the first section of Article II met his "entire approbation," 
he knew that some people objected to having a separate Executive 
Branch and to the election provisions in this section. Importantly, 
Davie made no mention of any objection concerning the assignment of 
substantive power, suggesting that neither he nor the opponents of the 
Constitution viewed the Clause as conferring substantive power. 
When the convention proceeded to discuss the second section of 
Article II, Iredell noted that " [i]t conveys very important powers, and 
ought not to be passed by."360 This was the first time in the debate that 
any portion of Article II was referred to as conveying substantive 
power. Furthermore, Iredell's statement suggests that this section was 
not viewed as merely illustrative of a more general grant of power in 
the Vesting Clause. Iredell confirmed this understanding, observing: "I 
believe that most of the governors of the different states have powers 
similar to those of the [P)resident."361 
Iredell then proceeded to defend the commander-in-chief power. 
He noted that "(i)n almost every country, the executive has the 
command of the military forces."362 He then argued that this is a 
proper assignment, based on functional reasons, such as the need for 
secrecy and dispatch. He further argued that the President's power is 
357. Lenoir's reading of the Article I Vesting Clause also contradicts Prakash and 
Ramsey's textual argument about the distinction between the Article I and Article II vesting 
clauses. Lenoir appeared to read Article I 's clause as signifying that all legislative power had 
to be vested in Congress, a construction at odds with the "herein granted" language as 
construed by proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis. See supra Part I .  
358. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 119. 
359. 4 id. 
360. 4 id. at 123. 
361. 4 id. 
362. 4 id. 
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properly guarded by Congress's power to declare war.363 Again, there 
is no hint of executive power essentialism. 
Essentialism did creep in, however, in the convention's discussion 
of the treaty power. Samuel Spencer, an opponent of the Constitution, 
objected to giving the Senate a role in the treaty process, because "by 
this clause they possess the chief of the executive power."364 Spencer 
thus obviously thought that the treaty power was something that 
should properly be vested with the Executive Branch, and his 
statement could be read as reflecting essentialist thinking with respect 
to this point.365 In response, Davie agreed that the treaty power "has, 
in all countries and governments been placed in the executive 
departments."366 This assignment, explained Davie, had been based on 
functional considerations: the need for "secrecy, design, and dispatch, 
which are always necessary in negotiations between nations,'' and the 
danger of "violence, animosity, and heat of parties, which too 
often infect numerous bodies."367 Davie further explained that the 
Constitution included the Senate in the treaty process as a 
compromise to take account of the interests of the small states.368 In 
addition, Davie contended that Montesquieu had been misconstrued 
as arguing against any blending of powers; in fact, explained Davie, 
Montesquieu did not advocate " [a]n absolute and complete 
separation."369 Iredell further defended the inclusion of state interests, 
through the Senate, in the treaty process.370 
At most, this exchange shows that the treaty power was considered 
by the speakers to be a traditionally executive power, and that there 
was some debate over whether this was justified by essentialist 
reasoning or functional considerations. Interestingly, an earlier 
exchange in the convention (between Lenoir and others, recounted 
above) was based on the opposite claim that the treaty power was 
legislative rather than executive, showing the uncertain nature of these 
categories. In any event, Spencer's essentialist objection, like North 
Carolina's initial decision not to ratify the Constitution, did not 
prevail. Rather, the Constitution deviated from strict categorization 
even with respect to what Spencer referred to as the "chief' of the 
executive power, which would seem to undercut the claim that the 
363. 4 id. at 124. 
364. 4 id. at 131. 
365. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 291 n.257. 
366. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STA TE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 134. 
367. 4 id. 
368. 4 id. at 135. 
369. 4 id. 
370. 4 id. at 139. 
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Vesting Clause incorporated some sort of well-understood package of 
executive power.371 
In the convention's discussion of the impeachment check on the 
President, Iredell stated that the President "is to regulate all 
intercourse with foreign powers, and it is his duty to impart to the 
[S)enate every material intelligence he receives."  372 Prakash and 
Ramsey rely on this statement as implying a dominant role for the 
President in foreign relations.373 On its face, however, this statement 
appears merely to be referring to the President's expected role as a 
medium for communications with other nations. Moreover, Iredell 
made no effort to tie his statement to the Vesting Clause, and it could 
just as well have been based on implications from the President's 
specified powers (such as the treaty power and the powers to appoint 
and receive ambassadors). This narrower construction would be 
consistent with a more general statement Iredell made later in the 
convention, that "[t)he powers of the government are particularly 
enumerated and defined: they can claim no others but such as are so 
enumerated. "374 
Near the end of the convention, there were some general speeches 
for and against the Constitution. In describing some of the objections 
to the Constitution, Lenoir complained about various presidential 
powers, including the pardon power, the appointment power, and the 
veto power. 375 He made no mention of unspecified presidential 
powers, although one would have expected Lenoir and other 
constitutional opponents to have objected to that idea if they thought 
it was encompassed within the Vesting Clause. Again, the silence is 
striking. 
South Carolina. The debates in South Carolina similarly reflected 
the view that the President would have only the powers specified in 
Article Il.376 For example, Charles Pinckney, in commenting on the 
proposed executive branch, noted that " [t)hough many objections had 
been made to this part of the system, he was always at a loss to 
371. It is not clear that Spencer's objection prevailed even at the North Carolina 
convention. None of North Carolina's proposed amendments, even the ones relating to the 
treaty power, addressed his objection concerning the Senate's role in the treaty process. See 
4 id. at 240-43. 
372. 4 id. at 140. 
373. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 288. Prakash and Ramsey also rely on an 
earlier hypothetical by Iredell about the President sending a spy overseas as suggesting 
executive control over foreign affairs. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 128; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 288. 
374. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 219. 
375. 4 id. at 205-06. 
376. For background on ratification in South Carolina, see Robert M. Weir, South 
Carolina: Slavery and the Structure of the Union, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 268, at 201, 201-34. 
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account for them."377 He explained that there was "nothing dangerous 
in its powers," something "easily discerned from reviewing them."378 
Pinckney then proceeded to discuss only powers enumerated in 
Article II. Given the Constitution's assignments of power, Pinckney 
explained, the only danger would come from a combination of the 
President and Senate acting together. These comments suggest that 
the Executive Branch was being granted only the powers enumerated 
in Article II. 
The other Pinckney - Charles Cotesworth Pinckney - explained 
that some people had argued for vesting the treaty power with 
Congress. But the need for secrecy and dispatch, he explained, 
weighed against vesting it there.379 He also argued that, even though it 
may have been proper for the British king to have the treaty power, 
there were potential dangers with vesting the treaty power solely with 
the President.380 His discussion of the proper placement of the treaty 
power is entirely functional rather than essentialist, and, like other 
participants in state ratification debates, Pinckney rejected the British 
model of executive power. At one point, Pinckney stated more 
generally that, for functional reasons, foreign relations authority is 
properly shared between the Senate and President.381 
Critics of the Constitution in South Carolina also rejected the 
British model. Rawlins Lowndes, for example, repeatedly asserted in 
the debates that the President's powers would be too great -
resembling a monarchy.382 To the extent this objection was explained, 
or answered, the reference always was to powers enumerated in the 
Constitution, such as the treaty power.383 
Conclusion. The state ratification debates confirm the lack of 
Founding-era support for the Vesting Clause Thesis. In the thousands 
of pages recording these debates, the argument that the Vesting 
377. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 253. 
378. 4 id. (emphasis added). 
379. 4 id. at 258. 
380. 4 id. at 258-59. 
381. 4 id. at 273. Prakash and Ramsey simply assert that Pinckney was mistaken on this 
point. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 289 n.253. 
382. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 
260, 278, 298. 
383. In responding to Lowndes's concern about vesting the treaty power with the 
President, John Pringle argued: "The making of treaties is justly a part of their prerogative 
- it properly belongs to the executive part of government, because [treaties] must be 
conducted with dispatch and secrecy; not to be expected in larger assemblies." 4 id. at 263. 
Prakash and Ramsey rely on the first part of this statement as confirming an understanding 
that the treaty power was executive in nature, see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 293, 
but they ignore the fact that Pringle's explanation is entirely functional rather than 
essentialist. It is telling that Prakash and Ramsey stop their quotation of Pringle right before 
the word "because" and simply summarize the functional language. 
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Clause grants the President a general foreign affairs power simply 
does not appear. Rather, the arguments for and against executive 
authority consistently focus on the specific powers listed in Article II. 
Moreover, many statements in these debates expressly or impliedly 
assume that these specific powers are the only ones being granted to 
the President. Furthermore, the Constitution's supporters repeatedly 
made clear that, in establishing the Executive, the Constitution had 
rejected the model offered by the British monarch. Instead of relying 
on essentialist categories, the supporters, and to a significant extent 
the Constitution's opponents as well, emphasized the functional 
reasons for granting, withholding, or dividing discrete powers among 
the President, Senate, and Congress. Other than as rhetorical 
embellishment, essentialist assertions did little or no work in any of 
these debates. 
IV. THE WA SHINGTON AD MINI STRATION 
A. The Senate's Role in Treatymaking 
We begin our discussion of the Washington Administration 
somewhat out of chronological order. The foreign affairs law 
development that we discuss here - a change in the Senate's role in 
the treaty process - was not the earliest foreign affairs law 
development, but it was one of the most significant. It also provides a 
vivid illustration of discontinuity, since it is likely that the change in 
the Senate's role was inconsistent with the Founders' original 
understanding of the Constitution. Furthermore, it offers a cautionary 
lesson against too easily drawing inferences about the understanding 
of the Founders from postratification practices. 
In a nutshell, the Founders appeared to assume that the Senate's 
power of "advice and consent" in the treaty process entailed not only 
a veto power but also some sort of role in the formulation and 
negotiation of treaties. Although the Washington Administration 
initially shared this understanding, the Administration soon deviated 
from it, often formulating and negotiating treaties without Senate 
input and simply presenting the treaties to the Senate for an 
affirmative or negative vote. This deviation from original understand­
ing became common practice and remains the practice today.384 
384. For detailed descriptions of this development, see Bestor, supra note 227, and 
Rakove, supra note 65. See also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION ch. 2 (1988) (discussing the original understanding on this issue). 
Prakash and Ramsey's otherwise quite detailed account of the Washington Administration 
makes no mention of this development. They do correctly observe in a footnote, however, 
that "some envisioned that the Senate would be heavily involved with foreign negotiations." 
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 290 n.255. 
February 2004] Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs 627 
1 .  Understanding of the Founders 
The text of the Article II Treaty Clause, in referring to both 
"advice" and "consent," appears to contemplate more than just a veto 
role for the Senate, since such a role presumably would be 
encompassed by the word "consent." Research concerning the historic 
meaning of the phrase "advice and consent" provides further support 
for this construction. As Howard Sklamberg has noted, the phrase had 
been used in English statutes to signify Parliament's dominant role vis­
a-vis the King in the legislative process.385 It also had been used in 
state constitutions to signify a formal advice role for the state 
legislatures, typically in situations in which the legislatures dominated 
the executive.386 Thus, as Sklamberg explains: 
[A]t the time of the Constitutional Convention, the term "advice and 
consent" denoted a Parliament that exercised nearly plenary lawmaking 
power and state councils that played a substantial role in the exercise of 
executive power. This historical context suggests that the Constitution 
assigns the Senate some active function in treatymaking and does not 
limit it to the role of a ratifier.387 
The records of the Federal Convention support this conclusion. 
Until late in the Convention, the proposed Constitution would have 
given the entire treaty power to the Senate. Thus, for example, the 
draft of the Constitution issued by the Committee of Detail on August 
6 provided that "The Senate of the United States shall have power to 
make treaties" and made no mention of treaties in its list of the 
President's powers.388 The Committee of Detail's draft also would 
have given the Senate the sole power of appointing ambassadors and 
judges.389 Although Hamilton had proposed in his plan on June 18 that 
the "Governor" was "to have with the advice and approbation of the 
Senate the power of making all treaties,"390 his plan was not discussed. 
Furthermore, even his plan would have given the Senate "the power 
of advising and approving all Treaties," thus extending the Senate's 
role beyond mere approval.391 
385. See Howard R. Sklamberg, The Meaning of "Advice and Consent": The Senate's 
Constitutional Role in Treatymaking, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445, 448 (1997). 
386. Id. at 449; see also supra Part 11.C. 
387. Sklamberg, supra note 385, at 450. 
388. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 
183, 185. 
389. See 2 id. at 183. As noted above in Part III.A, the Committee of Detail's draft 
assigned these powers to the Senate even though the draft also stated that the "Executive 
Power of the United States shall be vested" in the President. See 2 id. at 185. Thus, the 
Committee of Detail apparently did not understand the Vesting Clause as encompassing the 
powers of making treaties, appointing ambassadors, or appointing judges. 
390. 1 id. at 292. 
391. 1 id. 
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When the proposed Treaty Clause was considered in late August, 
concerns were expressed about giving the treaty power exclusively to 
the Senate. By this point, it had been agreed at the Convention (in 
what tas been called the "Great Compromise") that the states would 
have equal representation in the Senate. Madison thus "observed that 
the Senate represented the States alone, and that for this as well as 
other obvious reasons it was proper that the President should be an 
agent in Treaties."392 Other delegates expressed the view that there 
should be a check against abuses of the treaty power. Gouverneur 
Morris proposed an amendment whereby treaties would not be 
binding on the United States until ratified by Congress.393 James 
Wilson expressed concern that, "without the amendment, the Senate 
alone can make a Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be 
sent to some one particular port."394 Along somewhat similar lines, 
George Mason, in commenting in an earlier discussion about 
senatorial powers, had observed that the Senate "could already sell 
the whole Country by means of Treaties."395 Madison concluded the 
discussion by "hint[ing] for consideration, whether a distinction might 
not be made between different sorts of Treaties - Allowing the 
President & Senate to make Treaties eventual and of Alliance for 
limited terms - and requiring the concurrence of the whole 
Legislature in other Treaties."396 
In light of these objections, the Treaty Clause, along with certain 
other provisions, was eventually sent to what has come to be called the 
Committee of Postponed Parts. There is no record of the Committee's 
deliberations. But in its report on September 4, the Committee 
proposed that the President "by and with the advice and Consent of 
the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties. "397 It also proposed 
that the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" 
392. 2 id. at 392. As Arthur Bestor notes, in suggesting that the President should be an 
"agent" of the Senate, Madison may have had in mind the agency relationship that existed 
for treaties between the Continental Congress and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
pursuant to which Congress exercised ultimate control over the treaty process. See Bestor, 
supra note 227, at 109. 
393. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 392. 
394. 2 id. at 393. 
395. 2 id. at 297. At this point, John Mercer expressed the view that "the Senate ought 
not to have the power of treaties" because "[t]his power belonged to the Executive 
department." 2 id. As others have noted, it is unlikely that Mercer's views were 
representative of the views of the other delegates. See Bestor, supra note 227, at 103-06; 
Rakove, supra note 65, at 240 n.12. Moreover, Mercer also believed that treaties "would not 
be final so as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative authority," a proposition 
expressly rejected by the Convention. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, supra note 28, at 297; see also supra text accompanying notes 234-238. 
396. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 394. 
397. 2 id. at 498. 
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would have the power of appointing ambassadors and judges. 398 
Obviously, there had been a shift at this point towards sharing some of 
the Senate's powers with the executive.399 
The modified Treaty Clause was considered on September 7 .  As 
noted, James Wilson at this point moved to include the House of 
Representatives in the treaty process, observing that " [a]s treaties . . .  
are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of 
laws also."400 Sherman responded that the "necessity of secrecy in the 
case of treaties forbade a reference of them to the whole 
Legislature."401 Wilson's motion was subsequently defeated, and the 
first portion of the Treaty Clause (mentioning the role of the President 
and Senate) was approved.402 As Rakove has explained, it is difficult to 
understand the concerns of secrecy expressed in this discussion unless 
the Senate was envisioned as having a role beyond merely approving 
or disapproving finished treaties.403 Furthermore, as Arthur Bestor has 
argued, there probably would have been more concerns raised about 
assigning the treaty power to the President if it were believed that the 
Senate's role were limited in this way.404 
The Federalist Papers that discuss the treaty power similarly 
suggest that the Senate's role would be broader than voting on 
finished treaties. In Federalist No. 64, Jay emphasized the need for 
secrecy and dispatch in the negotiation of treaties, and noted that 
"although the President must, in forming [treaties], act by the advice 
and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business 
of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest."405 Jay went 
on to explain that the "preparatory and auxiliary measures" in treaty 
negotiations often require the most secrecy and that "should any 
398. 2 id. 
399. As Rakove explains, this shift appears to have been driven by concerns about the 
Senate rather than an essentialist view about the powers of the executive. See Rakove, supra 
note 65, at 249. 
400. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 538. 
401. 2 id. 
402. 2 id. 
403. See Rakove, supra note 65, at 246-47. 
404. See Bestor, supra note 227, at 93. After approval of the first part of the treaty 
clause, there was discussion of the two-thirds senatorial consent requirement. Wilson and 
King objected to this requirement because, as Wilson stated, it "puts it in the power of a 
minority to controul the will of a majority." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 540. Madison moved successfully at this point to 
exempt treaties of peace from the two-thirds requirement. 2 id. at 540-41 .  He also proposed, 
unsuccessfully, to allow two-thirds of the Senate to make peace treaties without the 
concurrence of the President. 2 id. The exception to the two-thirds requirement for peace 
treaties was subsequently stricken after additional discussion. 2 id. at 547-49. Nothing in 
these discussions suggests that the Senate's role would be limited to approving or 
disapproving finished treaties. 
405. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 64 (John Jay), at 393. 
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circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the 
Senate, he may at any time convene them. "406 These statements appear 
to assume that the President will be consulting with the Senate when 
negotiating treaties and not simply presenting the Senate with finished 
treaties that have already been negotiated. 
In Federalist No. 75, Hamilton argued that the treatymaking power 
was neither wholly executive nor wholly legislative in nature and thus 
should be shared between the legislative and executive branches: 
The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of 
foreign negotiations point out the executive as the most fit agent in those 
transactions; while the vast importance of the trust and the operation of 
treaties as laws plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a 
portion of the legislative body in the office of making them.407 
In arguing against giving the treaty power to the Senate alone, he 
emphasized "the benefits of the constitutional agency of the President 
in the conduct of foreign negotiations" and the "additional security 
which would result from the co-operation of the executive."408 In 
arguing against inclusion of the House of Representatives in the treaty 
process, Hamilton noted, among other things, the need for secrecy and 
dispatch and refers to problems associated with "obtain[ing the 
House's] sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty."409 Hamilton's 
statements seem to envision that the President will consult with the 
Senate in negotiating treaties. These statements can also be read to 
suggest that the President would act as the Senate's agent in the treaty 
process, something that Madison had suggested at the Federal 
Convention. 
The evidence from the state ratification conventions is less clear 
but on the whole is consistent with the foregoing discussion. There are 
statements in some of the conventions suggesting that the President 
would have a dominant role in the treaty process. There are also 
statements, however, suggesting that the Senate's role would not be 
limited to mere approval or disapproval of finished treaties. In the 
South Carolina convention, for example, although Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney refers at one point to the Senate's role in the treaty process 
as a "power of agreeing or disagreeing to the terms proposed,"410 he 
later explains that it is better to have the Senate rather than the House 
involved in the treaty process because it is functionally better suited 
for negotiation:  
406. Id. 
407. Id. No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), at 451 .  
408. Id. at  451-52. 
409. Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 
410. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 259. 
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Can secrecy be expected in sixty-five members [of the House of 
Representatives]? The idea is absurd. Besides, their sessions will prob­
ably last only two or three months in the year, therefore, on that account, 
they would be a very unfit body for negotiation; whereas the [S]enate, 
from the smallness of its numbers, from the equality of power which each 
state has in it, from the length of time for which its members are elected, 
from the long sessions they may have, without any great inconveniency 
to themselves or constituents, joined with the president, who is the 
federal head of the United States, form together a body in whom can be 
best and most safely vested the diplomatic power of the union.4 1 1  
James Wilson made similar statements at the Pennsylvania 
convention. While remarking that " [t]he Senate can make no treaties" 
and referring to Senators as "only auxiliaries to the President,"412 
Wilson observed that "the Senate and President possess the power of 
making [treaties]" and defended the exclusion of the House of 
Representatives from the treaty process on the ground that 
"sometimes secrecy may be necessary, and therefore it becomes an 
argument against committing the knowledge of these transactions to 
too many persons."413 Similarly, as we noted above in Part III.C, 
Robert Livingston stated in the New York ratifying convention that 
the Senate is "to form treaties with foreign nations," and that this 
"requires a comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics, and an 
extensive acquaintance with characters, whom, in this capacity, they 
have to negotiate with."414 
In sum, although the precise role envisioned for the Senate in the 
treaty process is not entirely clear, the Founders appear to have 
understood that the Senate would have an advice role that went 
beyond a mere affirmative or negative vote. 
2. Practices of the Washington Administration 
Initially, both the Washington Administration and the Senate 
shared the understanding, discussed above, that the Senate would 
have a substantial advice role in the treaty process. The first treaties 
received by the Senate for its consideration - two Indian treaties and 
a consular convention with France - had been negotiated before the 
Senate began operating and thus did not squarely present the issue of 
411. 4 id. at 272-73. 
412. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 303, at 480, 491. 
413. 2 id. at 562. Wilson also noted that the Senate and the President "are checks upon 
each other and are so balanced, as to produce security to the people." 2 id. at 563; see also 
supra text accompanying note 313 (describing a statement by Wilson expressing a preference 
for the Senate over the House in the treaty process because it is more suited to a "long series 
of negotiation"). 
414. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 339, at 281. 
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the Senate's role in the negotiation process. 415 Nevertheless, in 
approving the consular convention, the Senate "explicitly gave advice 
as well as consent, imparting not only its own imprimatur but also an 
unequivocal suggestion as to how the President should exercise his 
authority to perform the distinct act of final ratification."416 
On August 6, 1789, the Senate appointed a committee to confer 
with the President "on the mode of communication proper to be 
pursued between him and the Senate, in the formation of Treaties, and 
making appointments to Offices." 417 Two days later, Washington 
conveyed his sentiments to the committee, stating that, " [i]n all 
matters respecting Treaties,'' oral communications "seem indis­
pensably necessary."418 In a subsequent meeting with the committee, 
Washington expressed the view that the Senate acts as the President's 
council when considering treaties and that therefore the President 
should determine the time, place, and manner of the consultation.419 
He noted, for example, that "in Treaties of a complicated nature, it 
may happen that [the President] will send his propositions in writing 
and consult the Senate in person after time shall have been allowed 
for consideration."420 He therefore suggested that: 
[T]he Senate should accommodate their rules to the uncertainty of the 
particular mode and place that may be preferred; providing for the 
reception of either oral [or] written propositions, and for giving their 
consent and advice in either the presence or absence of the President, 
leaving him free to use the mode and place that may be found most 
eligible and accordant with other business which may be before him at 
the time.421 
In late August, the Senate considered the committee's report of its 
discussions with the President.422 After considering the report, the 
Senate passed a resolution governing the procedures to be followed 
when meeting with the President. 423 At this point, Washington 
delivered a message to the Senate announcing his intent of meeting 
415. See CURRIE, supra note 28, at 21-23. 
416. Id. at 22. 
417. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 24 
(Linda Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1974). 
418. Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Aug. 8, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE w ASHINGTON 373, 373 (John c. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939). 
419. Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Aug. 10, 1789), in 30 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 377, 377-78. 
420. 30 id. at 378. 
421. 30 id. at 378-79. 
422. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 417, at 
29 n.54. 
423. 2 id. at 29. 
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with them "to advise with them on the terms of the Treaty to be ne­
gotiated with the Southern Indians."424 Washington and his Secretary 
of War, Henry Knox, came to the Senate chamber the following day 
and presented the Senate with a report and a list of seven questions 
(concerning instructions to be given to the commissioners appointed 
to negotiate the treaty).425 
Senator Maclay notes in his diary that it was difficult to hear the 
presentation of the President's report (which was delivered by Vice­
President Adams), due to carriages driving past the Senate chamber.426 
At the request of Senator Robert Morris, the report was read a second 
time. Adams then immediately asked for the Senate's advice and 
consent on the questions. After a pause, Maclay rose and stated that 
" [t]he business is new to the Senate, it is of importance, it is our duty 
to inform ourselves as well as possible on the Subject."427 As a result, 
he asked for a "reading of the Treaties and other documents alluded 
to in the paper now before Us."428 According to Maclay's diary, 
Washington at this point "wore an aspect of Stern displeasure."429 
Various documents were then read and discussed. The Senate 
ultimately decided to postpone a decision on all but one of the 
questions until the following Monday. Senator Morris also proposed 
that the papers communicated by the President be given to a five­
person committee that would report back to the full Senate. Senator 
Butler objected, noting that the Senate was "acting as a Council" and 
that "no Councils ever committed anything."430 
Washington apparently was unhappy with the proposal to commit 
the matter to a committee. According to Maclay, Washington "started 
up in a Violent fret," stating that " [t]his defeats every purpose 
of my coming here."431 Although Maclay reports that Washington 
subsequently calmed down and indicated that he did not object to 
reconvening on Monday, Maclay also states that Washington left the 
Senate-chamber "with a discontented Air. "432 In his memoirs, John 
Quincy Adams reports that he had heard that "when Washington left 
424. 2 id. at 30. 
425. 2 id. at 31-34; Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Aug. 22. 1789), in 30 
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 385, 385-390. 
426. William Maclay, Diary entry (Aug. 22, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 128, 128 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. 
Veit eds., 1988). 
427. 9 id. 
428. 9 id. at 128-29. 
429. 9 id. at 129. 
430. 9 id. at 130. 
431. 9 id. 
432. 9 id. 
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the Senate chamber he said he would be damned if he ever went there 
again."433 Maclay's otherwise colorful diary does not report such a 
statement, however, and it may have been apocryphal.434 The Senate 
met again with the President on Monday, at which point, according to 
Maclay, the President was "placid and Serene and manifested a Spirit 
of Accomodation." 435 After discussion, the Senate proceeded to 
answer the President's questions.436 The instructions that Washington 
subsequently gave to the treaty commissioners conformed to the 
Senate's answers.437 
These early events suggest that both the Senate and the President 
understood that the Senate would consult with the President and give 
the President advice before treaties were finalized. As Professor 
Currie notes, both the Senate and President in the encounter over the 
Southern Indians treaty "plainly interpreted the power to advise and 
consent to include not merely approval of the finished product but 
also discussion in advance of the course of action to be pursued. "438 
Other early examples confirm this understanding.439 
The Washington Administration, however, consciously moved 
away from this understanding. Washington's two meetings with the 
Senate concerning the Southern Indians treaty were the first and last 
times he consulted with the Senate in person.440 To be sure, even after 
this episode Washington frequently sought the Senate's advice 
on treaties through written communications.441 But he did not do 
so consistently. In connection with four Indian treaties, for exam­
ple, Washington did not consult with the Senate before the treaties 
were negotiated. 442 With respect to one of these treaties in 1793, 
433. 6 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 427 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1875). 
434. See EDWARD s. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 
488 n.116 (5th rev. ed. 1984). But see RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 
1789-1817, at 23 (1920) (stating that it is "very likely" that Washington did make this 
statement). 
435. Maclay, supra note 426, at 131-32. 
436. Id. at 131-32; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 
1789-1797, supra note 417, at 34-36. 
437. See George Washington, Instructions to the Commissioners for treating with the 
Southern Indians, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 65, 65-68 (Walter 
Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832). 
438. CURRIE, supra note 28, at 24. 
439. See id. at 24-25. 
440. See HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 22; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., 
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
SENATE 33 (rev. ed. 2001). 
441. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 68-70 
(2d ed. 1916). 
442. See HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 37. 
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Washington asked his cabinet whether he should consult with the 
Senate, and, for secrecy reasons, they advised him not to do so.443 
Perhaps most famously, the Washington Administration did not 
consult with the Senate before starting to negotiate the Jay Treaty 
with Great Britain in 1794. The Administration informed the Senate in 
April 1794 that there would be negotiations when it sought Senate 
approval of Jay's appointment, but it did not submit Jay's treaty 
instructions to the Senate.444 There was a motion in the Senate to 
request that the Administration "inform Senate of the whole business 
with which the proposed Envoy is to be charged," but the motion was 
defeated. 445 More than a year later, in June 1795, Washington 
submitted the completed treaty to the Senate for its approval.446 The 
treaty generated substantial controversy in the United States, even 
after the Senate approved it and Washington signed it.447 After much 
debate, the House of Representatives demanded that Washington turn 
over to it copies of Jay's negotiating instructions and other materials 
relating to the treaty,448 but Washington declined to do so. 
By the end of the Washington Administration, it was clear that, 
despite the original understanding, the Senate had ceased to have a 
substantial advice role in the treaty process.449 Since then, presidents 
have consulted with the Senate prior to treaty negotiations only in 
isolated instances.450 The shift away from original understanding may 
443. See Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Treasury, and the Attorney General (Feb. 17, 1793), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 348, 348-49; HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 37-38. 
444. See Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Apr. 16, 1794), in 33 THE 
WRmNGS OF GEORGE w ASHINGTON 332, 332-33 (John c. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940); HAYDEN, 
supra note 434, at 70-71. 
445 . See Journal entry (Apr. 17, 1794), in 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 151, 151 (1828). There may, however, have been informal 
discussions between the Administration and Senate leaders concerning Jay's instructions. 
See HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 73. 
446. See Journal entry (June 8, 1795), in 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE SENATE, supra note 445, at 178, 178. 
447. See CURRIE, supra note 28, at 209-17; STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE 
AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 415-49 (1993). In  
approving the Jay Treaty (by a bare two-thirds majority), the Senate conditioned its consent 
on suspension of the twelfth article of the treaty limiting trade between the United States 
and the British West Indies, a condition accepted by Washington and Great Britain. This 
was the first time that the Senate attached a reservation to its consent to a treaty, something 
that is today common practice. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human 
Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 404-07 (2000); see also SOFAER, 
supra note 229, at 96 ("[President Washington] consciously accepted the Senate's power to 
approve treaties conditionally, and thereby in effect to advance 'advice' in the form of 
proposed amendments."). 
448. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 759-60 (1796). 
449. See HAYDEN, supra note 434, at 104-05. 
450. See CRANDALL, supra note 441, at 70-72. 
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well have been functionally sensible and, perhaps for this reason, the 
Senate did not actively resist it. This development provides a useful 
reminder, however, that one should not lightly assume that post­
ratification practices and statements implemented some sort of 
Founding consensus. It also provides a vivid illustration of how, in the 
early years of this nation, important separation of powers issues were 
worked out at the operational level in the light of practical experience 
rather than by reference to essentialist categories. 
B. Washington's Control of Diplomacy 
Upon assuming office, the Washington Administration necessarily 
embarked upon a wide range of activities relating to foreign affairs. 
Many of the powers the first President exercised appear 
straightforward and uncontroversial. Chief among these were 
Washington's de facto oversight of the holdover Department of 
Foreign Affairs, his direct authority over the newly established State 
Department, and his primary role in determining funding levels and 
establishing regulations with regard to the diplomatic corps. 
Executive power essentialists claim that only the Vesting Clause 
Thesis can account for Washington's actions.451 In fact, text and history 
offer more specific explanations. As a matter of text, reasonable 
constructions of specific foreign affairs clauses, such as those 
authorizing the President to appoint and receive ambassadors, make 
treaties, and require opinions from the heads of executive 
departments, support accepted assertions of presidential authority 
more plausibly than treating the Article II Vesting Clause as a general 
source of foreign affairs authority. The history of the period, 
moreover, indicates that contemporaries both inside and outside of 
the Administration followed this more modest interpretive strategy. 
Where specific grants reasonably supported those presidential actions 
that bore upon foreign affairs, officials and commentators tended 
either to accept the Executive's assertions, rely on specific text, make 
functional arguments to augment the particular textual claims, or 
pursue these approaches together. As we shall show in subsequent 
sections, where specific text did not point to a fairly clear answer, as 
with regard to the removal of the Secretary of State or the power to 
proclaim neutrality, substantial controversy ensued. Yet even here, as 
we will further show, participants in the debates continued to 
emphasize specific text and functional consequences, making 
essentialist arguments comparatively rarely, and - until Hamilton's 
451. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 298-31 1. 
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Pacificus essays and then only in part - relying on the Article II 
Vesting Clause almost not at all.452 
1. Oversight of the Old Department of Foreign Affairs 
George Washington took office facing a transitional situation that 
no President has had to face since. By the time he was sworn in on 
April 30, 1789, much of the rest of the government, including much of 
the Executive Branch, had yet to be established. These unsatisfactory 
circumstances extended to foreign affairs, one area in which an 
institutional vacuum could not long be tolerated. A new Department 
of Foreign Affairs was not formally established until late July, with 
subsequent legislation altering the name to Department of State in 
September.453 Compounding the situation, the first Secretary of State, 
Thomas Jefferson, was not confirmed by the Senate until September 
26, and since he was in France at the time, did not actually assume 
control of the Department until March 1790. Similar to what he did in 
other areas, Washington meanwhile chose to make do with the old 
Department of Foreign Affairs established under the Articles of 
Confederation and the holdover Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John 
Jay. Accordingly, the President directed Jay to communicate papers 
regarding a pending consular treaty to the Senate, to send an emissary 
to Canada, and otherwise to serve as though he were an interim 
Secretary of State. 
According to executive power essentialists, both Washington's 
attitude toward Jay and Jay's ready compliance are "inexplicable"454 
absent the Vesting Clause Thesis. Whereas the Confederation 
Congress had earlier created a foreign secretary answerable to it, the 
very same official immediately came under the supervision of a Chief 
Executive, where none had existed before, established by the new 
Constitution. As Prakash and Ramsey make the point, the behavior of 
these leading Founders could be considered ordinary "only if one 
admits that the Constitution created a new executive principal,"455 with 
the background assumption that "management of foreign affairs was 
an executive function constitutionally conveyed to the President as 
part of the executive power. "456 
452. See infra Parts IV.C, IV.D, and IV.E. 
453. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 
90 & n.56 (Linda Grant DePauw et al. eds., 1972); 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 693 (Linda Grant DePauw ed., 1982); 6 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 1753 (Charlene Bangs Bickford 
& Helen E. Veit eds., 1986). 
454. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 300. 
455. Id. 
456. Id. at 298. 
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As an initial matter, the transition between the Articles of 
Confederation and the U.S. Constitution was a unique event, and it is 
far from clear that the actions taken in this context reflected more 
general conceptions of the proper operations of government. More 
importantly, even if these actions illustrated general Founding 
understandings, they prove almost nothing. That the President was 
viewed as having supervisory authority over officers such as the 
Secretary of State hardly shows that he had been granted a residuum 
of unspecified powers in the Vesting Clause. Specific textual grants of 
power, such as the Appointments Clause, the Treaty Clause, the 
Opinions Clause, and the Take Care Clause, plausibly gave the 
President a lead role in directing such officers. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, there is no reference to the Article II Vesting Clause in any 
of the historical materials relating to Washington's oversight of the old 
departments, including the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Even on the narrow point relating to Washington's supervisory 
authority, the historical materials relating to the transition are more 
ambiguous than suggested by Vesting Clause Thesis advocates. In the 
first place, the President and "holdovers" such as Jay dealt with one 
another not as a matter of constitutional command, but instead 
consciously cooperated in an informal way to serve the interests of the 
nation during the transition. As Washington explained in the first 
letter he wrote to Jay seeking information regarding the nation's 
foreign affairs: 
Sir: Although in the present unsettled state of the Executive 
Departments, under the government of the Union, I do not conceive it 
expedient to call upon you for information officially; yet I have supposed 
that some informal communications from the Office of foreign Affairs 
might neither be improper nor unprofitable.457 
When Washington again addressed the subject in more than a passing 
fashion, he sounded a similar note of caution. Pressing Gouverneur 
Morris to act as an envoy to Britain, Washington explained the 
informal, ad hoc nature of his request: "It appears to me most 
expedient," he wrote, "to have these Inquiries made informally, by a 
private Agent; and understanding that you will soon be in London, I 
desire you in that Capacity, and on the Authority and Credit of this 
Letter, to converse with his Britannic Majesty's Ministers on these 
Points."458 The President added that, "This Communication ought 
regularly to be made to you by the Secretary of State, but that office 
457. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (June 8, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 343, 343. While Prakash and Ramsey cite this 
letter, and otherwise parse it, they omit this key passage. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 
14, at 299 & n.281. 
458. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (Oct. 13, 1789), in 30 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 439, 440. 
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not being at present filled, my Desire of avoiding Delays induces me 
to make it under my own Hand."459 
Jay's understanding of the situation was similar to Washington's. 
In an illuminating letter to an acting U.S. agent in Morocco, the 
holdover foreign secretary delivered what Prakash and Ramsey rightly 
note was a "constitutional lesson."4ro Jay made clear that, since his last 
communication, "a great Revolution and change in their 
Government" had occurred during which "the attention of the United 
States to their foreign affairs necessarily become interrupted."461 Nor, 
Jay continued, had the transition been fully completed. Noting that 
Jefferson had not yet assumed his duties as the new Secretary of State, 
Jay explained that Washington has "directed" him to update the 
envoy in the meantime.462 Jay then pointed out that holdover envoys, 
like the holdover secretary, might not have a formal status under the 
new regime until Congress could act, but should continue to serve for 
the best interests of the nation in any case. "In these arrangements," 
he wrote, "proper attention will be paid to the powers of the 
American Agents; but as this cannot be done until the ensuing 
459. 30 id. Washington and Jay in passing each once employed the compulsory term 
"order," and further employed the more ambiguous term, "direct." Writing to the Senate, 
Washington stated that Jay "has my orders" to provide papers relevant to negotiations 
resulting in certain alterations to the Consular Convention between the United States and 
France. See Letter from George Washington to the Senate (June 1 1 ,  1789), in 30 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 346, 346. Later, in a letter to 
Secretary of War Henry Knox, the President also mentioned that he had "seen fit to direct" 
Jay, as "acting Secretary of foreign Affairs," to send a special envoy to Britain to secure U.S. 
surveyors to enter Canada. See Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox (Sept. 5, 
1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 394, 394. 
Washington's reference to "orders" reflects either a passing slip into the language of 
command or, more likely, his desire to ensure ratification of the pending proposals by 
demonstrating his desire to provide the Senate further information relevant to the process. 
By contrast, to read the reference as indicating both that Washington believed that he had a 
constitutional power to command Jay, and that this power was a function of executive 
foreign affairs authority, not only places upon it a weight it cannot bear, but further opens 
Washington to a charge of inconsistency or hypocrisy in light of his initial explanation to Jay. 
Much the same can be said of Jay's language, which appears in a letter that resulted from 
the issue Washington mentioned to Knox. Writing to Lord Dorchester of Britain, Jay stated 
both that he had been "directed" by Washington and was acting "in pursuance of the orders 
of the President." Letter from John Jay to Lord Dorchester (Sept. 4, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 602, 602 n.l (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989). 
Given Washington's initial approach, Jay's use of compulsory language is best understood as 
reflecting an understandable desire not to highlight the "unsettled" nature of the President's 
authority over holdover officials in writing to a British official. 
460. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 299. 
461 . Letter from John Jay to Giuseppe Chiappe (Dec. 1, 1789), in 28 George 
Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 2 Letterbooks 92, 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-binlampage?collJd=mgw2&fileName=gwpage028.db&recNum=0, 
images 1 12-16 (last modified Feb. 16, 1999). 
462 Id. 
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Sessions of the two Houses of Congress, I am persuaded that their zeal 
and attachment will, in the meantime remain unabated."463 
Jay's letter also expressed his conception of the new President's 
constitutional authority. He began by telling the envoy that the first 
thing to notice about the new Constitution is that the President "is 
vested with powers and prerogatives of far greater magnitude and 
importance than any that were confided to the former Presidents of 
Congress . . .  to whom the great Executive Powers were not 
committed; for they were all held . . .  by . . .  the Congress itself. "464 In 
further explaining that the envoy's letters, which would otherwise 
have gone to the President of the Confederation Congress, should be 
delivered to the new President, Jay stated that the President 
"possesses Powers and Prerogatives in many respects similar to those 
which are enjoyed by the King of England."465 Jay, in other words, 
emphasized the strength that the new office would play in foreign 
affairs, indicated that it was analogous "in many respects," but not 
identical, to the British monarchy, and throughout referred to 
executive powers in the plural, rather than asserting a unified 
executive foreign affairs authority, much less indicating that such an 
authority came from the Vesting Clause. 
Not only was the relationship between Washington and Jay 
consciously informal and ad hoc, it is noteworthy that the express, 
public orders that Jay received came not from the President but from 
the Senate. About the same time that Washington unofficially sought 
information from Jay, the Senate "ORDERED that Mr. Jay furnish the 
Senate with an accurate translation of the Consular Conventions" 
between the United States and France.466 Washington, once more 
avoiding unambiguous language of command, responded to this order 
by stating that "Mr. Jay has my directions to lay before you [the 
relevant papers] at such time as you may think proper to assign."467 To 
this the Senate responded that Jay is again "ORDERED," this time to 
"lay before the Senate . . .  the Papers referred to in the President's 
Message. "468 An executive power essentialist might respond that this 
exchange reflects the exception from executive foreign affairs power 
that the new Constitution carved out in according the Senate a role in 
treaty ratification, or that Washington in any case interposed himself 




466. 2 DOCUMENT ARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 417, at 8. 
467. 2 id. 
468. 2 id. 
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however, would fully account for the discrepancy between 
Washington's careful refusal to treat the "acting Secretary" as an 
official subordinate and the Senate's readiness to issue express 
commands to the same official directly. 
In any event, even if it were clear that Washington believed that he 
had constitutional authority over the holdover officials, specific 
constitutional text interpreted in the light of pressing functional needs 
would provide a more reasonable account for Washington's (and the 
Senate's) oversight of the nation's lame-duck foreign affairs apparatus 
than would positing a vast and unspecified executive foreign affairs 
authority. Washington's request for information from Jay had obvious 
grounding in the Opinions Clause. 469 Both his, and the Senate's, 
"order" to provide papers relevant to a pending convention likewise 
had a plausible basis in the Treaty Clause.470 Even Washington's direc­
tions to Jay for sending an envoy, to say nothing of his own resort to 
Morris, gesture toward presidential power to appoint "Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers, and Consuls" set out in the Appointments 
Clause,471 the lack of Senate confirmation notwithstanding. In other 
words justifications grounded in specific foreign affairs grants are at 
least plausible, making it unnecessary to project all foreign affairs 
authority onto the cryptic Vesting Clause, even assuming that all 
parties at the time believed that the new Constitution gave the 
President authority over holdover officers and departments.472 
2. Creation of the State Department 
Specific constitutional text also accounts for the uncontroversial 
aspects of the statute establishing what came to be named the 
469. "The President . . .  may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in 
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices . . . .  " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
470. "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .  " U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 2. 
471. "(H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, 
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
472. By contrast, Prakash and Ramsey argue, for example, that the Opinions Clause was 
"hardly sufficient authority" to authorize Washington's efforts to be updated on foreign 
affairs, because "he did not merely seek opinions; he also sought the documents he would 
need to review in order to make decisions." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 291 n.289. 
Instead, they contend, the President's purported "executive prerogatives over foreign 
affairs," as granted through the Article II Vesting Clause, supplies the requisite authority. It 
is not clear, however, why the Opinions Clause should be read in the narrowest possible way, 
and the Vesting Clause read in the most expansive fashion. 
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Department of State.473 To address the problems that the transition so 
obviously created, James Madison on May 19 introduced a resolution 
calling for the creation of three "executive" departments - foreign 
affairs, war, and treasury. Anticipating Jay's concerns, Congress 
turned first to the proposed department of foreign affairs. The House 
passed the bill on June 24, with the Senate following suit on July 18. 
The bill's passage is remembered almost exclusively for the epic 
debate it ignited over whether Senate approval would be necessary for 
removing the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and by analogy, the 
other department heads - an issue that we address separately below 
in Section C. The Foreign Affairs Act did not otherwise generate 
significant controversy. 
Executive power essentialists take those parts of the Act that 
produced general agreement as confirmation of their thesis. First, they 
note that the statute expressly created an "executive" department 
that, along with its Secretary, was wholly subordinate to the will of the 
President. Second, they point out that Congress assigned no foreign 
affairs duties directly to the Secretary, but instead empowered the 
President to make such assignments. More generally, they contend 
that the organic statute made no attempt to convey foreign affairs 
authority to the President but instead "presumed a wide executive 
sphere in foreign relations" that was, moreover, "preexisting."474 
As before, these claims either lack historical support, are better 
explained by the Constitution's text and the experience that preceded 
it, or both. While, for example, the statute did not place either the 
department or the secretary under any express obligations to 
Congress, it directly assigned duties to department subordinates rather 
than leave such assignments entirely with the President. 475 More 
473. By contrast, where text failed to address an issue, or did so in a manner that invited 
opposing interpretations as in the case of removal, the statute would ignite substantial 
controversy. See infra Part IV.C. 
474. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 301. 
475. Specifically, the Act created a "chief Clerk" subordinate to the Secretary and 
provided that whenever the office of Secretary stood vacant, the clerk "shall during such 
Vacancy, have the charge and custody of all Records, Books, and Papers appertaining to the 
said department." Foreign Affairs Act of 1789, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29, reprinted in 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 453, at 
689, 689. 
This provision notwithstanding, it remains true that the Act generally did not directly 
assign duties to the department or its personnel, but instead left such assignment to 
presidential discretion. The same point also applies to the organic statute creating the War 
Department. See War Department Act of 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49, reprinted in 6 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 453, at 
2028. By contrast, Prakash and Ramsey point to the "stark" differences in the statute 
creating the Treasury Department, which both made the Secretary of the Treasury and 
subordinate personnel accountable to Congress and did so directly rather than through the 
President. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 301-02 n.291. These differences, they 
assert, "speak[] volumes," for they "suggest[] that Congress was aware that the President 
enjoyed a foreign affairs sphere (albeit limited) that no statute could infringe or limit." Id. 
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importantly, a careful reading of the Act reveals that the deference 
Congress gave to the President tracks, at points verbatim, Article II's 
specific grants rather than some broad and undefined conception of 
"executive Power." As an initial matter, at no point does the Act 
expressly or implicitly refer to general executive authority as the basis 
of its allocations or power. Rather, every version, including the one 
enacted, set forth the duties that the President would assign to the 
Secretary in almost minute detail: 
the Secretary for the department of foreign Affairs, who shall perform 
and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on, or 
intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the 
Constitution, relative to correspondences, commissions, or instructions 
to, or with public Ministers or Consuls from the United States, or to 
negociations with public Ministers from foreign States or princes, or to 
Memorials or other applications from foreign public Ministers, or other 
foreigners, or to such other Matters respecting foreign Affairs, as the 
President of the United States shall . . .  from time to time Order or 
instruct.476 
This list of specific areas of responsibility would have been 
surplusage if Congress had assumed that all it was doing was creating a 
subordinate officer subject to the President's general foreign affairs 
authority. Moreover, these areas of responsibility all echo Article II's 
discrete grants to the President. The duty to handle the 
correspondence, commissions, and instructions to U.S. "public 
Ministers or Consuls" finds a provenance in both the President's pow­
er "to appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,"477 as 
well as the duty to " Commission all the Officers of the United 
States."478 Likewise, the same duty as applied to "negociations" with 
foreign nations fairly clearly alludes to the President's authority "to 
make Treaties."479 The reference to other applications from foreign 
public ministers, finally, echoes presidential authority to "receive 
w
·
hat these differences instead suggest is the hybrid nature of the Treasury Department that 
followed from the Constitution's assignment of relevant specific powers. Just as Article II  
accords the President specific powers, including several bearing on foreign affairs, Article I 
grants Congress specific powers over public lands and finance. These are precisely the 
powers that the Treasury statute tracks in placing the department under certain obligations 
to Congress. See Treasury Act of 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 452, at 1975. In sum, 
the difference between the statutes creating the Foreign Affairs and War Departments on 
the one hand, and the Treasury Department on the other, are better understood as resulting 
from discrete textual commitments rather than an essentialist understanding of legislative or 
executive authority. 
476. Foreign Affairs Act of 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 29, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 453, at 689, 689 (emphasis added). 
477. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
478. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
479. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Ambassadors and other public Ministers."480 Further supporting each 
set of obligations is the President's authority to "require the Opinion, 
in Writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices."481 To be sure, the list of duties ends with a general 
reference to "such other Matters respecting foreign Affairs" that the 
President may order. Even aside from the descriptive limitation 
"such" other matters, this passage appears to be a classic candidate for 
the maxim ejusdum generis - that is, to be read as a catch-all 
provision limited by the class that proceeds it - rather than as a back­
door allusion to a general foreign affairs authority not set out 
anywhere else. 
We are not attempting here to make conclusive arguments 
detailing the Act's constitutional basis, or to address all 
counterarguments that could have been made either then or now. Our 
aim instead is to show that the general agreement that existed with 
respect to the Act did not depend on an acceptance of the Vesting 
Clause Thesis. Rather, both the statute and the agreement it 
generated can be understood as a function of discrete statutory 
allocations tracking specific constitutional grants. This view takes the 
available texts more seriously and, as we have shown, is consistent 
with the general emphasis on particular foreign affairs functions 
evident throughout the period. Put another way, there was simply no 
extraordinary gap that only an expansive reading of the Vesting 
Clause could fill. 
3.  Management of the Diplomatic Corps 
The textual approach that best accounts for the transitional period 
under the old Foreign Affairs Department, as well as the creation of 
its successor, also explains the day-to-day workings of the new State 
Department once it was up and running. As we will explain, a number 
of President Washington's more ambitious foreign policy forays, such 
as the Neutrality Proclamation, generated substantial constitutional 
controversy.482 By contrast, Washington's day-to-day handling of the 
diplomatic corps produced no more dispute than either of the matters 
just related. The President's generally acknowledged oversight of 
foreign affairs had several components. First, Washington for the most 
part treated his new Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, as his 
subordinate. Second, Washington instructed U.S. diplomats abroad 
through Jefferson, and, on rare occasions, directly. Third, the 
480. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
481. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
482. See infra Part IV.E. 
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President had diplomats both transferred and removed. Finally, 
Washington in effect created diplomatic posts, albeit through the 
mechanism of appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
In none of these instances is textual or historical support so wanting 
that only the Vesting Clause Thesis can account for them. 
According to essentialists, each category of Washington's actions is 
unfathomable absent an expansive conception of executive foreign 
affairs authority. Professors Prakash and Ramsey in particular assert 
that "the Chief Executive directed the nation's foreign affairs subject 
to the Constitution's exceptions to his executive power."483 Otherwise, 
they suggest, Jefferson as Secretary of State would plausibly have had 
a "sphere of foreign relations authority that the President simply could 
not breach,"484 a novel assertion that no one then or since appears to 
have made. 
Once more, this interpretation overreacts what occurred and 
overlooks more precise explanations. Consider, first, Washington's 
supervision of Jefferson. From the outset, the President asserted his 
authority over the Department,485 and the Secretary of State accepted 
483. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 307. 
484. Id. 
485. In a long letter hoping to entice Jefferson from Paris to become the first Secretary 
of State, Washington wrote that he had decided "to nominate you for the Department of 
State, which, under its present organization, involves many of the most interesting objects of 
Executive Authority." Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 13, 1789), 
in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 446, 446. Still seeking 
Jefferson's assent, Washington followed up, noting that, "The necessary arrangements with 
regard to our intercourse with Foreign Nations have never yet been taken up on a great scale 
by the Government: because the Department . . .  has never been properly organized, so as to 
bring the business well and systematically before the Executive." Letter from George 
Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 21, 1790), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 509, 511 .  These passing statements are hardly 
endorsements of either the Vesting Clause Thesis or executive foreign affairs essentialism. 
Fairly read, they show no more than that Washington viewed the State Department and 
those foreign affairs matters with which it deals as under the purview of the Executive 
Branch. 
Conversely, Washington's initial letter to Jefferson suggested that the Secretary of State 
would have a certain degree of independence. At one point the President stated that more or 
less out of practical necessity he had placed state papers pertaining to foreign affairs in the 
custody of Roger Alden, "Assistant Secretary to the late [Confederation] Congress," 
indicating nonetheless that this arrangement should be seen as provisional, "[u]nwilling as I 
am to interfere in the direction of your choice of Assistants." Letter from George 
Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 13, 1798), supra, at 447. We do not argue that 
Washington here was indicating anything more than prudential concerns, as opposed to a 
belief that his authority over the State Department was in any way limited. To assert 
otherwise would be to overreact this passage in the same way that Prakash and Ramsey 
overreact Washington's other statements. Rather, our point is simply that Washington's 
correspondence confirms only that he believed that he had authority over the State 
Department, a point that we do not dispute, rather than that this authority came from an 
essentialist conception of executive authority in foreign affairs, or from the Article I I  
Vesting Clause. 
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it,486 both in often flowery fashion. But why some version of executive 
power essentialism must be invoked to account for such authority 
remains a mystery. As noted, the Act establishing the Department sets 
forth the requisite basis for Washington's actions in the first instance 
by making the Secretary subject to presidential command in some 
detail. Reliance on the statute - which neither Jefferson nor 
Washington would have had any incentive to question - pushes back 
the issue to the basis for the Act's assignment of authority. As we have 
discussed, the Act's specific and modest language suggests that its 
basis was understood to be the Constitution's discrete grants, 
functionally applied, rather than an unstated consensus viewing 
foreign affairs as an inherently executive matter.487 
The same analysis applies to the President's handling of the 
diplomatic corps. As the Foreign Affairs Act assumed, Washington 
left most diplomatic correspondence to Jefferson, though in isolated 
instances he did correspond with diplomats directly.488 But even had 
the President corresponded directly with every U.S. diplomat all the 
time, exactly how this would prove the case for executive power 
essentialism would continue to be elusive. In this case the Foreign 
Affairs Act expressly specified the President's authority to entrust the 
Secretary of State with duties "relative to correspondences, 
commissions, or instructions . . .  with public Ministers or Consuls from 
the United States."489 It would be an odd interpretation holding that 
the Act, in placing the Secretary under these potential duties, 
486. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Dec. 15, 1789), in 16 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 34, 34 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to George Washington (Feb. 14, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra, at 184, 184. 
487. See supra text accompanying notes 475-481. 
488. One of the rare occasions on which Washington did so involved extraordinary 
circumstances. In June 1792, Gouverneur Morris assumed his duties as ambassador to 
France. As would happen with much else in American politics, the ongoing French 
Revolution made the appointment controversial, alienating especially those who believed 
Morris was hostile to the new regime. In this context, Washington enclosed a private letter 
to Morris along with the official letter from the Secretary of State signifying his nomination 
and appointment. The letter informed Morris that his posting had generated opposition, as 
well as the grounds for it. See Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (Jan. 
28, 1792), in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 468, 468-70. 
Washington had previously vetted the letter with Jefferson, see Letter from George 
Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 28, 1792), in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 467, 467, whose support for the Revolution had already 
become evident. In light of the extraordinarily sensitive issues that the French Revolution 
would likely present for American foreign policy, Washington evidently took the unusual 
step of writing to Morris directly to ensure his evenhandedness, while including Jefferson in 
the process to ensure that all the key American players were on the same page. For a 
discussion of the relevant background, see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 447, at 314-22. 
489 . Foreign Affairs Act of 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 28-29, reprinted in 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 453, at 
689, 689. 
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somehow precluded the President from undertaking them directly.490 
This again leaves the matter of the constitutional basis for presidential 
correspondence with diplomats. As we have argued, specific text such 
as the Opinions Clause and the Appointments Clause offers a more 
promising basis, both in requiring a less expansive reading of text than 
is required by the Vesting Clause Thesis, and in better comporting 
with the contemporary preference for discrete textual arguments.491 
Washington's disposition of diplomats is merely a variant on the 
same themes. The President on occasion would transfer envoys from 
one post to another. Significant here, however, is that this was 
ordinarily done with Senate approval, apparently on the theory that a 
transfer represented a new appointment that accordingly required 
advice and consent.492 Conversely, Washington did unilaterally remove 
diplomats, including two U.S. ambassadors to revolutionary France.493 
This power, however, would logically appear to be a corollary of the 
President's superior authority to remove the , Secretary of State 
himself, something expressly contemplated by the Foreign Affairs 
Act.494 In contrast to the fairly mundane powers dealt with so far, 
Congress's decision to allow the President to remove the Secretary of 
State without the advice and consent of the Senate triggered 
enormous controversy due in part to the practical stakes involved and 
in part because specific text did not reasonably settle the issue.495 
Finally, Washington's ostensible creation of diplomatic posts 
provides the essentialist interpretation with even less support than the 
practices already discussed. Since Congress itself did not establish 
490. We take no position on whether the Foreign Affairs Act conferred the foreign 
affairs duties it specified, or merely recognized presidential authority with regard to these 
matters. Either way, our argument remains that specific constitutional text, rather than 
executive power essentialism, offers a more modest and satisfactory foundation for the 
President's authority than the Vesting Clause Thesis. 
491. See also infra Part IV.C (discussing specific textual arguments made during the 
debate on removal of executive officers). 
492. See PLISCHKE, supra note 167, at 48 tbl. 2.2. Prakash and Ramsey concede that this 
was the usual practice without exploring its significance. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 
14, at 309. They might argue, of course, that this was simply an example where specific text 
transferred foreign affairs authority away from the President, with the specific text being the 
assignment to the Senate of an advice and consent power over appointments. That said, a 
thoroughgoing essentialist might argue that precisely since a transfer is not an appointment, 
the matter should be left to the President alone. It is noteworthy, therefore, that this was not 
the practice that Washington and the Senate worked out. Placed in the larger context of the 
period, moreover, the practice is best accounted for by the Founding generation's inclination 
for relying on discrete text and functional practicality, as we have noted throughout. 
493. The volatile nature of relations with France prompted Washington to remove two 
ambassadors; he first removed Gouverneur Morris, and later James Monroe. See PLISCHKE, 
supra note 167, at 64 n.25; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 447, at 503-04. 
494. Foreign Affairs Act of 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra note 453, at 689, 689. 
495. See infra Part IV.C. 
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specific foreign postings, the President did have a principal role in 
"creating" such positions by nominating specific individuals for 
particular assignments. This principal role, however, was not exclusive 
for the simple reason that the nomination of diplomats required 
Senate approval, a requirement that was followed in practice.496 An 
essentialist might respond that this arrangement merely confirms the 
thesis that the Executive controlled foreign affairs absent 
constitutional text excepting certain foreign affairs powers to the other 
branches. Yet given that the Appointments Clause addresses the 
matter directly, the de facto creation of diplomatic posts through 
presidential nomination and Senate confirmation is no less consistent 
with our view that the Founding generation looked, insofar as it could, 
to discrete text.497 
4. The Diplomatic Salaries Dispute 
With the issue of how to pay for U.S. diplomats abroad, the 
general though largely unstated agreement evident thus far begins to 
break down. Funding of the diplomatic corps did not produce the level 
of controversy associated with the removal debate a year earlier or the 
debate over the Neutrality Proclamation several years later. 
Nevertheless, the issue of diplomatic salaries did produce a lively and 
significant debate. In resolving this debate, the Founding generation 
relied first and foremost on specific constitutional text and functional 
practicalities. In this regard, this debate serves as a useful preview of 
our consideration below of the larger and more famous controversies. 
496. On this point, Prakash and Ramsey bring things almost full circle by arguing that 
Washington also "felt free to dispatch unilaterally emissaries to foreign nations without the 
advice (and certainly without the consent) of the Senate." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, 
at 309. For this proposition they cite the President's earlier designation of Gouverneur 
Morris as a private envoy to Britain in 1789. See id. As discussed above, Washington 
expressly viewed this mission as an interim measure adopted out of practical necessity, given 
that the nation still lacked a Secretary of State, a situation itself due to the as yet incomplete 
transition from the old regime under the Articles of Confederation to the new one under the 
Constitution. See supra text accompanying note 459. 
497. The establishment of diplomatic posts through presidential appointment and 
senatorial nomination raises the related issue of whether and to what extent this can be done 
without enabling legislation creating the post itself. As a matter of text, the Appointments 
Clause has conventionally been understood to require that officers of the United States 
"shall be established by law," whether "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, [] 
judges of the supreme Court," or "all other officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also 
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 309 n.336 (stating that they are "not sure whether the 
Constitution permits the President to appoint to a diplomatic post in the absence of a statute 
first creating that diplomatic post" in the light of the interpretation of the Appointments 
Clause in the domestic context). As we will show in the next subsection, moreover, the 
statute establishing a fund for diplomats was widely understood as delegating to the 
President the authority to commission persons to serve in foreign postings as well as what to 
pay them within certain specified salary grades. See infra Part IV.B.4. In this way, the Act 
arguably furnished a statutory basis for the positions. 
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In his first annual address to Congress, on January 8, 1790, 
President Washington asked Congress to appropriate "a competent 
fund designated for defraying the expenses incident to the conduct of 
our foreign affairs."498 Washington also noted in his address that the 
"compensations to be made to the persons who may be employed, 
should according to the nature of their appointments, be defined by 
law." 499 These remarks appear to envision a significant role for 
Congress in funding the diplomatic corps and thus, if anything, seem 
to weigh against executive power essentialism. 
On January 15, 1790, the House resolved that several select 
committees be created to generate responses to Washington's address. 
Among these was a committee regarding "provision for persons 
employed in the intercourse between foreign nations and the United 
States."500 Several days later, on January 19, Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts reported that the committee "had some doubts on their 
mind respecting the extent" of the provision they were to propose.501 
In particular, the committee was unsure whether it should make "a 
general provision for every grade of foreign ministers, or whether, in 
the contrary, they are not tied down to provide for those only who are 
now in existence. "502 
John Page of Virginia then moved to discharge the committee so 
that the issue could be determined in a committee of the whole.503 
Page's motion prompted a brief, initial debate over whether the House 
should fix diplomatic salaries by law or leave the matter to the 
discretion of the President. There was also some discussion at this 
point over who had the authority to determine the number of foreign 
ministers and where they would be sent. 
William Smith of South Carolina argued that it was the business of 
the President and Senate, not the House, to appoint foreign ministers, 
and that the decision whether to send them to particular places "was a 
business clearly within the executive branch."504 Roger Sherman of 
Connecticut "[w]as inclined to think that the legislature ought to 
determine how many ministers should be employed abroad" and he 
"did [not] think it would be any abridgment of the executive power to 
498. President George Washington, First Annual Address to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), in 
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 491, 492. 
499. 30 id. 
500. 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 23 
(Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1994). 
501. 12 id. at 34. 
502. 12 id. 
503. 12 id. at 35. 
504. 12 id. at 36. 
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do so." 505 Alexander White of Virginia argued that "the most 
inconvenient consequences might result" if congressional approval 
were needed prior to sending foreign ministers, since " [t]he exigencies 
that required such an appointment, might be over before the legis­
lature had convened for the purpose of authorising him to make it."506 
Moving to the issue of who should set the diplomatic salaries, 
Jam es Jackson of Georgia made two arguments in support of 
congressional authority. First, he suggested that Congress was better 
suited than the President to take account of geographic differences 
when setting diplomatic salaries.507 Second, he argued that it would be 
embarrassing to the President if he were the one to make salary 
distinctions among postings.508 This salary issue would become the 
focal point of a more lengthy debate about a week later. At this point, 
the House simply instructed the committee that, in providing for 
compensation for U.S. diplomats, it should provide for "a 
compensation for persons who may hereafter be employed in such 
intercourse."509 It is noteworthy, though, that these initial discussions 
were focused entirely on functional arguments, and that there was no 
mention of either executive power essentialism or the Article II 
Vesting Clause. 
On January 26, the House resolved itself into a committee of the 
whole "on the bill to provide for the means of intercourse between the 
United States and foreign nations."510 This bill authorized a sum not 
exceeding $40,000 to be drawn from the Treasury at the President's 
discretion, and it also set maximum salaries for the various diplomatic 
grades.51 1  
Almost immediately, Richard Bland Lee of Virginia moved to 
amend the bill by inserting the words "by and with the consent of the 
senate" after the word "president." Lee relied on an analogy to the 
treaty power, arguing that, "as the constitution had vested in the 
president, with the advice and consent of the senate, the power of 
appointing ambassadors and other public ministers, he thought they 
ought to be equally interested in proportioning the salaries. "512 As The 
505. 12 id. at 37. 
506. 12 id. 
507. 12 id. 
508. 12 id. at 37-38. 
509. 12 id. at 38. 
510. 12 id. at 75. 
511. See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, 
supra note 453, at 67. 
512. 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 500, at 75. 
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Daily Advertiser put it, " [a] considerable debate now ensued. "5 13  
Nowhere in this debate was there any mention of the Article II  
Vesting Clause. Nor did executive power essentialism play any 
significant role in the debate. Instead, in rejecting Lee's motion, the 
prevailing view appears to have been that Congress had the authority 
to set the diplomatic salaries, but that it was functionally desirable to 
delegate some of that authority to the President. 
Several House members supported Lee's motion to require Senate 
consent, and these House members obviously did not rely on 
executive power essentialism. Rather, they relied on a combination of 
specific textual grants and functional arguments. For example, 
Michael Jennifer Stone of Maryland argued that it was proper to give 
the Senate a consent power over diplomatic salaries because "the 
constitution has vested [the Senate] with equal authority in every 
transaction relative to this business."514 He subsequently elaborated on 
this point, noting that the Senate's advice and consent was required 
for treaties and arguing that the House would be departing from this 
principle if it " [increased] the agency of the president."515 Stone also 
complained that allowing the President to determine the salaries 
would give him undue influence over the appointments process.516 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut invoked both the Treaty Clause and 
the Appointments Clause, arguing: 
The establishment of every treaty requires the voice of the senate, as 
does the appointment of every officer for conducting the business; these 
two objects are expressly provided for in the constitution, and they lead 
me to believe, that the two bodies ought to act jointly in every 
transaction which respects the business of negociation with foreign 
powers.517 
As for the opponents of the motion, almost all of them objected to 
Lee's motion on purely functional grounds. Smith of South Carolina, 
for example, acknowledged that the Constitution was "silent" on the 
issue, but argued that a requirement of Senate consent would 
"diminish the responsibility of the executive officer" and might "open 
513. 12 id. at 69. 
514. 12 id. at 76. 
515. 12 id. at 78. 
516. 12 id. 
517. 12 id. at 79. In attempting to discount these pro-Senate statements, Prakash and 
Ramsey assert that "a much larger number [of House members] . . .  regarded the 
'intercourse with foreign nations [as] a trust specially committed to the President.' " Prakash 
& Ramsey, supra note 14, at 303-04. Here they quote from a summary of the debate in the 
Gazette of the United States, which merely states that this proposition "was contended" 
during the debate and does not indicate how much support it received. See 12  
DOCUMENT ARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 500, at 
72. The much more detailed account of the debate in the Congressional Register reveals little 
express support for this proposition. See 12 id. at 75-82. 
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a door for cabal."518 Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut further 
noted that "it might happen that the money might be wanting during 
the recess of the senate, and it would hardly be expedient to call them 
together for the purpose of making a draft upon the treasury for a 
small sum of money" and that "it was also judged prudent to leave it 
at the discretion of the executive officer to apportion the salaries."519 
And James Madison observed that apportionment of salaries "could 
be better performed by the president alone than connected with a 
large body. "520 
In conjunction with these functional arguments, some House 
members emphasized that the proposed bill would sufficiently cabin 
presidential power. In response to Stone, for example, Sedgwick 
argued that the ceilings imposed by the bill on the salaries for the 
various diplomatic grades, along with the Senate's role in the 
appointments process, would ensure that the President would not have 
"an improper influence."521 John Laurance of New York made the 
same point, while also noting that the power of setting the diplomatic 
salaries was a congressional power and thus one that it could delegate 
to the President.522 
Other House members echoed Laurance's view that Congress had 
the ultimate authority to establish the diplomatic salaries. James 
Jackson, for example, argued that the power to set salaries should not 
be delegated to the President even with the Senate's consent, because 
" [t]he appropriation of public money belongs in a peculiar manner to 
this house, and I am for retaining the power in our own hands."523 
Similarly, Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania argued that "disposing of, or 
giving away sums of public money, is a legislative, not an executive act; 
and cannot be performed in any other way than with all the formalities 
of legislative authority." 524 These comments, if anything, suggest 
legislative essentialism rather than executive essentialism, although 
the speakers also appear to have had in mind the requirement in 
Article I, Section 9 that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury, 
but in consequence of appropriations made by law."525 
Importantly, this claim by several House members that Congress 
had the power to set the diplomatic salaries was not met with denial. 
518. 12 DOCUMENT ARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 500, at 75. 
519. 12 id. at 76. 
520. 12 id. at 81. 
521. 12 id. at 77. 
522. 12  id. at 78. 
523. 12 id. at 88. 
524. 12 id. at 89. 
525. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. 
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Instead, opponents of Lee's motion simply responded that it was 
functionally desirable for Congress to delegate some of this authority 
to the President. Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, for example, argued 
that "we are so circumstanced as not to be able to ascertain the proper 
sum required by every diplomatique officer who may be sent to the 
various courts of Europe, and other quarters of the globe." 526 
Sedgwick similarly acknowledged that Congress could fix the salaries, 
but he "feared that the house had not sufficient information for that 
purpose. "527 
Only one House member, Egbert Benson of New York, espoused 
an executive essentialist position. In objecting to Lee's motion, 
Benson stated that: 
[I]t would be wrong to blend the senate with the president, in the 
exercise of an authority not jointly vested in them by the constitution; 
and in any business whatever of an executive nature, they had no right to 
do it any more than they had the right to associate a committee of this 
house with him.528 
This comment, although emphasized by Prakash and Ramsey,529 was 
sandwiched between the lines of argument described above and 
appears to have generated no discussion. Benson's comment is also 
substantially outweighed by the numerous statements claiming, or 
acknowledging, that Congress had the constitutional power to set the 
diplomatic salaries. Finally, Congress's eventual enactment of the 
appropriations bill was itself a repudiation of executive power 
essentialism, since the bill placed precise limits on the salaries for each 
of the diplomatic grades.530 
The above debate did not entirely resolve the controversy over 
diplomatic appointments. On January 28, 1790, Sherman successfully 
moved to table the appropriations bill, arguing that the sum of $40,000 
was "too much for the purposes specified in the bill, and that the 
house had no measure at present whereby they could ascertain the 
sums necessary to be appropriated."531 The House did not return to 
the bill until late April. 
526. 12 DOCUMENT ARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 500, at 89. 
527. 12 id. at 90. 
528. 12 id. at 81. 
529. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 304. 
530. See An Act Providing the Means of Intercourse Between the United States and 
Foreign Nations, 1 Stat. 128 (1790); see also CURRIE, supra note 28, at 46 ("In prescribing 
ceilings for remuneration for various types of officers, Congress rejected the thesis that the 
Constitution reserved the matter to the President with or without consent of the 
Senate . . . .  "). 
531. 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra 
note 500, at 97. 
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In the meantime, Washington asked Jefferson (who had just 
returned from France to assume his duties as the new Secretary of 
State) to prepare an opinion addressing whether the Senate, in 
exercising its advice and consent power over appointments, could 
"negative" the proposed grade of U.S. diplomats. In response to this 
request, Jefferson prepared a written opinion concluding that the 
Senate did not have the authority to negative the grade.532 Jefferson's 
opinion contains some pro-executive language, and Prakash and 
Ramsey not surprisingly rely on it.533 
Jefferson's opinion begins with the following general claim about 
the separation of powers structure of the Constitution: 
The Constitution has divided the powers of government into three 
branches, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, lodging each with a 
distinct magistracy. The Legislative it has given completely to the Senate 
and House of [R]epresentatives: It has declared that the "Executive 
powers shall be vested in the President," submitting special articles of it 
to a negative by the Senate; and it has vested the Judiciary power in the 
courts of justice, with certain exceptions also in favor of the Senate. 534 
This passage obviously refers to powers in somewhat essentialist 
terms, albeit by reference to constitutional text rather than 
preconstitutional theory. Unlike proponents of the Vesting Clause 
Thesis, however, Jefferson appears to be assuming here that there is 
no difference in the effect of the three vesting clauses in the 
Constitution, with the Article I Vesting Clause, for example, 
purportedly giving the legislative power "completely to the Senate and 
House of Representatives."  Furthermore, Jefferson's reference here 
to "the Executive powers" in the plural rather than to the singular 
form used in the Article II Vesting Clause, may suggest that he is 
referring to the powers specifically listed in Article II rather than some 
residuary category.535 
Jefferson then proceeds to equate at least one aspect of foreign 
affairs with executive power, stating: "The transaction of business with 
foreign nations is Executive altogether. It belongs then to the head of 
that department, except as to such portions of it as are specifically 
submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly."536 In 
532. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic 
Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 486, 
at 378, 378-80 [hereinafter Jefferson Opinion). 
533. See, e.g. , Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 305-07. 
534. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 532, at 378-79. 
535. Prakash and Ramsey claim that, in using a plural reference, Jefferson "erroneously 
quoted the Vesting Clause," see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 306, and then in a later 
discussion they substitute a singular reference in brackets in place of Jefferson's actual 
language, see id. at 311 .  
536. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 532, a t  379. 
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context, Jefferson's reference to the "transaction of business with 
foreign nations" is almost certainly a reference to negotiations and 
other diplomatic interactions between the United States and other 
nations, and not to substantive foreign affairs powers. Although 
Jefferson does not explain the reasoning behind his claim that such 
interactions are to be managed by the Executive Branch, the 
remainder of his opinion suggests that he was relying, at least in part, 
on the President's designated role in nominating, appointing, and 
commissioning diplomatic officers.537 Thus, Jefferson observes that the 
Constitution "gives the nomination of the foreign Agent to the 
President, the appointment to him and the Senate jointly, and the 
commissioning to the President," and he reasons that the Senate's 
advice and consent power "does not comprehend the neighboring acts 
of nomination or commission, (and the constitution says it shall not, by 
giving them exclusively to the President) still less can it pretend to 
comprehend those previous and more remote of destination and 
grade."538 In other words, Jefferson reasons that the determination of 
the destination and grade of the diplomats is related to the President's 
assigned powers over nomination and appointment, not the Senate's 
advice and consent power. 
In sum, although essentialist and pro-executive in its orientation, 
Jefferson's opinion did not claim that all foreign affairs powers were 
inherently vested in the Executive Branch. Moreover, despite making 
an arguable reference to the Article II Vesting Clause at the beginning 
of his opinion, Jefferson did not ultimately claim that the 
determination of the destination and grade of diplomats was a residual 
power encompassed by the Vesting Clause. Rather, in concluding that 
the Senate did not have the power to regulate those determinations, 
Jefferson relied on the specific language of the Appointments and 
Commissions Clauses.539 
537. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides in relevant part that the President 
"shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Article II, Section 
3 provides in relevant part that the President "shall commission all the officers of the United 
States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Of course, Jefferson also could have relied on the 
President's role in making treaties as further support for his control over diplomacy; 
regardless of the originally intended role for the Senate in the treaty process, see supra Part 
IV.A, the Treaty Clause easily can be read to give the President at least a lead role in 
negotiating and concluding treaties. 
538. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 532, at 379. 
539. Washington apparently also sought out the views of John Jay and James Madison 
concerning the Senate's authority to control the destination and grade of U.S. diplomats. 
There is no direct record of what Jay and Madison told the President. In his diary, however, 
Washington reported that Madison's view 
coincides with Mr. Jays and Mr. Jeffersons - to wit - that [the Senate has] no 
Constitutional right to interfere with either, & that it might be impolitic to draw it into a 
precedent their powers extending no farther than to an approbation or disapprobation of the 
person nominated by the President all the rest being Executive and vested in the President 
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C. The Removal Debate 
Congress's establishment of the executive departments in 1789 
occasioned a sustained and important debate in the House of 
Representatives over the President's power to remove executive 
officers.540 This debate is relevant to foreign affairs authority, both 
because it concerned the scope of executive power in general, and 
because it specifically concerned executive power to remove the 
Secretary of State. On May 19, 1789, Madison proposed that Congress 
establish three executive departments - a department of foreign 
affairs, a department of the treasury, and a department of war.541 He 
also proposed that the heads of these departments be "removable by 
the [P]resident. "542 There was substantial debate over the removal 
provision, after which a vote was taken and a "considerable majority" 
in the House (sitting as a Committee of the Whole) favored retaining 
the provision. 543 The House revisited the issue on June 16, in 
considering the proposed bill for the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
At this point, Alexander White of Virginia moved to strike the 
presidential removal provision, and a week-long debate ensued over 
this issue.544 The House subsequently voted thirty-four to twenty not 
to strike the provision. A few days later, however, the provision was 
deleted in a complicated vote described below. 
by the Constitution. 
George Washington, Diary entry (Apr. 27, 1790), in 6 THE DIARIES OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 68, 68 (Donald Jackson & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1979). Although cryptic, this 
diary entry appears to suggest that Madison and Jay, like Jefferson, thought that the 
Constitution (perhaps through the terms of the Appointments Clause) granted the President 
general control over U.S. diplomats, subject only to the Senate's ability to disapprove of par­
ticular nominees. There is no suggestion here that Madison or Jay thought that the Article II 
Vesting Clause gave the President residual foreign affairs powers. Nor did Madison make 
such a suggestion in the House debates over diplomatic funding described above. 
540. For detailed accounts of this debate, see 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 317-71 
(Richard Loss ed., 1981); JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION 1789, at 
155-89 (1948); and THACH, supra note 122, at 140-65. See also CURRIE, supra note 28, at 36-
41. This debate is also discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Prakash and Ramsey make only passing reference to the debate. 
See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 302. 
541. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, 
at 725 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992). 
542. 10 id. 
543. 10 id. at 740. 
544. When White made the motion, William Smith of South Carolina noted that he 
himself had planned to make such a motion, and that he "believed that many gentlemen [on 
May 19) neglected to oppose the principle in the bill, under an idea that a further discussion 
would take place, and had reserved themselves accordingly." 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 842-43 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. 
eds., 1992). 
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Both in the May 19 debate and in the debate in mid-June, a 
substantial number of House members argued that the heads of 
departments could constitutionally be removed only in the same way 
that they were appointed - that is, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. Theodorick Bland of Virginia argued, for example, that "[t]he 
constitution declares, that the president and the senate shall appoint, 
and it naturally follows, that the power which appoints shall remove 
also."545 Similarly, Alexander White of Virginia stated that "[t]he 
constitution had given the power of appointment to the senate, and 
most certainly it gave them the power to dismiss."546 William Smith of 
South Carolina went further, arguing that the only constitutional basis 
for removing heads of departments was through the impeachment 
process.547 
In response to these arguments, some of the supporters of the 
removal provision - including eventually Madison - did invoke the 
Article II Vesting Clause. In the May 19 debate, John Vining of 
Delaware argued that "there was a strong presumption that [the 
President] was invested with [the removal power]; because, it was 
declared, that all executive power should be vested in him, except in 
cases where it is otherwise qualified."548 And George Clymer of 
Pennsylvania stated that "the power of removal was an executive 
power, and as such belonged to the president alone, by the express 
words of the constitution, 'the executive power shall be vested in a 
president of the United States of America. '  "549 At this point in the 
debate, Madison, in contrast, relied primarily on functional arguments. 
He noted, for example, that a requirement of senatorial advice and 
consent for removal "would be found very inconvenient in practice" 
and would "tend[] to lessen [the] responsibility" of the President over 
his subordinates.550 
When the debate resumed in June, Madison added his voice to 
those invoking the Vesting Clause. On June 16, he noted that the 
Constitution states that the executive power shall be vested in the 
President and that, although it contains an exception for senatorial 
545. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 541, at 737. 
546. 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 544, at 848. 
547. lO DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 541, at 727. At times, however, Smith seemed to accept that presidential removal with 
the advice and consent of the Senate might be sufficient. See, e.g. , 1 1  DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1 789-1791, supra note 544, at 861. 
548. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 541, at 728. 
549. 10 id. at 738. 
550. 10 id. at 735. 
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involvement in appointments, he did not think Congress had the right 
to "extend this exception."551 And, on June 17, Madison referred to 
the Vesting Clause and argued that the requirement of senatorial 
advice and consent for appointments was "an exception to this general 
principle; and exceptions to general rules are ever taken strictly."552 
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts also invoked the Vesting Clause in the 
June debate, noting that the Constitution declares "that the executive 
power shall be vested in the president" and that " [u]nder these terms 
all the powers properly belonging to the executive department of the 
government are given, and such only taken away as are expressly 
excepted. "553 
Despite these invocations of the Vesting Clause, it is impossible to 
find in the removal debates any consensus in favor - or even majority 
support for - the Vesting Clause Thesis. This is so for a number of 
reasons. First, more than a dozen House members spoke on behalf of 
the removal provision in the May and June debates, and most of them 
did not invoke the Clause. Instead, they relied on specific textual 
grants, such as the Appointments Clause and the Take Care Clause, 
and on functional arguments. Indeed, Madison himself often relied on 
these alternative arguments, even after having invoked the Vesting 
Clause. Immediately after invoking the Vesting Clause on June 17, for 
example, Madison noted that "there is still another part of the 
constitution, which in my judgment, clearly favors the construction I 
give. The President is required, sir, to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. "554 
Second, at least some of the proponents of the removal provision 
appear to have believed that the Constitution did not even address the 
power of removal, let alone assign this power to the President. These 
proponents supported the removal provision not because it followed 
from the Article II Vesting Clause, but rather because they thought it 
was a functionally desirable legislative measure. John Laurance of 
New York, for example, thought that the "constitution was silent with 
respect to the time the secretary of foreign affairs shall remain in 
office" and that the "only question" was "could the legislature safely 
trust the president with this power."555 Similarly, Egbert Benson of 
551. 1 1  DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 544, at 868. 
552. 1 1  id. at 896; see also 1 1  id. at 922 (invoking the Vesting Clause). 
553. 1 1  id. at 979; see also 11 id. at 960 (Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts making 
arguable reference to the Vesting Clause). 
554. 11 id. at 896. 
555. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 541 ,  at 733; see also 1 1  DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 
1789-1791, supra note 544, at 908-09 (John Laurance stating that the Constitution "is silent" 
on the issue of removal and that Congress can address this constitutional omission); 11 id. at 
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New York argued that "there was a power in the legislature of 
supplying the omission in the constitution."556 And Fisher Ames, 
despite having invoked the Vesting Clause, expressed the view that 
the power of removal "not being distributed by the constitution, it will 
come before the legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must 
be supplied by law."557 
At times, Madison also suggested this view. He acknowledged that 
" [p]erhaps this is an omitted case" in the Constitution,558 and he 
argued that "there was no impropriety in the legislature settling this 
question."559 In a letter to Edmund Randolph, he noted that, "The 
Constitution has omitted to declare expressly by what authority 
removals from office are to be made. Out of this silence four con­
structive doctrines have arisen . . . .  "560 Moreover, Madison confessed 
that his view regarding a presidential power of removal "does not 
perfectly correspond with the ideas I entertained of [the Constitution] 
from the first glance."561 These statements suggest that Madison was 
not necessarily claiming that the constitutional Founders had resolved 
the removal issue in favor of the President.562 Indeed, Smith pointed 
911 (Laurance referring to "declaring a legislative opinion in cases where the constitution is 
silent"). 
556. 11 DOCUMENT ARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 544, at 902. 
557. 1 1  id. at 882; see also 1 1  id. at 886 (Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania arguing that if 
the Constitution was "silent" on the issue of removal, Congress had the power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to address it); 11 id. at 873 (Elias Boudinot of New Jersey 
referring to the removal provision as "a legislative construction of the constitution necessary 
to be settled for the direction of your officers"); 1 1  id. at 939 (Vining suggesting that 
Congress has the power to give the President the power of removal by virtue of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause); 11 id. at 963 (Richard Lee of Virginia making a suggestion to 
the same effect); 11 id. at 983 (Sedgwick stating that "the legislature were at liberty to 
determine that an officer should be removable by the president, or whom they pleased"). 
558. 1 1  id. at 927. 
559. 11 id. at 845. 
560. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 251,  252 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979). Madison also 
described Congress's decision on this matter as a "legislative construction" of the 
Constitution, see 1 1  DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-
1791, supra note 544, at 987, and expressed the view that Congress's resolution of this issue 
would become "the permanent exposition of the constitution." 11 id. at 921. As Professor 
Caleb Nelson explains, Madison believed that the meaning of uncertain provisions of the 
Constitution could be "liquidated" or "fixed" by the post-Founding practices and 
interpretations of the federal branches. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 19, 525-29 (2003). 
561. 1 1  DOCUMENT ARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 544, at 867; see also 1 1  id. at 846; 1 1  id. at 896; 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 541, at 735 (stating that "[t]he 
constitution at the first view, may seem to favor" the requirement of senatorial advice and 
consent for removal). 
562. At least this is true during much of the debate. At the end of the debate, in arguing 
for Benson's motion (described below), Madison claimed: "Gentlemen have all along 
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out during the debate that Federalist No. 77 had stated that senatorial 
advice and consent would be required for removal, and neither 
Madison nor anyone else disagreed.563 This idea - that Congress was 
addressing something not resolved at the Founding - helps explain 
the frequent reliance by Madison and other proponents of the removal 
provision on functional rather than textual arguments. As Smith 
accurately observed, many supporters of the removal provision "have 
gone mostly on the point of expediency."564 
Third, a number of the opponents of the removal provision directly 
contested the Vesting Clause Thesis. Alexander White, for example, 
argued that, although the executive power is vested in the President, 
"the executive powers so vested, are those enumerated in the 
constitution." 565 Similarly, Smith argued that the Vesting Clause 
argument "proves too much, and therefore proves nothing; because it 
implies that powers which are expressly given by the constitution 
would have been in the president without the express grant."566 And 
James Jackson of Georgia argued that even if it could be proved that 
the power of removal was executive in nature, "it does not follow that 
it vests in the president alone because [the President) alone does not 
possess all executive powers."567 
proceeded on the idea that the constitution vests the power in the president; and what 
arguments were brought forward respecting the convenience or inconvenience of such a 
disposition of the power, were intended only to throw light upon what was meant by the 
compilers of the constitution." 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 544, at 1029. 
563. 1 1  id. at 861. Federalist No. 77, written by Hamilton, states that the consent of the 
Senate "would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 
2, No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), at 459. 
564. 1 1  DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 544, 
at 985; see also 1 1  id. at 849 (Smith noting that the supporters of the removal provision were 
"inconsistent with themselves," with some arguing that the Constitution gave the President 
the power of removal and others arguing that Congress should give the President this 
power). Not surprisingly, Smith and other opponents of the removal provision denied that 
Congress had the power to fill in a constitutional omission in this way. See, e.g., 11 id. at 850 
(Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts stating that he "feared that the House were about making 
a breach in the constitution, by treating the subject as a meer question of expediency"); 1 1  
id. at  943 (Smith stating that "[s]ome gentlemen have supposed that the constitution has 
made no provision for the removal of officers; and they have called it an omitted case, and a 
defect. They ask, if we may not supply that defect. I answer, No."); 1 1  id. at 901 (recording a 
statement by Gerry that "[a]n attempt to supply such a case might appear an attempt at an 
amendment to the constitution"). They also argued that the removal provision was 
unnecessary if the Constitution in fact already gave the President the power of removal. See, 
e.g. , 1 1  id. at 986 (documenting remarks made by Smith). 
565. 11 id. at 872; see also 11 id. at 952-53 (White contesting the Vesting Clause Thesis). 
566. 1 1  id. at 936-37; see also 11 id. at 843 (Smith stating that "[i]f one reads the 
[Constitution] with attention, one would see that the powers of the different departments of 
the government were defined expressly"). 
567. 11 id. at 912; see also 11 id. at 1013-14 (Michael Stone of Maryland contesting the 
Vesting Clause argument). White and Gerry also pointed out that a number of state 
constitutions had not given the governors the powers of appointment and removal, which 
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Fourth, the House members who invoked the Vesting Clause did 
so in a limited way. None of them suggested that the Article II Vesting 
Clause gave the President a package of unenumerated foreign affairs 
powers, even though the mid-June debate occurred in the context of 
discussing the proposed Department of Foreign Affairs.568 In fact, one 
of the opponents of the removal provision - Samuel Livermore of 
New Hampshire - stated that he did not think anyone would claim 
that the President had the implied power to terminate treaties,569 and 
no one did. Instead of seeing the Vesting Clause as conveying a 
package of foreign affairs powers, the House members who invoked 
the Clause may have simply believed that the Clause gave the 
President a general power to execute the laws, and that removal of 
subordinate executive officers was included within such a power. 
Fisher Ames, for example, closely tied his views regarding the vesting 
of executive power to the President's responsibility for executing the 
laws, stating: 
The constitution places all executive power in the hands of the president, 
and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion 
for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed powers of human 
nature in one man, demands the aid of others . . . .  [H]e must therefore 
have assistants: But in order that he may be responsible to his country, 
he must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them, 
with power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which 
induced their appointment cease to exist. 570 
This strong functional argument does not depend on the acceptance of 
unenumerated foreign affairs powers. 
Madison also appears to have been invoking the Vesting Clause in 
this limited, "execution of the laws," way. Unlike the typical 
formulation of the Vesting Clause Thesis, Madison made no 
distinction in his statements between the three Vesting Clauses, 
instead referring to the legislative, executive, and judicial Vesting 
Clauses as if they had similar effect. He stated, for example, that "the 
legislative powers shall be vested in two houses, and the executive in a 
shows, they argued, that these powers were not viewed as inherently executive in nature. See 
1 1  id. at 877-878, 930. 
568. As Professor Powell notes, there was a reference to foreign affairs by Vining, see 
POWELL, supra note 17, at 39, but the reference is vague and does not claim that the Vesting 
Clause grants foreign affairs powers to the President. See 1 1  DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 544, at 870 (stating that the 
President "executes the duties of foreign affairs"). Although Thomas Hartley of 
Pennsylvania did not refer to the Vesting Clause, he did state at one point that, "The 
business of the secretary of foreign affairs is of an executive nature, and must consequently 
be attached to the executive department." 11 id. at 905. 
569. See 1 1  DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, 
supra note 544, at 884. 
570. 11 id. at 880. 
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President. "571 In addition, Madison made no reference to an executive 
power over foreign affairs, and the only textual exception Madison 
mentioned with respect to the Constitution's vesting of executive 
power in the President is the requirement of senatorial advice and 
consent for appointments.572 Thus, to the extent that Madison viewed 
the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of power, the power he 
appears to have had in mind was something like a power to execute 
the laws - not a package of substantive foreign affairs powers. This 
reading of his statements is consistent with the Helvidius essays he 
wrote several years later regarding the constitutionality of the 1793 
Neutrality Proclamation (discussed below in Section E). In those 
essays, he distinguished the Proclamation from the President's power 
of removal, arguing that "the powers of war and treaties" implicated 
by the Proclamation cannot be classified "within a grant of executive 
power. "573 Madison argued: 
[No analogy] can be traced between a power in the supreme officer 
responsible for the faithful execution of the laws, to displace a subaltern 
officer employed in the execution of the laws; and a power to make 
treaties, and to declare war, such as these have been found to be in their 
nature, their operation, and their consequences.574 
Finally, the ultimate vote on the removal provision was too 
complicated and uncertain to show even a consensus in favor of an 
Article II power of removal, let alone a consensus in favor of the 
Vesting Clause Thesis. On June 19, the question was called, and the 
vote was thirty-four to twenty to retain the removal provision.575 Three 
days later, however, Benson, who had voted for the removal provision, 
made two motions - first, to add a provision in the bill stating that the 
duties of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would be assumed by his 
assistant "when ever [the secretary] shall be removed from office by 
the president of the United States"; 576 and second, to delete the 
removal provision that had occasioned so much debate. Benson 
explained that the removal provision might look too much like a grant 
of power from Congress, whereas his new proposed language "would 
evade that point, and establish a legislative construction of the con-
571. See 11 id. at 896. 
572. 11 id. 
573. JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS NO. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in 15 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 72. 
574. 15 id.; see also Prakash, supra note 26, at 794-97 (noting consistency between 
Madison's position in the removal debate and his position as Helvidius). 
575. 1 1  DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra 
note 544, at 1024. 
576. 1 1  id. at 1028. 
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stitution."577 In two separate votes, Benson's motions were approved. 
As Professor Currie explains, however, different House members 
voted for the two motions, making it impossible to infer majority 
support for an Article II power of removal: 
The members first voted thirty to eighteen to add Benson's "whenever" 
language. All those who voted in favor of presidential removal voted aye, 
whether they thought that Article II settled the question or left the 
matter to Congress. The House then voted thirty-one to nineteen to drop 
the phrase "to be removable by the President." The numbers were 
virtually identical, but it was a different majority. For on this question 
the proponents of Article II power prevailed only because they were 
joined by a substantial number of members who had opposed 
presidential removal altogether.578 
A fortiori, one cannot infer majority support from this vote for the 
Vesting Clause Thesis, even in the limited form it was presented 
during the debates.579 
Although the bill for the Department of Foreign Affairs was then 
sent to the Senate, there is unfortunately no official record of the 
Senate discussions. It is clear from Senator Maclay's diary that there 
was a debate in the Senate over the "whenever" clause that had been 
added pursuant to Benson's motion, and that Maclay and certain other 
Senators spoke out against it.580 We also know from the Senate Journal 
that the clause narrowly survived defeat, when there was a ten to nine 
vote on July 18 to retain it, with Vice-President Adams casting the tie­
breaking vote.581 Although it appears from Maclay's diary and from 
Adams's (very sketchy) notes that there was disagreement over the 
implications of the Vesting Clause - between Oliver Ellsworth and 
577 . 11 id. In support of Benson's motions, Vining expressed the view that the 
substitution made it "more likely [that they would] obtain the acquiescence of the senate." 
11 id. at 1035-36. 
578. CURRIE, supra note 28, at 40-41; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 284-
85 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting this uncertainty in the votes); Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 36, at 645 (describing the "sea of conflicting congressional views"). 
579. See also 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 540, at 332 (noting that "a 
mere fraction of a fraction, a minority of a minority, of the House, can be shown to have 
attributed the removal power to the President on the grounds of executive prerogative"). 
580. See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, 
supra note 426, at 109-16. 
581. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, 
supra note 453, at 86. An earlier vote apparently had been taken on July 16, and it was 11-10, 
with the Vice-President breaking a tie. See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 426, at 115. "Two days later (July 18) those who 
were against the bill asked for the yeas and nays in the same form as originally voted, with 
the casting vote of the Vice President. Butler had been for striking out, but was now absent. 
So Ellsworth withdrew to preserve the tie." HART, supra note 540, at 188. 
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William Johnson, for example582 - it is impossible to reconstruct the 
precise nature of the Senate's discussion from the materials we have. 
As a result, the same ambiguities that exist with respect to the House 
vote exist with respect to the Senate vote. As Professor Currie notes, 
" [I]t was the considered judgment of a majority in both Houses of 
Congress that the President could remove the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, but there was no consensus as to whether he got that authority 
from Congress or the Constitution itself."583 
In sum, what we find in the first major debate in Congress over 
executive power is uncertainty and disagreement, not consensus. The 
idea that the Article II Vesting Clause conveys unenumerated power, 
far from being an understood feature of the recently ratified 
Constitution, was instead simply one of many contested arguments in 
the debate, and not the dominant one. If any approach could fairly be 
said to claim preeminence in this debate, it was the focus on functional 
consequences that had been so evident earlier in the Founding 
debates. Moreover, even those who invoked the Vesting Clause did so 
in the limited context of a presidential power to execute the laws and 
made no claim that the Vesting Clause conveys unenumerated foreign 
affairs powers. 
D. Reception and Recall of Genet 
Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis invoke the Washington 
Administration's handling in 1793 of the controversial ambassador 
from revolutionary France, Edmond Genet, as support for the Thesis. 
On their view, only a general foreign affairs power understood as 
executive can explain the Administration's dealings with this reckless 
emissary.584 In fact, the Administration's actions with respect to Genet 
can all reasonably be tied to the President's enumerated powers to 
receive ambassadors and to execute the laws. Moreover, although the 
handling of Genet generated significant debates within the 
Administration and in the country, it is noteworthy that the Article II 
Vesting Clause was never invoked during these debates. 
582. See William Maclay, Diary entry (July 18, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, supra note 426, at 117-18; 3 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS 409, 412 (1851) . 
583. CURRIE, supra note 28, at 41; see also JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON AND THE NEW NATION, 1783-1789, at 215 (1969) ("Since the matter was 
so closely contested even with the prestigious Washington in the executive chair, it is hard 
to doubt that if anyone else had been elected President, the vote would have gone the 
other way."). 
584. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 312-17. 
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1. Chronology of Key Events and Statements 
We begin this section with a detailed account of the key events and 
statements in this period, and we then assess the implications of these 
events and statements for the debate over the Vesting Clause Thesis. 
The Genet episode concerned, in part, two treaties between the 
United States and France concluded during the Revolutionary War. 
Among other things, these treaties required the United States to help 
protect French possessions in the Americas (such as the French West 
Indies), allowed French warships and privateers to bring prizes into 
U.S. ports, and disallowed the use by France's enemies of U.S. ports 
for outfitting privateers and selling prizes.585 In 1789, the same year 
that the United States began operating under its new Constitution, a 
violent revolution was initiated in France. The monarchy was 
subsequently abolished in September 1792, and King Louis XVI was 
executed in January 1793. The French government was controlled by a 
National Convention, dominated until the spring of 1793 by the 
Girondins, and thereafter by the Jacobins. In conjunction with its 
abolition of the monarchy, France began declaring war on various 
countries. In April 1792, it declared war on Austria and soon found 
itself also at war with Prussia (which had earlier formed an alliance 
with Austria).  In early 1793, France declared war on Great Britain and 
Holland, and then against Spain. The French-U.S. treaties raised the 
prospect that the United States might be drawn into the European war 
on the side of the French. 
In November 1792, the National Convention appointed Genet to 
serve as the new French Minister to the United States. Genet set sail 
for the United States in late February 1793 and arrived in Charleston, 
South Carolina, on April 8, 1793, where he was greeted by enthusiastic 
crowds. Soon thereafter, before he had even been officially received 
by the U.S. government, he began commissioning and arming 
privateers, manned largely by American sailors, to prey on British 
ships. He also began establishing French prize courts on U.S. soil to 
oversee the condemnation and sale of captured prize vessels, planning 
raids into Spanish-controlled Florida, and plotting the "liberation" of 
Louisiana and Canada. 
President Washington wanted to keep the United States out of the 
European war. As he explained in a letter to Gouverneur Morris, the 
U.S. Minister to France, "unwise should we be in the extreme to 
involve ourselves in the contests of European Nations, where our 
weight could be but small; tho' the loss to ourselves would be 
585. See 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 3-44 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931). 
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certain."586 Upon hearing of France's declaration of war on Great 
Britain and Holland, Washington cut short his stay at Mount Vernon 
and returned to Philadelphia (then the national capital) to discuss the 
matter with his cabinet.587 
On April 18, Washington gave his four cabinet officers (Alexander 
Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and Henry Knox) 
a list of thirteen questions he wanted to discuss with them the 
following day.588 The questions included whether to issue a neutrality 
proclamation, whether to receive the new French minister, whether to 
renounce the 1778 treaties, and whether to call Congress into special 
session.589 That same day, Genet left Charleston by land en route to 
Philadelphia. Genet made frequent stops, such that the trip took 
almost a month. 
In the meantime, Washington met with the cabinet on April 19. At 
that meeting, it was agreed unanimously that Congress should not be 
called into special session, that a neutrality proclamation should be 
issued, and that the minister from the Republic of France should be 
received.590 In letters to Madison and Monroe, Jefferson stated that he 
had initially opposed the issuance of the proclamation because he 
believed that, given the Constitution's assignment of the power to 
declare war to Congress, the Executive Branch did not have the power 
586. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (Mar. 25, 1793), in 32 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 402, 402. 
587. See Letter from George Washington to Henry Lee (May 6, 1793), in 32 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 448, 448-49; Letter from George 
Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 12, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 314, 314-15 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969). 
588. See Questions Submitted to the Cabinet by the President (Apr. 18, 1793), in 32 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 418, at 419, 419-21. 
589. Jefferson, apparently for good reason, believed that the thirteen questions had 
been formulated by Hamilton. See 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 569 n. (John 
Catanzariti ed., 1992); Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Washington's Questions on Neutrality 
and the Alliance with France (May 6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra, at 665, 665-66; see also 3 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON 
AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 68 (1962) (stating that the questions "almost certainly" were 
drafted by Hamilton). It is clear that Hamilton had already been discussing similar questions 
with John Jay. See 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 587, at 297-300 
(reprinting two letters from Hamilton to Jay, both dated April 9, 1793). Indeed, at 
Hamilton's request, Jay had drafted a sample neutrality proclamation prior to the April 18 
meeting. See Letter and Enclosure from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 11,  1793), in 
14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 587, at 307; CHARLES MARION 
THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT 43-45 
(1931). 
590. See Cabinet Opinion (Apr. 19, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra note 589, at 570; Notes on Washington's Questions (May 6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 665-66; Notes on Cabinet Meeting (Apr. 19, 
1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 587, at 328. 
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to declare neutrality.591 In response to this concern, Jefferson said that 
it was agreed in the cabinet meeting that the word "neutrality" would 
not be used in the proclamation.592 
There was debate in the meeting, however, over whether to receive 
the French minister with or without qualifications. 593 If he were 
received without qualifications, it might signify that the United States 
accepted the continuing effect of the 1778 treaties between the United 
States and France, notwithstanding the change in France's 
government. A receipt with qualifications, by contrast, might allow the 
United States the option of suspending or renouncing the treaties. 
Hamilton and Knox thought the minister should be received with 
qualifications, whereas Jefferson and Randolph thought he should be 
received without qualifications. Washington asked his cabinet 
members to prepare written opinions on this issue. There is no 
indication that the constitutional powers of the Executive Branch were 
discussed at the April 19 meeting. 
While the cabinet officials were preparing their written opinions, 
Randolph drafted the Neutrality Proclamation, which was issued on 
April 22, 1793. Copies of it were sent to the foreign ministers from 
France, Great Britain, and Holland.594 The Executive Branch's power 
to issue this Proclamation became the subject of the Pacificus­
Helvidius debate between Hamilton and Madison, discussed below in 
Section D. 
Jefferson submitted his written opinion to the President on April 
28.595 He argued that, under the law of nations, the 1778 treaties 
between the United States and France were still in effect, 
notwithstanding the intervening change in the French government. As 
he explained: 
[T]he treaties between the US. and France, were not treaties between the 
US. and Louis Capet, but between the two nations of America and 
France, and the nations remaining in existence, tho' both of them have 
591. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 23, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 346 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (June 29, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra, at 403; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (July 14, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 501. 
592. See CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE FIRST AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: A STUDY OF 
THE AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF NEUTRAL OBLIGATIONS DURING THE YEARS 1792 
TO 1815, at 12-13 (1934); THOMAS, supra note 589, at 46. 
593. Even before the meeting, Washington had decided to receive Genet. See 3 
MALONE, supra note 589, at 69; 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 
469-70. 
594. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Ternant, George Hammond, 
and F.P. Van Berckel (Apr. 23, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra 
note 589, at 583, 583-84. 
595. See Letter and Enclosed Opinion from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington 
(Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 607, 607-18. 
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since changed their forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by 
these changes.596 
Jefferson also argued that compliance with the treaties would not 
unduly threaten U.S. neutrality. In addition, he argued that the 
reception of Genet was, in any event, a separate matter from the 
continuing effect of the treaties: "There is not a word, in either of 
them, about sending ministers. This has been done between us under 
the common usage of nations, and can have no effect either to 
continue or annul the treaties."597 There is no discussion in Jefferson's 
opinion of constitutional issues. Rather, the focus is on international 
law, with references to the leading international law commentators of 
the time, such as Vattel, Grotius, and Puffendorf - each of whom, it 
will be recalled,  had little or nothing to say concerning how nations 
constituted those parts of their governments responsible for 
conducting foreign affairs.598 
Hamilton and Knox submitted their opinion on May 2.599 They 
argued that, in light of the substantial changes in the French govern­
ment, the United States had a right to suspend the 1778 treaties and 
consider whether the changes in the government warranted a renun­
ciation of the treaties.6()() Like Jefferson's opinion, the Hamilton/Knox 
opinion contains an extensive discussion of the law of nations, with 
references to Vattel, Grotius, and Puffendorf. Hamilton apparently 
gave Washington another opinion on May 2 concerning whether, 
under international law, the war in which France was engaged was 
offensive or defensive.6()1 There is no discussion of executive power in 
either opinion. 
Randolph submitted his own opinion on May 6. In this opinion 
(which is quoted at length in the footnotes to the Hamilton/Knox 
opinion in the Hamilton papers) , Randolph agreed with Jefferson that 
Genet should be received without qualifications.6()2 Once again, there 
was no discussion of executive power. 
596. 25 id. at 609. 
597. 25 id. at 612. 
598. See supra Part II.A. 
599. See Letter and Enclosed Answer from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to 
George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra 
note 587, at 367, 367-96. 
600. 14 id. at 372. 
601. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 587, at 398, 398-408. 
602. See Letter and Enclosed Answer from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to 
George Washington, supra note 599, at 368 n.4, 374 n.12, 375 n.13, 388 n.22, 396 n.26. 
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Washington agreed with Jefferson and Randolph and decided, on 
May 6, to receive Genet without qualifications.603 Genet arrived in 
Philadelphia on May 16, and Washington met with him on May 18. 
Initially, Jefferson was very supportive of Genet, telling Madison that 
"he offers every thing, and asks nothing."604 
Despite the Neutrality Proclamation, Genet continued with his 
privateering and other activities. This prompted vigorous complaints 
from the British Minister to the United States, George Hammond, 
starting in May with complaints about the capture of the British ship 
Grange in U.S. waters.605 
Genet's activities were the subject of numerous cabinet meetings, 
and the Administration repeatedly, through Jefferson, asked Genet to 
cease his activities, to no avail.606 At times, Genet suggested that if the 
Administration continued to thwart his activities, he would appeal to 
Congress and the American people. Not surprisingly, Washington 
became increasingly frustrated with Genet. For example, Washington 
wrote a letter to Jefferson on July 11, 1793, asking, "Is the Minister of 
the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at defiance, 
with impunity? and then threaten the Executive with an appeal to the 
People?"607 Jefferson, despite his initial support for Genet, became 
603. Prakash and Ramsey claim that, even though Washington did not attempt to 
suspend or terminate the French treaties, the discussion of that possibility by his cabinet 
shows that they understood that the President had the unilateral constitutional power to 
terminate U.S. treaties. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 324-27. However, there 
was never any discussion by the cabinet (let alone by the Senate or Congress), of either the 
President's constitutional authority with respect to this issue, or how a suspension or 
termination would be accomplished. As a result, the evidence here is much too thin to 
support any claim of constitutional consensus, especially one tied to the Article II Vesting 
Clause, which was never even mentioned. Furthermore, as Prakash and Ramsey appear to 
acknowledge, President John Adams, in the "quasi-war" with France in the late 1790s, acted 
as if he did not have the unilateral power to terminate treaties with France. See Prakash & 
Ramsey, supra note 14, at 326 n.409. 
604. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 19, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 61, 62. 
605. See Memorial from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (May 2, 1793), in 25 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 637, 637-38; Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra note 591, at 38, 38-40; see also Edmund Randolph's Opinion on the Grange (May 14, 
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 31, 31-35 (concluding 
that the Grange "has been seized on neutral ground" and thus restitution should be made to 
the British). 
606. Jefferson's initial letters were addressed to the outgoing French minister, Jean 
Baptiste Teman!. See, e.g. , Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Temant (May 3,  
1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 649; Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Teman! (May 6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 589, at 676; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Teman! 
(May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 42. 
607. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (July 1 1 , 1793), in 33 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 444, at 4, 4. 
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disenchanted with him. For example, in a letter to Madison dated July 
7, 1793, he stated: 
Never, in my opinion, was so calamitous an appointment made, as that of 
the present minister of F[rance] here. Hotheaded, all imagination, no 
judgment, passionate, disrespectful and even indecent towards the 
P[resident] in his written as well as verbal communications, talking of 
appeals from him to Congress, from them to the people, urging the most 
unreasonable and groundless propositions, and in the most dictatorial 
style . . . . 608 
The Genet episode reached a boiling point in July, when word 
reached the cabinet that Genet's ship, the Embuscade, had captured a 
British merchant ship, Little Sarah, and had fitted her out in the port 
of Philadelphia as a privateer, under the new name Petite Democrate. 
Governor Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania reported that the ship now 
had fourteen guns and appeared ready to sail. Despite the Neutrality 
Proclamation, and despite requests by both Mifflin and Jefferson that 
the Petite Democrate stay in port, Genet allowed the ship to sail. He 
informed Jefferson that, "When treaties speak, the agents of nations 
have but to obey."609 
As a result of these events, the cabinet began considering in July 
whether and how to have Genet recalled.610 In early August, it was 
decided that a letter would be sent to Gouverneur Morris detailing 
Genet's conduct and asking Morris to lay this information before the 
French government and ask for Genet's recall.611 Jefferson drafted the 
608. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 443, 444. For a lively account of Jefferson's 
initial support for Genet and eventual disenchantment with him, see CONOR CRUISE 
O'BRIEN, THE LONG AFFAIR: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1785-
1800, at 152-90 (1996). 
609. Letter from Edmond Genet to Thomas Jefferson (July 9, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 163, 163 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke 
eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833). 
610. See Notes of Cabinet Meeting on Edmond Charles Genet (July 23, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 553; Notes of Cabinet Meeting on 
Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 2, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra 
note 591, at 601. 
611. See Notes of Cabinet Meeting on Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 1, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 598; see also Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra note 591, at 606 (stating that "[w]e have decided unanimously to require the recall of 
Genet"). The cabinet also considered again whether to call Congress into early session. 
Jefferson was the only cabinet member who favored doing so, and Washington decided not 
to take this action. See Rules on Neutrality (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 608 (covering rules developed in a meeting on the same day); 
Opinion on Convening Congress (Aug. 4, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra note 591, at 615 (suggesting that Congress be called). Washington eventually did agree 
with Jefferson that Congress should be called into special session, but he allowed himself to 
be voted down by Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph. See JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON: ANGUISH AND FAREWELL, 1793-1799, at 85 (1972). 
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proposed letter to Morris, and, after revisions by the cabinet, the letter 
was sent on August 23.612 Morris delivered the recall request to the 
French government on October 8, and they made a decision to recall 
him three days later, on October 11 .  News of this decision did not 
reach Philadelphia, however, until January 1794.613 
Also in July, the Administration sent twenty-nine questions to the 
Justices of the Supreme Court concerning, among other things, the 
meaning of the 1778 treaties with France.614 Jefferson's letter to the 
Justices explained that the war in Europe had generated questions "of 
considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace of the 
US," and that "their decision is so little analagous to the ordinary 
functions of the Executive, as to occasion much embarrassment and 
difficulty to them."615 Washington's cabinet also agreed to inform the 
British and French ministers that "the Executive of the US., desirous 
of having done what shall be strictly conformeable to the treaties 
of the US. and the laws respecting the said cases has determined to 
refer the questions arising therein to persons learned in the laws."616 A 
letter to this effect was sent to Genet and Hammond.617 The Supreme 
Court subsequently declined to answer the questions, on the ground 
that the Court was not empowered to issue advisory opinions.618 As a 
result, the cabinet formulated its own rules of neutrality, addressing, 
among other things, the arming and equipping of foreign vessels in 
U.S. ports.619 
As Genet became increasingly frustrated with the Administration's 
neutrality policy, he began to raise the issue of executive power in his 
612. See Cabinet Opinions on Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 23, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 745; 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 747-50 (covering the letter to Gouverneur Morris and some 
cabinet notes). 
613. See HARRY AMMON, THE GENET MISSION 155-56 (1973); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, 
supra note 447, at 369. 
614. See Questions Proposed to be Submitted to the Judges of the Supreme Court (July 
18, 1793), in 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 444, at 15, 15-19. 
615. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Justices of the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793), 
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 520, 520. 
616. Cabinet Opinion on Consulting the Supreme Court (July 12, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 484, 484. 
617. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet and George 
Hammond (July 12, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, 
at 487. 
618. See Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to George Washington 
(Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note 
184, at 488, 488-89. See generally STEW ART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY 
ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997). 
619. See Rules on Neutrality, supra note 611, at 608-09. The rules adopted by the 
cabinet were largely embodied, in the spring of the following year, in the Neutrality Act 
of 1794. 
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correspondence and discussions with Jefferson.62° For example, in a 
letter dated June 8, Genet objected that "every obstruction by the 
Government of the United States, to the arming of French vessels, 
must be an attempt on the rights of man, upon which repose the 
independence and laws of the United States" and was contrary to "the 
intention of the people of America." 621 Similarly, Jefferson in a 
memorandum describes a conversation he had with Genet in July 
about the respective powers of Congress and the President. 622 In 
response to a suggestion by Genet that U.S. policy towards France 
should be decided by Congress rather than by the President: 
[Jefferson] explained our constitution to him, as having divided the 
functions of government among three different authorities, the 
Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary, each of which were supreme in all 
questions belonging to their department and independent of the others: 
that all the questions which had arisen between him and us belonged to 
the Executive department, and if Congress were sitting could not be 
carried to them, nor would they take notice of them. 623 
Jefferson further explained that Congress was "sovereign in making 
laws only, the Executive was sovereign in executing them, and the 
Judiciary in construing them where they related to their 
department."624 When Genet asserted that Congress should at least 
decide the proper interpretation of the 1778 treaties, Jefferson "told 
him No, there were very few cases indeed arising out of treaties which 
they could take notice of; that the President is to see that treaties are 
observed" and that "the constitution had made the President the last 
appeal. "625 
Genet continued along these lines in a vitriolic letter dated June 
22, complaining that the Washington Administration had acted 
without waiting for Congress, and asserting that the Administration's 
actions were contrary to the will of the American people.626 Jefferson 
620. Genet also was frustrated by the Administration's decision not to accede to his 
request to pay off the entire U.S. debt to France. See, e.g. , Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Edmond Genet (June 11 ,  1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, 
at 252, 252. 
621. Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 8, 1793), in 1 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 151, 151. 
622. See Memorandum of a Conversation with Edmund Charles Genet (July 10, 1793), 
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 463, 463-67. 
623. 26 id. at 465. 
624. 26 id. 
625. 26 id. 
626. See Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 22, 1793), in 1 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 155, 155-56. Hamilton 
later referred to Genet's June 22 letter as "the most offensive paper, perhaps, that ever was 
offered by a foreign Minister to a friendly power, with which he resided." Reasons for the 
Opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary at War Respecting the 
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drafted a response, which he showed to Washington but never sent 
to Genet: 
When you shall have had time to become better acquainted with the 
constitution of the US. you will become sensible that this question can 
only arise between him and the legislature: that the Executive is the sole 
organ of our communications with foreign governments; that the Agents 
of those governments are not authorized to judge what cases are to be 
decided by this or that department; but to consider the declarations of 
the President conclusive as to them, and sufficient evidence that the 
proper department has pronounced on the case.627 
Genet apparently did not accept Jefferson's views about executive 
power. In mid-September, for example, upon receiving a copy of the 
letter that had been sent to Morris, Genet sent Jefferson an angry 
letter asserting, among other things, that "the Executive power is the 
only one which has been confided to the President of the United 
States" and that the President does not have "the power to bend 
existing treaties to circumstances, and to change their sense."628 In 
December, Genet asked the Administration to present to Congress a 
translation of his instructions and other papers. Jefferson replied that 
"the communications, which are to pass between the Executive and 
Legislative branches, cannot be a subject for your interference, and 
that the President must be left to judge for himself what matters his 
duty or the public good may require him to propose to the 
deliberations of Congress. "629 
One specific issue that came up concerning executive power was 
the proper organ of government for approving and revoking the 
commissions of foreign consuls. In a letter on October 2, Jefferson 
informed Genet that, "by our constitution all foreign agents are to be 
addressed to the President of the US. no other branch of the 
government being charged with the foreign communications."630 Genet 
responded on November 14 that the French government "will adopt 
Brigandine Little Sarah (July 8, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra 
note 5, at 74, 75. 
627. Unsent letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (July 16, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 510, 513; see also Unsent letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Nov. 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 378, 378-79 (John Catanzariti ed., 1997) (explaining that the Constitution assigns 
the power of corresponding with foreign nations to the executive, not to the states). 
628. Letter from Edmond Genet to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 18, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 172, 172. 
629. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Dec. 31,  1793), in 27 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 649, 649. As Harry Ammon explains, 
neither the National Convention nor Genet fully understood the role of the President in the 
U.S. constitutional system. See AMMON, supra note 613, at 25-26, 129. 
630. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Oct. 2, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 175, 176. 
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the alterations of which this matter appears susceptible, agreeably to 
the text, spirit, and basis, of your constitution" and that, in his view, 
the Constitution appeared to give the President only the ministerial 
duty "to verify purely and simply the powers of foreign agents 
accredited to their masters."631 Jefferson responded in a letter dated 
November 22 that he was "not authorized to enter into any discussions 
with you on the meaning of our constitution in any part of it, or to 
prove to you that it has ascribed to him alone the admission or 
interdiction of foreign agents. I inform you of the fact by authority 
from the President."632 Genet then sent Jefferson a letter on December 
3 questioning the requirement that consular commissions be addressed 
to the President and arguing that the U.S. government did not have a 
right to revoke consular commissions.633 This letter was considered by 
the cabinet on December 7, where it was agreed that consular 
commissions could be addressed "either to the US. or to the President 
of the US. but that one of these should be insisted on."634 Jefferson 
subsequently wrote Genet arguing that governments have the right to 
determine whether to accept particular consular officials and whether 
to permit them to continue exercising consular functions.635 Jefferson 
also stated: 
By what member of the government the right of giving or withdrawing 
permission, is to be exercised here, is a question on which no foreign 
Agent can be permitted to make himself the Umpire. It is sufficient for 
him, under our government that he is informed of it by the Executive.636 
On at least a couple of occasions, Jefferson pointed out that the 
President lacked power over a particular matter. Thus, in a letter 
dated June 1 ,  1793, Jefferson informed Genet that Gideon Henfield, 
who was charged with violating U.S. neutrality, "appears to be in the 
custody of the civil magistrate, over whose proceedings the Executive 
has no controul."637 Similarly, in a letter dated June 17, 1793, Jefferson 
explained that the President could not interfere with judicial decisions 
exercising jurisdiction over certain vessels and cargoes taken by a 
631. Letter from Edmond Genet to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 14, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 184, 184. 
632. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Nov. 22, 1793), in 27 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 414, 414. 
633. Letter from Edmond Genet to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 3, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 479, 479-80. 
634. Cabinet Opinion on Edmond Charles Genet and James King (Dec. 7, 1793), in 27 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 489, 489. 
635. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Dec. 9, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 500, 500-01. 
636. 27 id. at 500 (footnotes omitted). 
637. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (June 1, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 160, 160. 
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French vessel as prizes. Jefferson stated that " [t)he functions of the 
Executive are not competent to the decision of Questions of property 
between Individuals. "638 And, in responding to complaints by Genet of 
threats to French consuls and other concerns, Jefferson informed him 
that most of his complaints, "being beyond the powers of the 
Executive, they can only manifest their dispositions by acting on those 
which are within their powers. "639 
In November 1793, while awaiting word back from France 
concerning Genet's recall, the Administration considered dismissing 
Genet on its own authority.640 This proposal was opposed by Jefferson 
and was never implemented. Nor was there any discussion of the 
source of the President's authority, if any, to dismiss a foreign 
ambassador. 
On December 5, 1793, Washington presented Congress with a 
report concerning Genet's conduct, attaching much of the 
correspondence and other papers relating to what had occurred since 
Genet's arrival.641 At the outset of the report, Washington stated: 
As the present situation of the several nations of Europe, and especially 
of those with which the United States have important relations, cannot 
but render the state of things between them and us matter of interesting 
inquiry to the Legislature, and may indeed give rise to deliberations to 
which they alone are competent, I have thought it my duty to 
communicate to them certain correspondences which have taken place.642 
Genet continued to engage in problematic conduct to the very end. 
For example, on December 8, he wrote to Randolph demanding that 
Chief Justice Jay and Senator Rufus King be prosecuted for libel, 
based on their published allegation that he had threatened to appeal 
to the people of the United States to override the actions of the 
President.643 In mid-January 1794, news of Genet's recall by France 
638. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, at 301, 301. 
639. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Nov. 30, 1793), in 27 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 458, 458 (footnotes omitted); see also 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Genet (Sept. 9, 1793) , in 27 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, at 67, 68 ("The Courts of Justice exercise the 
sovereignty of this country in judiciary matters, are supreme in these, and liable neither to 
controul nor opposition from any other branch of the Government."). 
640. See Notes of Cabinet Meetings on Edmond Charles Genet and the President's 
Address to Congress (Nov. 18, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 
627, at 399, 399-401 . 
641. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 609, at 
141-243. 
642. 1 id. at 141. 
643. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph enclosing letter from 
Edmond Genet (Dec. 18, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 627, 
at 587, 587. For a description of the circumstances surrounding the allegation made against 
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reached Philadelphia. On January 20, Washington informed Congress 
that Genet's conduct had "been unequivocally disapproved" by the 
French government and that the French Government had given "the 
strongest assurances . . .  that [Genet's] recall should be expedited 
without delay."644 Genet's successor, Jean Fauchet, arrived in the 
United States on February 20. Genet did not wish to return to France 
(where he might have been executed by the now-Jacobin controlled 
government), and Washington decided to grant him political asylum in 
the United States. In a truly American conclusion, Genet settled down 
as a gentleman farmer in New York and married Governor Clinton's 
daughter. 
2. Assessment 
While there is nothing in the Genet episode that contradicts the 
Vesting Clause Thesis, there is also nothing there that provides 
significant support for it. First, the assumptions and assertions 
concerning executive power during this episode were all made by 
Executive Branch officials, at a time when Congress was out of session 
and the Administration was understandably trying to prevent Genet's 
conduct from drawing the United States into war. There is no reason 
to believe that these officials were objectively trying to apply 
Founding intent. Second, although the scope of executive power came 
up in the discussions between Genet and Jefferson, there was almost 
no internal discussion by Washington's cabinet of this topic, so it is 
difficult to draw inferences from this episode about the constitutional 
theory underlying the Administration's actions. Third, the 
Administration's effort to obtain answers from the Supreme Court on 
the treaty questions, and its presentation of the Genet materials to 
Congress once Congress was in session, undermine the strong 
executive control story presented by Prakash and Ramsey.645 Fourth, 
notwithstanding Jefferson's broad statements about the executive in 
his discussions with Genet, there is no documented reference in any of 
the correspondence or cabinet meetings relating to the Genet episode 
that refers to the Vesting Clause. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, all of the Executive Branch actions during this episode 
could reasonably have been based on specific constitutional provisions 
rather than on the Vesting Clause. Thus, the assumption that the 
Executive Branch could decide whether and how to receive Genet, 
Genet that he would attempt to appeal to the American people, see JOANNE B. FREEMAN, 
AFFAIRS OF HONOR 93-97 (2001). 
644. Letter from George Washington to Congress (Jan. 21, 1794), in 33 THE WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 444, at 245, 245-46. 
645. See also FLEXNER, supra note 611, at 26 ("Washington would undoubtedly have 
consulted the Senate in the [neutrality] crisis had Congress been in session."). 
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and then could decide to ask for his recall, could reasonably have been 
based on the President's power to "receive ambassadors and other 
public ministers."646 And the Administration's belief that it had the 
power in the absence of a judicial decision to interpret the 1778 
treaties could reasonably have been based on the President's power to 
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed."647 
Prakash and Ramsey argue, however, that the Ambassador 
Receipt Clause cannot explain the Washington Administration's 
practice of issuing and revoking "exequaters" to consuls, that is, the 
formal permission to set up consular functions. Consuls are mentioned 
in the Ambassador Appointment Clause and in the Article III 
jurisdictional provisions, but not in the Ambassador Receipt Clause.648 
At best, this appears to be a minor point. If one accepts the 
proposition that the Ambassador Receipt Clause includes a power to 
determine which foreign diplomats to receive (which is at least 
plausible), then the exequatur practice was at most a modest extension 
of that power to a class of diplomats not specifically included within 
the Clause. In other words, Prakash and Ramsey have at most 
identified a minor example of where the Administration's practice 
may have strained the constitutional text, not any confirmation or 
acceptance of the Vesting Clause Thesis. 
In any event, it is possible that the Founders intended the 
Ambassador Receipt Clause to encompass consuls but inadvertently 
left out an express reference to those officials. This conclusion is 
supported by Federalist No. 42. There, Madison explains that, 
although the Articles of Confederation gave the national government 
"the sole and exclusive right and power of . . .  sending and receiving 
ambassadors," the Constitution improves upon the Articles by adding 
646. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Courts have long construed the Ambassador Receipt 
Clause as giving the President the power to determine whether to accredit foreign diplomats. 
See, e.g. , United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359, 361 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 15,971) ("The 
constitution of the United States having vested in the president the power to receive 
ambassadors and other public ministers, has necessarily bestowed upon that branch of the 
government, not only the right, but the exclusive right, to judge of the credentials of the 
ministers so received . . . .  "). Courts also have relied on the Ambassador Receipt Clause as 
support for a presidential power to determine whether the United States should recognize 
particular foreign governments. See, e.g., Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 1 18  F.3d 76, 79 
(2d Cir. 1997) ("Because the Constitution empowers only the President to 'receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers,' the courts have deferred to the executive branch 
when determining what entities shall be considered foreign states." (quoting Iran Handicraft 
& Carpet Exp. Ctr. v. Marjan Int'I Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff d, 868 
F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988))). Although not noted by Prakash and Ramsey, in Federalist No. 69, 
Hamilton suggested a narrow reading of the Ambassador Receipt Clause, stating that the 
President's power to receive ambassadors "is more a matter of dignity than of authority" and 
would be "a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the 
government." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), at 420. 
647. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
648. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 316. 
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"a power of appointing and receiving 'other public ministers and 
consuls.' "649 Thus, Madison seemed to believe that the Ambassador 
Receipt Clause, unlike the equivalent clause in the Articles of 
Confederation, encompassed consuls. He went on to explain that: 
The term ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the 
second of the Articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade 
only of public ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States 
will be most likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. 
And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend 
consuls. 650 
Importantly, Madison also noted that, despite this textual problem, "it 
has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to 
employ the inferior grades of public ministers and to send and receive 
consuls."651 Thus, the Washington Administration's practice, even if 
not encompassed by the Ambassador Receipt Clause, was a less 
dramatic extension of this Clause than what had already occurred 
under the Articles of Confederation, likewise on grounds of 
expediency. 
On the other hand, although Prakash and Ramsey do not examine 
the Founding history on this point, a close reading of the Federal 
Convention proceedings suggests that the omission of consuls from the 
Ambassador Receipt Clause might have been intentional. The 
Committee of Detail's draft of the Constitution assigned the power to 
appoint ambassadors to the Senate and the power to receive 
ambassadors to the President.652 Neither of these clauses mentioned 
other public ministers or consuls, although those diplomats were 
mentioned in the federal court jurisdiction provision.653 On August 23, 
1787, the Ambassador Appointment Clause was modified to include a 
reference to "other public Ministers."654 On August 25, the same 
change was made to the Ambassador Receipt Clause.655 On September 
7, the Ambassador Appointment Clause was further modified to 
include a reference to consuls.656 Somewhere along the way, a similar 
649. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 42 (James Madison), at 264. 
650. Id. at 264-65. Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation provided: "Each state 
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, 
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress 
assembled.,
, 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II. 
651. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 42 (James Madison), at 265. 
652. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 
183, 185. 
653. See 2 id. at 186. 
654. See 2 id. at 394. 
655. See 2 id. at 411, 419. 
656. See 2 id. at 533, 539. 
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modification must have been made to the Ambassador Receipt 
Clause, because both clauses contained a reference to consuls in the 
draft sent to the Committee of Style.657 The draft reported out of the 
Committee, however, did not contain a reference to consuls in the 
Ambassador Receipt Clause, although consuls were still referenced in 
the Ambassador Appointment Clause (and in the federal court 
jurisdiction provision).658 
The Committee of Style's deletion of the reference to consuls in 
the Ambassador Receipt Clause, but not in the Ambassador 
Appointments Clause, makes it harder to argue that the lack of a 
reference to consuls in that Clause was accidental. That said, it is not 
clear why the deletion was made. The disparity between the two 
clauses could still have been inadvertent, especially since the 
Committee of Style was not charged with making substantive changes. 
Alternatively, the Framers may have wanted to give the President the 
power to appoint all U.S. representatives abroad, but may not have 
wanted to burden him with the duty of receiving low-level foreign 
diplomats. Of course, if that was the reason for the deletion, the 
Framers would not necessarily have wanted to deny to the President 
the power over exequaturs, so Washington's practice still might have 
been consistent with the overall Founding intent. The key point, 
however, is that the Administration's practice concerning consuls was 
at most a minor deviation from the constitutional text, and one that 
was never linked to the Vesting Clause. 
E. The Pacificus-Helvidius Debate 
In contrast to the Genet affair, the Neutrality Proclamation did 
famously produce what in many ways was the first sustained 
articulation of the Vesting Clause Thesis, from no less than the pen of 
Alexander Hamilton. In late June 1793, Hamilton began publishing 
newspaper essays, under the pseudonym "Pacificus," to defend the 
Proclamation against Republican criticisms. He ultimately wrote seven 
Pacificus essays, but only the first one focuses on the constitutionality 
of the Proclamation.659 In late August and early September, James 
Madison published five essays, under the pseudonym "Helvidius," 
responding to Hamilton's constitutional arguments. 
657. See 2 id. at 574-575. 
658. See 2 id. at 599-600. 
659. The other essays address the validity of the Proclamation under international law 
and the Proclamation's policy implications. See LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 2 
(July 3, 1793), at 55-63; LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 3 (July 6, 1793), at 65-69; 
LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 4 (July 10, 1793), at 82-86; LETTERS OF 
PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 5 (July 13-17, 1793), at 90-95; LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra 
note 5, No. 6 (July 17, 1793), at 100-06; LETTERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 7 (July 27, 
1793), at 130-35. 
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Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis sometimes describe 
Hamilton's constitutional defense of the Proclamation as if it rest­
ed entirely on the Vesting Clause Thesis. 660 Prakash and Ramsey 
emphasize, for example, that "the leading contemporaneous defense 
of Washington's Proclamation, that of Hamilton as Pacificus, directly 
identified Article II, Section 1 as its constitutional basis."661 Indeed, 
Prakash and Ramsey go so far as to suggest that the Vesting Clause 
Thesis was the only possible constitutional argument that could have 
been made in support of the Proclamation and that "the only 
alternative explanation is that Washington simply seized powers not 
granted to him by the Constitution. "662 In fact, although Hamilton 
does invoke the Vesting Clause Thesis, he begins and ends his 
constitutional analysis by relying on specific textual grants of power 
rather than on the Vesting Clause. Furthermore, Hamilton expressly 
notes that resort to the Vesting Clause may not have been necessary in 
order for the Proclamation to be constitutionally valid. 
Hamilton begins his analysis by noting that " [i]t will not be dis­
puted that the management of the affairs of this country with foreign 
nations is confided to the Government of the [United States]."663 He 
then goes on to argue that, within the national government, the 
Executive Branch is the "organ of intercourse between the [United 
States] and foreign Nations."664 As support for this claim, he notes that 
it is the Executive Branch, not the Legislative or Judicial Branch, that 
is charged under the Constitution with making treaties and executing 
the laws. 665 Hamilton thus begins his constitutional analysis by 
referring to two enumerated powers in Article II. 
At this point in his essay, Hamilton advocates a version of the 
Vesting Clause Thesis. He contends that the Vesting Clause is a 
comprehensive grant of executive power to the President and that this 
grant is not limited by Article II's specific grants of power, except to 
the extent that those grants are themselves specifically limited. As 
support for this claim, he notes the difference in wording between the 
Article I Vesting Clause and the Article II Vesting Clause. According 
to Hamilton, the specific grants of power in Article II merely "specify 
and regulate the principal articles implied in the definition of 
Executive Power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of 
that power, interpreted in conformity to other parts [of] the 
660. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 329-30. 
661. Id. at 330. 
662. Id. at 331.  But cf Prakash, supra note 26, at 793-94 (noting Hamilton's reliance on 
the Take Care Clause as an alternative argument). 
663. LETIERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5,  No. 1 (June 29, 1793), at 33, 36. 
664. Id. at 38. 
665. Id. at 37-38. 
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constitution and to the principles of free government."666 Since issuing 
the Neutrality Proclamation was an "Executive Act," says Hamilton, it 
fell within the powers granted in the Vesting Clause. 
Immediately after making this Vesting Clause argument, however, 
Hamilton returns to the specific textual grants of power. He 
acknowledges that Congress has the power to declare war, and that 
this power may include the power to determine whether the United 
States "is under obligations to m[ ake] war or not."667 But he contends 
that, in the absence of a declaration of war by Congress, the Executive 
Branch has a concurrent power to make this determination. As 
support for this claim, Hamilton relies on the Take Care Clause. His 
explanation is worth quoting at length: 
If the Legislature have a right to make war on the one hand - it is on 
the other the duty of the Executive to preserve Peace till war is declared; 
and in fulfilling that duty, it must necessarily possess a right of judging 
what is the nature of the obligations which the treaties of the Country 
impose on the Government; and when in pursuance of this right it has 
concluded that there is nothing in them inconsistent with a state of 
neutrality, it becomes both its province and its duty to enforce the laws 
incident to that state of the Nation. The Executive is charged with the 
execution of all laws, the laws of Nations and well as the Municipal law, 
which recognizes and adopts those laws. It is consequently bound, by 
faithfully executing the laws of neutrality, when that is the state of the 
Nation, to avoid giving a cause of war to foreign Powers.668 
Thus, according to Hamilton, Washington had the power to issue the 
Neutrality Proclamation by virtue of his Article II responsibility to 
execute "the Laws," which, Hamilton argued, included U.S. treaty 
commitments and the customary international laws of neutrality.669 
Hamilton goes on to argue that this power is confirmed by the 
Ambassadorial Receipt Clause, which, Hamilton contends, necessarily 
entails the power of interpreting U.S. treaty commitments. 670 Im­
portantly, Hamilton concludes his essay by suggesting that the Take 
Care Clause may by itself be enough to support the Neutrality 
Proclamation: "That clause of the constitution which makes it his duty 
to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' might alone have 
been relied upon, and this simple process of argument pursued."671 
666. Id. at 39 (alteration in original). 
667. Id. at 40 (alteration in original). 
668. Id. 
669. See also id. at 41. We take no position here on whether Hamilton correctly 
interpreted the word "Laws" in Article IL For evidence suggesting that the word "Laws" 
may have been intended to encompass treaties, but not the law of nations, see Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article Ill, 42 VA. J. lNT'L L. 587, 602 n.65 (2002). 
670. LErrERS OF PACIFICUS, supra note 5, No. 1 (June 29, 1793}, at 41-42. 
671. Id. at 43; see also CURRIE, supra note 28, at 178 (noting Hamilton's reliance on the 
Take Care Clause). 
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A close reading of the Pacificus essay shows, therefore, that the 
Vesting Clause Thesis was less central to Hamilton's analysis than 
proponents of the Thesis typically acknowledge. Moreover, Hamilton 
was defending only the limited argument that the President had the 
power to declare the default position of the United States under 
international law in the absence of congressional or judicial action.672 
Hamilton was not defending any of the presidential powers sometimes 
linked by modern commentators to the Vesting Clause, such as treaty 
termination, offensive war powers, or sole executive agreements. 
Although the Washington Administration controversially sought to 
prosecute individuals who violated U.S. neutrality, Hamilton's essay 
does not defend the constitutionality of that practice (which, among 
other things, might have violated Congress's power to define and 
punish offenses against the law of nations), 673 let alone link the 
practice to the Vesting Clause. And it is doubtful that others in the 
Administration thought that the Neutrality Proclamation itself (as 
opposed to the common law, treaties, or the law of nations) could 
serve as the basis for the prosecutions.674 
In any event, it is difficult to see how the Pacificus essay can serve 
as evidence of the original understanding of the Article II Vesting 
Clause. The essay was an advocacy piece, written four years after the 
Constitution took effect, by a particularly pro-executive member of 
the Founding generation. The Pacificus essay was sharply contested by 
James Madison as well as by Thomas Jefferson, who urged Madison to 
write the Helvidius essays. · rn addition, Hamilton's reliance on the 
Vesting Clause Thesis in Pacificus contradicted his own statements 
about executive power made during the Founding. 675 If one is 
672 . As reported in Jefferson's diary, President Washington himself viewed the 
Proclamation in these narrow terms: "The (President] declared he never had an idea that he 
could bind Congress against declaring war, or that anything contained in his (proclamation] 
could look beyond the first day of [Congress's] meeting . . . .  " Notes of Cabinet Meetings on 
Edmond Charles Genet and the President's Address to Congress (Nov. 18, 1793), supra note 
640, at 400. In a speech to Congress on December 3, 1793, Washington explained that, in 
light of the war in Europe, he had issued the Proclamation "to admonish our Citizens of the 
consequences of a contraband trade, and of hostile Acts to any of the parties; and to obtain 
by a declaration of the existing legal state of things, an easier admission of our right to the 
immunities, belonging to our situation." President George Washington, Fifth Annual 
Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra 
note 444, at 163, 164. In describing the specific acts he had taken to give effect to U.S. 
neutrality, he further noted that "(i]t rests with the wisdom of Congress to correct, improve 
or enforce this plan of procedure." 33 id. 
673. See CURRIE, supra note 28, at 178-79. 
674. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 343-45 (documenting this point). At 
President Washington's request, Congress enacted a neutrality statute in 1794 that provided 
a statutory basis for prosecuting violations of the law of nations concerning neutrality. See 
An Act in Addition to the Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United 
States, 1 Stat. 381 (1794). 
675. The constitutional plan that Hamilton presented at the Federal Convention would 
have limited the President to certain enumerated powers. See supra Part III.A. In the 
February 2004] Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs 683 
attempting to discern the Constitution's original meaning, surely 
Hamilton's Founding statements should be given more weight than 
what he later said in Pacificus. 
Seeking to assign broader historical significance to the Pacificus 
essay, proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis typically suggest that 
Hamilton "won" the debate with Madison. Prakash and Ramsey state, 
for example, that Madison's arguments were "incoherent" and that 
"Helvidius was no match for Pacificus."676 The implication apparently 
is that Hamilton's arguments were so overpowering that they must 
have reflected Founding intent. 
As others have noted, there are certainly weaknesses in Madison's 
Helvidius essays.677 Logically, however, the fact that Madison's re­
sponse may have been less than convincing does not show that 
Hamilton's views were correct, since Madison may have simply failed 
to make the best arguments. This would not be surprising, given that 
he wrote the Helvidius essays quite reluctantly, while he was 
preoccupied with other business, and he apparently was dissatisfied 
with his performance.678 Moreover, even if Hamilton was right about 
Federalist Papers, Hamilton repeatedly implied that the President would have only the 
powers recited in Article II. See supra Part III.B. And in the New York ratifying convention, 
Hamilton stated that the Constitution entrusted the management of foreign relations to the 
Senate and President together. See supra Part 111.C. See also Raoul Berger, The Presidential 
Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1972-73) ("The magic of Hamilton's 
name must not obscure the fact that he had executed a volte-face [in Pacificus], repudiating 
assurances he had made both in The Federalist and in the New York Ratification Convention 
to procure adoption of the Constitution."). 
676. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 336, 339. 
677. See, e.g. , EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 28 (1917); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 447, at 362; SCHLESINGER, supra 
note 18, at 20; SOFAER, supra note 229, at 114-15. But cf LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED 
FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 527 
n.18 (1995) (stating that Helvidius "decimates the logic of Hamilton's argument that the 
executive possesses something like a concurrent right with the legislature to determine 
whether treaty obligations compel war or peace"); LEVY, supra note 384, at 52 ("Madison 
demolished [Hamilton's] argument by showing that the Constitution had rejected the British 
theory of executive prerogative and by quoting The Federalist against Hamilton."). 
678. Madison wrote the Helvidius essays after being urged to do so by Jefferson. In a 
June 30 postscript to a June 29 letter, Jefferson complained that "heresies" in the first 
Pacificus essay might "pass unnoticed and unanswered." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
James Madison (June 29, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 591, 
at 401, 404. On July 7, Jefferson wrote to Madison, "Nobody answers [Hamilton], and his 
doctrine will therefore be taken for confessed. For god's sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen, 
select the most striking heresies, and cut him to peices in the face of the public." Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 608, at 444. For a number of reasons, 
Madison was reluctant to take on this task. He agreed with Jefferson that Hamilton's 
argument "ought certainly to be taken notice of by some one who can do it justice." Letter 
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 2, at 44, 44. But he felt that he did not have either the necessary 
factual information or the requisite legal materials, and he hoped to find out "that some one 
else has undertaken it." Id. Madison also was in a difficult political situation, given the need 
by this time to distance the Republicans from Genet and the importance of not challenging 
Washington directly. On the latter point, he expressed concern to Jefferson that he did not 
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the constitutionality of the Neutrality Proclamation, it may have been 
because of his specific textual arguments rather than his Vesting 
Clause argument. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an 
examination of Madison's argument shows that its weaknesses are 
similar to weaknesses shared by the Vesting Clause Thesis itself. 
Madison's argument has two principal components. First, he 
contends that the powers of declaring war and making treaties are 
inherently "legislative" in nature and thus "can never fall within a 
proper definition of executive powers. "679 The exercise of executive 
power, rather, "must pre-suppose the existence of the laws to be 
executed."680 Hamilton's suggestion to the contrary, Madison con­
tends, is improperly borrowed from the example of British 
monarchy.681 Consequently, Madison argues that the Constitution's 
grant of the war declaration power and the treaty power should not, as 
Hamilton argues, be construed strictly to preserve the maximum scope 
for presidential power. Here, Madison argues that the Constitution did 
not adopt the purported Locke/Montesquieu conception of executive 
power, noting: "Both of [these writers] too are evidently warped by a 
regard to the particular government of England, to which one of them 
owed allegiance; and the other professed an admiration bordering on 
idolatry. "682 Once it is concluded that the war power and the treaty 
power are legislative in nature, argues Madison, it becomes clear that 
the Constitution could not have assigned them to the President, since: 
[T]he constitution cannot be supposed to have placed either any power 
legislative in its nature, entirely among executive powers, or any power 
executive in its nature, entirely among legislative powers, without 
charging the constitution, with that kind of intermixture and 
know "how far the [President] considers himself as actually committed with respect to some 
doctrines." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 22, 1793), in 15 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 46, 46-47. Nevertheless, Madison "forced 
[himself] into the task of a reply," a task that he described as "the most grating one I ever 
experienced." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 30, 1793), in 15 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 48, 48. Years later, Madison expressed 
dissatisfaction with his essays, describing them as a "polemic tract." James Madison, 
Detached Memoranda, in Elizabeth Fleet ed., Madison's "Detached Memoranda, " 3 WM. & 
MARY Q. (3d Series) 534, 567 (1946). He continued to be critical of the Pacificus essays, 
however, noting that they represented "a perverted view of [President] Washington's 
proclamation of neutrality, and [were] calculated to put a dangerous gloss on the 
Constitution of the U.S." Id. at 567-68. 
679. LEITERS OF HELVJDIUS, supra note 573, No. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), at 66, 69. Given the 
expressions of legislative foreign affairs essentialism that appeared during the state 
ratification debates, see supra Part 111.C, this tack was neither new nor unique to Madison. 
680. LEITERS OF HELVIDIUS, supra note 573, NO. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), at 66, 69. 
681. Id. at 72. 
682. Id. at 68. 
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consolidation of different powers, which would violate a fundamental 
principle in the organization of free governments.683 
Second, Madison contends that the Constitution does not allow for 
the concurrent exercise of powers that are purely legislative or purely 
executive. He notes that Hamilton acknowledged that Congress's 
power of declaring war, even when strictly construed, includes the 
power of judging whether the United States is under an obligation to 
make war. This acknowledgment, Madison argues, means that the 
President cannot also have such a power, since concurrent powers are 
"contrary to one of the first and best maxims of a well organized 
government, and ought never to be founded in a forced construction, 
much less in opposition to a fair one."684 As for Hamilton's argument 
that the executive has the power under specific textual grants, such as 
the Take Care Clause, to act in the absence of a congressional 
declaration of war, Madison contends that: 
Whenever then a question occurs whether war shall be declared, or 
whether public stipulations require it, the question necessarily belongs to 
the department to which these functions belong - And no other 
department can be in the execution of its proper functions, if it should 
undertake to decide such a question.685 
Madison also denies that the President's power to execute the laws 
gives him any discretion in interpreting and applying those laws, 
stating that " [t]he executive has no other discretion than to convene 
and give information to the legislature on occasions that may demand 
it; and whilst this discretion is duly exercised the trust of the executive 
is satisfied, and that department is not responsible for the 
consequences. "686 
There are a number of weaknesses in Madison's analysis. These 
weaknesses, however, do not confirm the persuasiveness of the 
Vesting Clause Thesis. Indeed, these weaknesses are similar to 
weaknesses in the Vesting Clause Thesis itself. First, Madison, 
atypically for him, relies on essentialist reasoning instead of functional 
arguments. Madison talks as if there are pure categories of executive 
and legislative power, and he simply disagrees with Hamilton about 
what those categories should look like. Madison's argument is also 
unpersuasive in rejecting the possibility of concurrent powers. In 
doing so, Madison (again, atypically for him) espouses a formal, 
categorical approach to the separation of powers. Yet, like the Vesting 
Clause Thesis, Madison's approach appears to be at odds with the 
mixing of powers so evident in the Constitution, a feature defended by 
683. Id. at 70. 
684. LETIERS OF HELVIDIUS, supra note 573, No. 2 (Aug. 31,  1793), at 80, 83. 
685. Id. at 82. 
686. Id. at 86. 
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Madison himself in Federalist No. 47.687 Madison's approach also has 
the problem of being unworkable in practice, since it ignores the 
interpretive role necessarily entailed in executing the laws. Finally, his 
approach is functionally problematic, since it might mean that the 
national government would be unable to respond to many foreign 
relations problems when Congress was out of session. As Hamilton 
himself appeared to recognize, however, the specific textual grants 
may be sufficient to address these functional concerns, without any 
need for the Vesting Clause Thesis.688 
In sum, the Pacificus-Helvidius debate neither provides Founding 
support for the Vesting Clause Thesis, nor demonstrates its inherent 
persuasiveness. Instead, the debate serves to highlight the fact that 
there were disagreements in the 1790s over the nature and scope of 
executive power. It also tends to confirm the possibility (as Hamilton 
himself acknowledged with respect to the Neutrality Proclamation) 
that the specific textual grants of power in Article II may give the 
Executive Branch sufficient authority over foreign affairs without the 
need for the Vesting Clause Thesis. To the extent that one can read 
anything into the lack of persuasiveness in the Helvidius essays, it is 
simply that essentialist reasoning about categories of power does not 
advance the constitutional analysis. The constitutional Founders 
(including Hamilton, at least before the Pacificus essays) were aware 
of this problem, which is why they spelled out the President's powers 
in Article 11.689 
687. See supra text accompanying notes 256-259. 
688. Although Madison's response to Pacificus suffered from some of the same 
analytical problems as the Vesting Clause Thesis, it is not accurate to suggest that Madison's 
response implicitly accepted the Thesis. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 335-37; 
William R. Casto, Pacificus and Helvidius Reconsidered, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 612, 631-32 
(2001). Madison appeared to conceive of the category of "executive power" as simply a 
power to execute the laws, not as a package of independent substantive powers, and he 
construed the President's enumerated foreign affairs powers narrowly vis-a-vis Congress -
an approach directly at odds with the Vesting Clause Thesis. It is possible, however, that 
Madison shied away from a direct assault on the Vesting Clause Thesis because of earlier 
statements he had made in connection with the 1789 removal debate. See supra Part IV.C. 
689. Early post-Founding treatises also appear to confirm that the Article II Vesting 
Clause was not understood as conveying substantive powers. See, e.g., 1 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 281 (1836) (stating, after a discussion of the Vesting 
Clause, that "(h]aving thus considered the manner in which the president is constituted, it 
only remains for us to review the powers with which he is invested," and then referring only 
to powers specified in the Constitution); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 135-49 (1825) (equating executive power with the 
power to execute the laws, and then discussing only powers specified in the Constitution); 
THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 356 (1822) (discussing Article II Vesting 
Clause and not mentioning any substantive powers); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 340 (1833) ("Having thus considered the 
manner, in which the executive department is organized, the next inquiry is, as to the 
powers, with which it is entrusted. These, and the corresponding duties, are enumerated in 
the second and third sections of the second article of the constitution."); ST. GEORGE 
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE 
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CONCLUSION 
Elegant theories can often obscure shaky foundations, especially in 
constitutional law. Among the most venerable constitutional theories 
is the Vesting Clause Thesis, which is also among the most newly 
popular. This Thesis posits that the Founders, in vesting the 
"executive Power" in the President, delegated an unspecified but well­
understood bundle of foreign-affairs powers, so well understood that 
the label served as mere shorthand for what everyone knew to be the 
essential attributes of an executive department. The Thesis further 
holds that, by virtue of this delegation, the President properly wields 
all foreign affairs authority not expressly granted to the other 
branches. 
The Vesting Clause Thesis has a number of attractions. It offers a 
straightforward textual solution to a number of vexing questions about 
foreign affairs authority. It also helps reconcile the spare list of powers 
in Article II with the reality of vast presidential authority in foreign 
relations. And it hearkens back to a purported age when the 
boundaries separating the executive, legislative, and judicial were 
clear and precise. For many, of course, the Thesis has the added 
attraction of justifying a broad view of unilateral presidential power in 
foreign affairs. This aspect of the Thesis has helped attract adherents 
going back at least to Alexander Hamilton. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that this presidentialist orientation currently attracts 
advocates in an era in which the nation's security faces threats that 
create pressure for sure and swift response. 
History, especially constitutional history, may at times be elegant 
as well, but it is rarely so simple. As a description of what the 
Founding generation intended, understood, or meant, both the 
Vesting Clause Thesis and the broad view of executive power 
essentialism on which it rests are untenable. European political theory 
offers support for these views that is at best vague and overstated. A 
closer examination reveals that the leading theorists wrestled with 
specifics, disagreed among themselves, and in some cases reached 
what to modern expectations are surprising conclusions. The practices 
of the Washington Administration likewise offer some support, if not 
so much for the Vesting Clause Thesis expressly, at least for the idea 
of broad presidential power in foreign affairs. Yet it was precisely 
when such practices ventured beyond a plausible basis in specific text 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 329-50 (1803) (stating that "[t]he powers, or more 
properly, the duties, of the president of the United States, are various and extensive; though 
happily abridged of many others, which are considered as inseparable from the executive 
authority in monarchies: of these last, we have had frequent occasion to notice such as are 
transferred by the constitution to the congress of the United States; and of those which are 
assigned to the president," and then analyzing only Article II's specific grants of power). 
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that they ran into substantial opposition. Most of all, neither the 
Vesting Clause Thesis nor executive power essentialism find any 
significant support - and indeed, barely any plausible mention - in 
the materials on which originalists typically rely - that is, materials 
from the Founding and from the experiences of the national and state 
governments in the years leading to the Founding. To the contrary, 
these materials make clear what the Constitution's text suggests: the 
Founders settled upon a specific, and in certain regards 
unprecedented, set of executive powers by listing them in Article II. 
To the extent that the phrase "executive Power" conveyed any widely 
understood independent meaning, it encompassed simply a power to 
execute the laws. 
Neither the Vesting Clause Thesis, nor executive power 
essentialism, provide the only arguments that can be made for broad 
presidential power in foreign relations. It is arguable, for example, that 
the President's delegated powers should be construed liberally to 
account for the changing and unanticipated responsibilities of his 
office. It is also arguable that the President has acquired constitutional 
powers not specified in Article II by virtue of the longstanding 
practices and interactions of the political branches. Indeed, it may be 
difficult to justify some features of modern foreign relations law, such 
as congressional-executive agreements and certain presidential 
authorizations of military force, on any other basis.690 We do not, 
therefore, take a position here on the scope of the President's modern 
foreign affairs authority. Our goal, rather, is to put to rest one 
especially sweeping claim that typically appeals to history, but in fact 
lacks any substantial historical basis. In this way we hope to have 
cleared the path for a more nuanced and constitutionally defensible 
approach to the topic of presidential power, whether the approach 
rests on text, structure, custom, political theory, or indeed, history. 
690. Prakash and Ramsey simply beg the question of how the Constitution should be 
interpreted when they assert that reliance on post-constitutional practice or other nontextual 
materials involves "giv[ing] up on the Constitution." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 
233. The Supreme Court has often relied on longstanding practice when interpreting the 
Constitution. Indeed, such reliance has long been thought to be the most defensible part of 
the Court's famous foreign affairs law decision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 
299 U.S. 304 (1936). See, e.g. , THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS I JUDICIAL 
ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 14-15 (1992); Sarah H. 
Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127, 
1133-34 (1999); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An 
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1973-74). 
